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This Conference Report contains a synopsis of a conference on the The 
New European Agencies held on 1-2 March 1996 by the Robert Schuman 
Centre (RSC) of the European University Institute (EUI) in Florence. The 
objective of the report is to disseminate to a wider audience the presentations 
made at the conference and the conclusions reached. It also aims to prepare the 
way for further research. Three papers presented at the conference are 
published individually in the RSC working paper series.'
The idea to study the establishment of new agencies in the EC first arose 
within the Robert Schuman Centre at the EUI as early as Autumn 1993, right 
after the Heads of State and Government of the European Union decided on the 
location of the seats of certain bodies and departments of the European 
Communities.2 This research project on the European Agencies is linked both 
to various long-term RSC research programmes (for example, on EU 
Regulatory Policy Making) as well as to specific RSC research projects (for 
example, Reform o f the European Institutions,3 EU Competition Policy*, 
Integrating Scientific Expertise into Regulatory Decision-Making5) which have 
been conducted in the form of conferences, round tables or workshops.
The project on the new European Agencies is based not only on pure 
academic interest, but also on practical questions, such as how the heads of the 
agencies launched their organisations and how the already existing Community 
institutions complement the creation of these new EC agencies. Furthermore, 
we assume that the establishment of new EC agencies in various policy areas 
will be an ongoing process, and therefore a comparative and inductive approach 
is necessary to correctly understand their function within the Community’s 
political system.
1 Karl-Heinz Ladeur, The European Environment Agency and Prospects for a European 
Network o f Environmental Administrations. EUI Working Paper, Robert Schuman Centre No. 
96/50.
Rod Rhodes, Reinventing Whitehall: the Agency Experiment. EUI Working Paper, Robert 
Schuman Centre No. 96/51.
Martin Shapiro, Independent Agencies: US and EU. Jean Monnet Chair Papers No. 34,
Robert Schuman Centre, EUI.
2 OJ C323, 30 November 1993, p. 1.
3 Club de Florence: Europe: L'impossible Statu Quo, Paris, Stock, 1996.
4 A workshop on The Implementation o f Antitrust Rules in a “ Federal" Context was 
organised by Prof. Claus-Dieter Ehlermann at the European University Institute on 19-20 
April 1996.
5 The workshop on Integrating Scientific Expertise into Regulatory Decision-Making was 
organised by Christian Joerges and Karl-Heinz Ladeur at the European University Institute on 
5-7 October 1995. The contributions to this workshop are published in the EUI Working 



























































































The New European Agencies
The main focus of this conference was on three aspects: first, the 
conference explored the politics of institutional design and examined 
institutional development to date; second, it focused on reasons for establishing 
agencies in other jurisdictions, such as in Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom 
and the United States, and the respective experience of these organisations, 
and; third it focused on future prospects and the consequences that may flow 
from the establishment of EC agencies. The participants of this conference 
reflected different approaches as might have been expected given their diverse 
backgrounds. They included: academic experts, some working on the European 
Union and others on the agency model in different national contexts; EC 
representatives from the European Parliament, the Commission and the 
Council, as well as the Heads of five of the new EC agencies.
Clearly, this conference took place at an early stage in the development 
of the agencies. Some of the eight new agencies were still not operational; the 
Office of Harmonisation, for example, was opened one month after this 
conference. Nevertheless, the willingness of those invited to participate and 
their contributions and general discussions clearly demonstrated that, even at 
this stage, an exchange of ideas and experiences is not only useful but also 
critical to the future development of the agencies. It has also allowed the RSC 
and researchers at the EUI to study this new development right from its 
inception.
As financial constraints restricted the number of participants, delegates 
from only five agencies could be invited. These five6 were chosen because of a 
conviction that these particular agencies represent a good example of the range 
of different functions that the present ten agencies7 are supposed to fulfill. The 
RSC also greatly appreciated the participation of each of the main Community 
institutions, with opinions being provided by the Budget Rapporteur of the EP 
for the 1997 financial year, the Secretariat General of the Commission, and the 
Legal Service of the Secretariat of the Council.
Overall, the key to the success of the conference, as a number of 
participants remarked, was not only that it brought together experts from 
various fields, but also that it helped to foster communication, clear-up
6 The European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction, Lisbon; the European 
Agency for the Evaluation for Medicinal Products, London; the European Training 
Foundation, Turin; the European Environment Agency, Kopenhagen; the Office for 
Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Design), Alicante.
1 The other five are: the European Agency for Safety and Health at Work, Bilbao; the 
Translation Centre for bodies of the European Union, Luxembourg; the Community Plant 
Variety Office, no site yet found; European Centre for the Development of Vocational 





























































































misunderstandings and misconceptions and elaborate the present situation, as 
well as enabling representatives to discuss future actions. The Conference 
organisers at the RSC were very pleased that the participants found that this 
conference on The New European Agencies achieved its objectives.
This Conference Report is divided into four parts. It begins with the 
opening paper by Professor Giandomenico Majone, who presented some 
general questions which resurfaced throughout the various sessions of the 
conference. While this paper focuses in particular on agencies having mainly an 
information function, it also emphasises that debates on European agencies 
should not rely only on the distinction between providing information and 
making policy, but must also pay attention to issues of independence, 
accountability, credibility and networking.
The second part of the report comprises the presentations by the Heads of 
Agencies and Community institution representatives. All five agency directors 
were asked to begin with a description of the initial idea to create each 
respective agency, and to go on to address the various interests of the actors 
involved, and to highlight legal and political obstacles to achieving their 
objectives. After this focus on policy design, the directors were asked then to 
describe the subsequent launching of the agencies, through implementation of 
the provisions of the respective regulations establishing their agency. 
Additionally, they were asked to outline the difficulties the agencies had 
encountered at their inception, potential constraints, as well as future 
perspectives. The presentations by the Agency Heads are followed by the 
statements made by the representatives from the EP, the Commission and the 
Council, who were asked to give their individual perspectives on the creation 
period, with a particular emphasis on their experiences with and future lines of 
development concerning the new EC agencies.
The third part of this Conference Report comprises case studies on 
national experiences with respect to agencies in Italy, Germany, and the US.8 
The speakers first address the reasons for establishing agencies and the 
problems that were encounted along the way, and they then discuss their 
relevance to the European venture. Each speaker was asked to focus on a 
particular issue. In the German case, the difficulties of establishing a body, that 
falls between a scientific and administrative body were examined; in the Italian 
case, the relationship between agencies, political parties and the parliament was 
addressed; in the British case, the issue of accountability was explored; and in 
the US case, the issue of coordinating a number of agencies was considered.
The fourth part provides a conference synopsis in which the various 
contributions are partly compared and which considers a number of key points 
raised during the conference discussions. The summary points to the need for
8 The contribution by Professor Rod Rhodes on executive agencies in the UK is published as 




























































































The New European Agencies
additional research on EC agencies. The annexes comprise the list of 

































































































N E W  A G E N C IE S  IN  T H E  E C : R E G U L A T IO N  B Y  
IN F O R M A T IO N
Giandomenico MAJONE
1. The Main Thesis
It hardly needs repeating that public policy is increasingly dependent on 
relevant, timely and especially credible information. This is particularly true in 
the area of economic and social regulation where the policy-maker is often faced 
with problems at the frontier of scientific and technical knowledge. The main 
thesis of this paper goes beyond this obvious observation, to claim that the role of 
information in contemporary policy-making is not only instrumental but also 
constitutive. In other words, information is not only a necessary input into the 
policy process; under some conditions, information constitutes policy. In this 
sense I speak of "regulation by information": meaning that the provision of 
information and evidence may be usefully seen as a mode of regulation - 
alternative to other more coercive modes - rather than merely as a prerequisite for 
sound regulatory decisions.
2. Coercion vs Policy Credibility: the Big Trade-Off
The claim that information may in itself constitute policy rather than being 
merely instrumental, sounds odd only because we are accustomed to see in the 
legitimate use of coercion the essential characteristic of governmental activity. In 
the words of Theodore Lowi, "while governments can rarely if ever perform any 
function that a nongovernmental institution cannot also perform, 
govemmentalisation of a function - that is passing a public policy - is sought 
because the legitimacy of its sanctions makes its social controls more surely 
effective". Before examining in more detail the constitutive function of 
information, I shall indicate why the traditional view of policy-making as been 
ultimately based on coercion, no longer corresponds to the reality of policy 
making in the contemporary world. Increasing interdependence and policy 
complexity are changing the nature of the trade-off between coercion and 



























































































The New European Agencies
3. The Changing Nature of Policy-Making
Several factors are slowly but surely changing the nature of policy-making 
at the national, supranational and international levels.
First, growing economic, financial, ecological and political 
interdependence among nations has the effect of weakening the impact of policy 
actions on the home country, while potentially strengthening their impact on 
other countries. National policy is increasingly projected outside the national 
border, but it can achieve its objectives there only if it is credible. As already 
suggested, at the national level, there is (or at least there used to be) a trade-off 
between coercion and credibility: even a nearly worthless currency can be made a 
legal tender by legislative fiat, but, of course, only inside national borders. 
Similarly, a policy lacking credibility may, up to a point, be enforced by coercive 
means, but, again, only domestically and only at the price of a significant 
increase in the costs of implementation. This increased openness of the national 
border changes the nature of the trade-off by making it impossible or very costly 
to use coercive power as a substitute for policy credibility.
Second, the growing complexity of public policy continues to erode the 
effectiveness of the traditional command-and-control techniques of government 
bureaucracy. Until fairly recently, most of the tasks undertaken by national 
governments were simple enough to be organised along classical bureaucratic 
lines. Once a programme was enacted, the details of its operations could be 
formulated and appropriate commands issued by highly centralised command 
centres. In contrast, the single most important characteristic of the newer form of 
economic and social regulation is that its success depends on affecting the 
attitudes, expectations, consumption habits or production patterns of millions of 
individuals and hundreds of thousands of firms and local units of government. 
The tasks are difficult not only because they deal with technologically 
complicated matters but even more because they aim ultimately at modifying 
individual behaviour. In this situation, information and persuasion become 
essential resources of policy-makers.
4. Insights from Policy Analysis
Much recent research on the dynamics of policy-making recognizes the 
constitutive role of information and analysis. Objective conditions are seldom so 
compelling and so unambiguous that they set the policy agenda or dictate the 
appropriate conceptualization. For example, in the 1950's, the issue of poverty 




























































































Giandomenico Majone: New Agencies in the EC: Regulation by Information
change in the actual distribution of income, it became a significant part of public 
policies. What had changed were attitudes and views on poverty, and beliefs in 
the capacity of government to find solutions to social problems. A similar 
example is provided by the pollution control laws of the early 1970's. This 
legislation was significantly influenced by a theory of "agency capture", 
according to which vague statutory language was a cause of the capture of 
regulatory agencies by business. The proposed remedy was statutes that have 
clear goals, set fixed deadlines for achieving them, and empower citizen groups 
to take slow-moving agencies to court. The final result of the combined efforts of 
researchers and activists was a radical resetting of norms relating to 
environmental and health protection.
In sum, one of the major insights of recent policy research is that public 
problems are "socially constructed" rather than objectively given. This is not to 
say that policy is determined by cognitive factors rather than by interests. The 
point is, rather, that interests are revealed in the process of translating an issue 
into a policy problem.
5. Information and Soft Law
The parallel between regulation by information and "soft law" is 
particularly instructive. The tertiary rules on "soft law" of the EU are increasingly 
important and appear in a number of guises: resolutions, declarations, action 
programmes, deliberations, memoranda, guidelines and so on. Soft law 
provisions may not be directly effective but they can give rise to indirect legal 
effects. Even where soft law lacks legal effects, items such as resolutions and 
recommendations can make a subject a matter of Community concern and hence 
may remove it from the domestic jurisdiction of the member states (see, for 
example, the ERTA case).
Just as information may represent a non-coercive mode of regulation, so 
Community soft law offers a less formal alternative to regulations, directives and 
decisions and may prove particularly attractive where there is resistance to 
secondary legislation. It may indeed be the case, as Robert Baldwin has 
observed, that informal Community action proves feasible where secondary 
legislation would be politically impossible. Even when this is not the case, the 
use of soft law may still be advisable in order to offer member states a higher 
level of flexibility in implementation than would be offered even by a 
directive.The following historical example provides additional insights into the 




























































































The New European Agencies
6. The American "Sunshine Commission"
The American regulatory state is best known abroad for its powerful 
regulatory bodies - the independent regulatory commission (IRCs) - but in US 
administrative history one can find also a weaker version, termed "sunshine 
commission" because of its reliance on what McGraw has called "regulation by 
publication", that is, on disclosure and public information. The outstanding 
example is the Massachusetts Board of Railroad Commissioners created in 1869.
This commission issued no orders that the regulated industry was legally 
bound to obey, except for orders to produce information. Sometimes the board 
also specified the form the information had to take. For example, the agency 
often required railroads to submit data in standard accounting forms that would 
facilitate comparative statistical analysis of different companies.
The informal approach to regulation followed by the Massachusetts Board 
amounted to a reversal of the state's traditional railroad policy, which had 
produced a number of stringent laws that everyone then ignored. The Board, by 
foregoing the role of adversary, avoided the embarrassing impotence of early 
statutory regulations and also avoided the troublesome question of 
constitutionality in the delegation of legislative power to agency discretion. 
Charles F. Adams, the first chairman of the Board, was convinced that in some 
cases "regulation by publication" was a sufficient form of control; in others, it 
was preferable to badly designed or poorly implemented statutory regulation or 
to forms of self-regulation not sufficiently open to public scrutiny.
The model of the sunshine commission was rejected by an increasingly 
interventionist federal government, but it is interesting to note that some of the 
most successful regulatory bodies rely, at least to some extent, on "regulation by 
publication”. The best example is the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC). Nearly all American business executives are familiar with the commission 
because of the reporting requirements it enforces. These include the public 
disclosure of detailed information about their companies as well as their own 
salaries and perquisites. Recently, American firms have also been required to 
inform the SEC about prospective environmental liabilities, for example, for 
cleaning up contaminated land.
7. Independence and Credibility
Information can affect expectations and behaviour only if it is credible. As 




























































































Giandomenico Majone: New Agencies in the EC: Regulation hy Information
importance in direct proportion to the difficulty of enforcing policy by coercive 
means. However, credibility is problematic for elected politicians and for 
bureaucratic agencies under their direct control. In part, this is because, in a 
democracy, political executives tend to have shorter time horizons than their 
counterparts in the private sector, so the efficacy of reputational mechanisms is 
more limited in the political sphere. Moreover, a legislature cannot bind a 
subsequent legislature and a majority coalition cannot bind another so that public 
policies are always vulnerable to reneging and hence lack credibility.
One important way of solving the credibility problem is to delegate policy­
making powers to some independent body. In fact, the recent willingness of 
politicians to delegate regulatory powers to agencies distinct from government 
itself is best understood as a means whereby governments can commit 
themselves to regulatory strategies that would not be credible in the absence of 
such delegation. As I have argued elsewhere, also the massive transfer of 
regulatory powers to the European institutions can be explained in the same way: 
inter-governmental agreements lack credibility because it is difficult for the 
parties concerned to know whether or not the agreements are properly kept.
8. Networking
Delegation may not be sufficient to ensure credibility. If politicians can 
violate agency independence with impunity, the national and international 
credibility of the agency remains open to doubt. Therefore additional 
mechanisms may be needed to strengthen the resolve of the agency to defend its 
own independence. Networking is one such mechanism. An agency which sees 
itself as part of an international network of institutions pursuing similar 
objectives and facing analogous problems, rather than as a new and often 
marginal addition to a huge central bureaucracy, is more motivated to resist 
political pressures. This is because the agency executives have an incentive to 
maintain their reputation in the eyes of their counterparts in other countries. A 
politically motivated decision would compromise their international credibility 
and make cooperation more difficult to achieve in the future.
Professional associations of regulators working in the same policy area 
have been in existence for many decades in the United States and Canada. 
Regulatory networks are beginning to develop also at the international level, for 
example, the International Organisation of Securities Commissions (IOSCO). In 
the European Union, the Commission's Competition Directorate has recently 




























































































The New European Agencies
competition statute applied throughout the EU by a network including DG IV 
itself, national competition authorities, and national courts.
There is no reason why the network model could not be extended to other 
areas of economic and social regulation, and indeed to all activities where mutual 
trust and reputation are the key to greater effectiveness. An example is the 
emerging pattern of coordinated partnership between Eurostat and the national 
statistical offices of the member states.
A high level of professionalisation is crucial to the viability of the network 
model. Professionals are oriented by goals, standards of conduct, cognitive 
beliefs, and career opportunities that derive from their professional community, 
giving them strong reasons for resisting interference and directions from political 
outsiders.
9. Agency Independence and Accountability
A basic principal of democratic theory is that governmental policy ought 
to be subject to control only by persons accountable to the electorate. 
Independent agencies seem to violate this principle. The technocrats who head 
such agencies are appointed, not elected, officials, yet they yield considerable 
power. How is the exercise of that power to be democratically controlled?
The tendency to assume that independence and accountability are mutually 
exclusive is largely due to the conventional view of control as "self-conscious 
oversight, on the basis of authority, by defined individuals or offices endowed 
with formal rights or duties to inquire, call for changes in behaviour and to 
punish". For the highly technical and discretionary activities delegated to 
independent agencies, a more appropriate notion of control is one which 
Christopher Hood has called "interpolable balance": a view of control that takes 
as its starting point a need to identify self-policing mechanisms which are already 
present in the system, and can contemplate a network of complementary and 
overlapping checking mechanisms instead of assuming that control is necessarily 
to be exercised from any fixed place in the system.
In other words, expert independent agencies can be monitored and kept 
democratically accountable only by a combination of control instruments: clear 
and limited objectives; reason-giving requirements; professional principals and 
peer review; judicial review (where appropriate) and public participation (again, 
where appropriate). Legislative and executive oversight are not, of course, 




























































































Giandomenico Majone: New Agencies in the EC: Regulation by Information
authorities should be firmly resisted. When such a multi-pronged system of 
controls works properly, no one controls the agency, yet the agency is "under 
control".
10. Conclusions
1 have argued that "regulation by information" should be viewed as an 
alternative, and in some respects more promising, mode of regulation than the 
traditional command-and -control approach. The intellectual challenge is to 
determine the optimal mix of "soft" and "hard" regulatory instruments.
If this view is correct, then the current debate about the new European 
agencies is misleading to the extent that it relies on an artificial, and by now 
outdated, distinction between providing information and making policy.
I have emphasised that information can affect expectations and trigger 
concrete regulatory measures only if it is credible. Independence is necessary to 
ensure credibility, but it raises serious issues of democratic accountability. In 
turn, independence and accountability may be reconciled only if we move 
beyond traditional, one-dimensional views of control. The future of regulation by 
information, and hence of the European agencies, will depend, at least in part, on 




























































































PART I : THE EMERGENCE OF EC AGENCIES AND THEIR 
FUNCTIONNING
A. Presentations by the Heads of Agencies
1. George Estievenart, The European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug 
Addiction, Lisbon
2. Fernand Sauer, The European Agency for the Evaluation of Medicinal 
Products, London
3. Domingo Jimenez-Beltran, The European Environment Agency, 
Copenhagen
4. Peter de Rooij, The European Training Foundation, Turin
5. Jean-Claude Combaldieu, The Office for Harmonisation of the Internal 
Market, Alicante
B. Statements by Representatives of the European Union Institutions
1. Niels Ahrendt, Secretariat-General, European Commission
2. Antonio Sacchettini, Directeur au Service juridique du Conseil
3. Laurens Jan Brinkhorst, Member of the European Parliament, General 



























































































L ’O B S E R V A T O I R E  E U R O P E E N  D E S  D R O G U E S  E T  D E S  
T O X IC O M A N IE S
Georges ESTIEVENART, Directeur
Mesdames et Messieurs, dans le temps qui m’est prêté, je vais essayer 
effectivement de vous tracer en contrepoint l’évolution de la mise en place de 
cet Observatoire européen des drogues et des toxicomanies, en suivant la 
démarche qui nous a été proposée, en trois parties: d’abord essayer de rappeler 
les raisons qui ont conduit à la création de cette agence communautaire; 
ensuite, les problèmes et les objectifs de sa mise en marche et de sa mise en 
fonction; et puis je terminerai sur quelques affirmations - et quelques 
interrogations aussi - sur les perspectives d’avenir de cette agence, et peut-être 
des agences en général au niveau de la Communauté Européenne.
Quelles sont les raisons qui ont amené l’Union Européenne à décider la 
mise en place d’un Observatoire européen des drogues et des toxicomanies ? La 
principale raison tient au fait que récemment, les Etats-membres de l’Union 
Européenne, et l’Union Européenne, se sont trouvé confrontés sur ce sujet de la 
drogue, à une contradiction importante. Contradiction importante entre les 
objectifs de politique générale économique mise en place par l’Union, et en 
particulier la mise en place du marché unique, et les conséquences que cette 
mise en place pouvait avoir dans un domaine social sensible comme l’est celui 
de la consommation et du trafic de drogue en Europe. Cela situe donc tout de 
suite le moment dans l’Histoire où la question a commencé à se poser 
sérieusement: nous sommes à la fin des années 1980, très exactement en 1988- 
1989, on a dans la ligne de mire l’abolition des frontières dans la Communauté 
européenne et on n’a pas de réponse du tout au niveau européen au problème de 
la drogue. Ce problème, alors qu’on est en train de démobiliser les frontières, 
est encore considéré par tous comme un problème exclusivement national, c’est 
à dire complètement encadré dans les frontières de chacun de nos pays, qu’on 
est justement en train de faire disparaître. C’est donc une contradiction de taille. 
Bien sûr, il s’agit en outre d’un sujet qui n’est ni simple ni linéaire. Il n’existe 
pas de réponse monolithique ou monocéphale, ou monopolitique, au problème 
de la drogue. La lutte contre la drogue, c’est toujours un cocktail très difficile à 
établir et à coordonner entre des actions d’une part de type répressif. D’autre 
part, ce sont des mesures de santé publique destinées à tenter d’apporter des 
remèdes aux phénomènes de la toxicomanie et aux toxicomanes. Enfin, 
progressivement, ces dernières années, on a eu aussi recours à des mesures de 
santé publique qui se situent plus en amont et qui visent à tenter de prévenir la 
toxicomanie. Voilà le sujet complexe devant lequel se trouvent les douze Etats- 



























































































The New European Agencies
Alors comment l’idée d’une agence a-t-elle émergé ? Je crois que c’est 
intéressant - c’est un peu anecdotique, mais cela ne manque pas d’intérêt. 
L'origine de cet Observatoire, la première fois où le nom même a été sinon 
prononcé, du moins écrit, est une lettre du Président Mitterrand d’octobre 1989 
adressée aux onze autres chefs d’Etat et au Président de la Commission, qui 
justement avait pour but de commencer à articuler une réponse au malaise que 
je viens de dire. Le Président Mitterrand proposait de mettre en place un comité 
politique, au niveau coordinateur de la lutte contre la drogue dans chaque pays 
des Douze, plus la Commission, pour discuter de “qu’est-ce qu’on peut faire 
ensemble?” dans le paysage juridique qu’on avait à l’époque, qui était 
évidemment assez pauvre. L’une des mesures - c’était la seule mesure concrète 
d’ailleurs, mise à part la mise en place d’un comité - était d’envisager la 
création d’un observatoire européen de la drogue. Cette idée d’observatoire 
européen nous a paru dès le début une idée intéressante pour de multiples 
raisons. La première raison, c’est que, s’agissant d’un observatoire européen, il 
devait être par essence transversal, c’est à dire il devait observer l’Europe dans 
tous les sens: Nord-Sud, Est-Ouest, et dans toutes les dimensions du problème, 
dans la globalité du problème de la drogue, aussi bien les problèmes liés à la 
consommation des drogues, à l’abus des drogues, que les problèmes liés à son 
trafic. En y incluant d’ailleurs un aspect extrêmement important aussi, qui est la 
dimension externe, mondiale, parce que le problème de la drogue n’est pas 
seulement un problème européen, c’est un problème global à l’échelle de la 
planète. La dimension des relations entre l’Union Européenne et le monde 
entier - mais spécialement l’Amérique du Nord et l’Amérique Latine, pour des 
raisons différentes - était évidemment un aspect prioritaire.
A la Commission, nous avons lancé un processus de faisabilité de cet 
observatoire européen. Nous avons décidé de procéder à une consultation de 
chaque Etat-membre sur ce qu’il pensait que pourrait et devrait être un 
observatoire européen des drogues. Autrement dit, au lieu de réfléchir, soit dans 
un bureau de la Commission à Bruxelles, soit dans une officine d’un bureau 
d’études auquel on aurait délégué cette tâche - nous avons décidé au contraire 
de mobiliser un petit groupe de fonctionnaires et d’experts pour aller 
“interviewer” en quelque sorte les quinze Etats-membres - enfin c’était les 
douze à l’époque. Nous avons constaté que pratiquement les Douze avaient 
plus ou moins la même vision de ce que pourrait être une agence de ce type. Il a 
été constaté qu’il y avait au fond une espèce de consensus caché, ignoré, de 
tous sur la nature et les fonctions d’une telle agence, d’un tel observatoire. On 
s’est mis finalement assez rapidement d’accord sur le fond, mais on est entré 
très vite dans un autre débat - qui a été mentionné ici tout à l’heure - qui était le 
débat: “oui mais, quelle formule institutionnelle donner à un tel observatoire ?” 




























































































Georges Estievenart: L'Observatoire Européen des Drogues et des Toxicomanies
Une option très classique à la Commission qui eût consisté à établir un 
service spécialisé à la Commission à ce sujet. La Commission n’a pas choisi 
cette option, parce que, premièrement, nous étions toujours dans une situation 
de pénurie juridique, en termes de compétence, de la Communauté et par 
conséquent de la Commission, sur le sujet; que nous étions face à un problème 
extrêmement complexe, supposant évidemment une vision et une expertise 
technique que la Commission n’a pas, sur cette question. Il aurait donc fallu 
aller recruter à l’extérieur des personnes pour y faire face. Mais aussi bien sûr, 
il n’y avait certainement pas de consensus au niveau des Etats-membres pour 
que cette solution soit finalement choisie.
Alors le vrai débat a plutôt porté entre l’option intergouvemementale et 
l’option agence communautaire.
L’option intergouvemementale, soutenue fermement et activement par 
quelques Etats-membres, avait tout de même un inconvénient : elle avait déjà 
fait l’objet d’un premier essai. On avait déjà en 1971 créé au sein du Conseil de 
l’Europe ce qu’on appelle “le Groupe Pompidou”, qui était précisément un 
organisme qui avait un peu les mêmes intentions mais qui, du fait des structures 
de l’Europe et du fait des moyens mis à sa disposition, n’a jamais pu parvenir à 
être un espèce de phare sur le problème de la drogue en Europe, même si 
nombre de ses travaux sont considérés comme essentiels pour nous 
aujourd’hui.
Et donc finalement on a pu réaliser un consensus sur la création d’une 
agence de droit communautaire, et on a demandé à la Commission à ce 
moment-là de faire une proposition - je crois en 1991 - et cette proposition a été 
faite début 1992 et a été négociée jusqu’au mois de février 1992, où le 
réglement a finalement été adopté à l’unanimité par le Conseil, puisque basé sur 
l’article 235 du Traité. Pour quelles raisons a-t-on fait finalement ce grand pas, 
si on le met en perspective avec le cadre juridique pré-existant ? C’est que 
l’absence d’information, c’est aussi une politique. Donc décider de faire de 
l’information, ce n’est pas neutre politiquement, c’est décider d’apporter de la 
vérité sur un sujet, c’est-à-dire décider que la décision politique pourra moins 
se faire à l’avenir sans référence aux réalités présentées par un système 
d’information qui fonctionne plus ou moins correctement.
Je passe à une deuxième étape; la mise en marche. Depuis 1993, nous 
avions donc la base juridique pour travailler; il nous fallait encore un siège 
(c’est un problème général pour les agences). Nous avons été fixés à la fin de 
l’année 1993, et c’est à Lisbonne que cet observatoire a été installé. Nous avons 
donc depuis 1994 commencé à mettre en place la structure. Je passe vite là- 
dessus parce que c’est une structure extrêmement classique: nous avons un 
conseil d’administration où sont maintenant représentés les quinze Etats- 
membres, plus deux représentants de la Commission européenne, plus deux 




























































































The New European Agencies
évidemment un peu différent de ce qu’il peut être dans une organisation 
intergouvemementale, d’une part, ou dans une structure purement 
communautaire d’autre part. Du point de vue du personnel, nous démarrons 
petits: nous sommes aujourd’hui trente personnes tout compris, des agents 
temporaires avec un contrat de cinq ans, renouvelable - trente personnes en 
1996, nous serons trente-sept en 1997. Le budget actuel de cette année: six 
millions d’ECUs. Du point de vue du personnel, nous avons une structure que 
je qualifierais de duale: d’une part, un staff administratif qui est chargé bien sûr 
de gérer les procédures communautaires (si l’on parle d’indépendance ou 
d’autonomie des agences, il faudra s’interroger là-dessus), les procédures 
communautaires qui nous sont pratiquement transférées sur bien des points: 
contrôle financier par exemple, le contrôleur financier de l’Observatoire, 
comme des autres agences, c’est le contrôleur financier de la Commission; la 
gestion du personnel se fait selon le statut du personnel des Communautés 
européennes. Mais la partie plus intéressante, c’est l’autre partie, c’est le staff 
scientifique. L’Observatoire est supposé devenir le centre d’excellence 
européen en matière de mesure technique du phénomène de la drogue en 
Europe. C’est très intéressant parce qu’il n’existait pas auparavant de structures 
établies en Europe où des experts et des scientifiques puissent travailler sur la 
durée - parce qu’il faut de la durée pour pouvoir mettre en place un système 
d’information sur le phénomène des drogues et des toxicomanies. L’agence 
communautaire le permet : elle a un budget en principe stable, elle a une 
structure de personnel en principie stable et aussi un personnel scientifique qui 
se met en place maintenant et qui va apporter la qualité de l’information qui 
manque jusqu’à présent.
Il y a un autre élément qui me paraît tout à fait décisif aussi dans la 
structure de cette agence, et c’est une plus-value énorme par rapport aux 
prédécesseurs, aux précurseurs (le Groupe Pompidou du Conseil de l’Europe), 
ce sont les courroies de transmission vers les niveaux de la prise de décision 
politique de l’Union. Le mandat de l’Observatoire européen, c’est de fournir 
aux Etats-membres et aux institutions de l’Union une base d’information fiable, 
comparable - fiable, comparable, pour parvenir à une prise de décisions 
politiques plus rationnelles dans le domaine de la drogue. Une autre plus-value 
de départ de cette agence, c’est que justement elle n’est pas du tout appelée à 
fonctionner comme un institut. Elle est surtout appelée à fonctionner comme un 
animateur, ce qui correspond bien d’ailleurs à la petite taille de son staff, au 
départ en tout cas, comme un animateur d’un réseau d’observatoires nationaux 
sur la drogue. Et cela, c’est pratiquement l’objectif majeur, de mon point de 
vue, de l’Observatoire européen. Je vais vous raconter pour illustrer cela une 
seconde anecdote, qui montre bien le lien entre le scientifique, le technique et 
le politique dans la mise en place d’une agence européenne. En fait l’idée de 
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puisqu’elle avait été présentée par le Président Mitterrand. Cela a été transféré 
et proposé au niveau européen. Mais seulement en France, à cette époque-là, on 
essayait tout de même de créer un observatoire français, et on n’y est pas arrivé. 
La France a abandonné ce projet et a eu l’idée de mettre cela dans une 
proposition au niveau européen. Au niveau européen, nous avons pu 
progresser. Et maintenant, l’année dernière, l’Observatoire européen étant en 
place, au niveau français on est revenu à l’attaque: il fallait bien trouver une 
contrepartie nationale à cet Observatoire européen. Cette fois on a trouvé le 
moyen au niveau national de créer un observatoire français, de lui donner un 
statut juridique autonome, de l’accrocher bien entendu à l’Observatoire 
européen et cette structure mise en place sur ce sujet l’année dernière en France 
a vaillament passé le changement de gouvernement et est restée stable, il n’y a 
pas eu de changement de statut ni de personnes. Et cela, me semble-t-il, dans le 
domaine de la drogue c’est essentiel. Donc si nous arrivons, petit à petit, à 
entraîner une certaine stabilité du travail, à laquelle s’ajouterait la qualité 
technique, je crois que nous aurons en grande partie rempli notre mandat.
Un autre point important pour nous, c’est d’avoir rapidement une 
visibilité, et derrière la visibilité, la crédibilité. Comme nous ne sommes pas 
encore crédibles, nous avons choisi pour l’instant de ne pas être visibles. Nous 
allons devoir progresser un peu vers la visibilité dans les mois qui viennent. Il 
aurait fallu pouvoir dire ... - j ’aurais aimé pouvoir dire: “donnez-moi trois ans, 
ne me demandez rien pendant trois ans, revenez dans trois ans et vous aurez 
peut-être une machine qui fonctionne à peu près bien. Parce que la mobilisation 
des points focaux nationaux, c’est quelque chose considérable et qui ne peut 
pas produire immédiatement. Tout de même, nous avons trouvé des compromis, 
bien sûr, et nous avons engagé nos points focaux nationaux dans un exercice 
périlleux qui est la rédaction de notre premier rapport annuel sur le phénomène 
de la drogue en Europe. Notre réglement prévoit que chaque année, nous 
publions un document sur ce phénomène de la drogue en Europe, et donc nous 
allons devoir sortir au milieu de cette année le premier de ces rapports. Ce ne 
sera évidemment pas encore un tableau de bord comme nous l’envisagions 
avons en tête, un tableau de bord sur l’extension du phénomène de la drogue, la 
mesure du phénomène, son évolution, les interrogations entre les Etats, etc., 
cela ne pourra pas être cela tout de suite, mais ce sera déjà, je pense, un bon 
atlas du système de travail, et dans le domaine politique, et dans le domaine 
technique, de l’information des Etats-membres sur le problème de la drogue.
Le travail en réseau était probablement une garantie de l’autonomie, 
relative mais enfin une garantie de l’autonomie et de l’indépendance des 
agences. C’est tout à fait vrai, c’est ce que nous expérimentons aussi: nous, 
nous avons à trouver la quadrature du cercle dans ce domaine, ce que personne 
n’a réussi jusqu’à présent. C’est d’une part être de bons amis avec les 
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compris le précurseur, le prédécesseur, le Groupe Pompidou du Conseil de 
l’Europe. Jusqu’à présent nous avons six organisations avec lesquelles nous 
devons coopérer étroitement: le programme des Nations Unies sur la drogue, 
qui est installé à Vienne, le Groupe Pompidou du Conseil de l’Europe à 
Strasbourg, l’Organisation Mondiale de la Santé à Genève (et son bureau 
Europe, à Copenhague), Interpol, l’Organisation Mondiale des Douanes, et - 
surtout peut-être - Europol, l’Unité Drogues d’Europol. Mais nous avons un 
autre exercice assez redoutable à tenter : l’ouverture de cet Observatoire aux 
institutions publiques, mais aussi privées, y compris les organisations non 
gouvernementales, de recherche qui ont un mot à dire en termes techniques sur 
le problème de la drogue et sur l’information sur la drogue en Europe. Pour cela 
nous avons lancé un appel à travers le Journal Officiel des Communautés 
Européennes, et nous avons maintenant identifié un nombre assez considérable 
de partenaires avec lesquels nous allons développer notre programme de 
travail, donc à qui nous allons confier certaines des tâches qui font partie de 
notre programme de travail.
Je ne peux pas finir sans parler des perspectives d’avenir. On peut se 
poser un certain nombre de questions. Premièrement: un des objectifs de fond 
que nous avons dû fixer au départ, c’était l’objectif de la globalité de 
l’observation du problème de la drogue, incluant l’épidémiologie (c’est à dire la 
mesure scientifique et pratiquement arithmétique de la consommation), mais 
aussi les législations, les politiques de lutte contre la drogue (nous avons à faire 
un bilan de ces politiques et même à faire une évaluation - on commence à nous 
demander de faire de l’évaluation des politiques de réduction de la demande de 
drogue ; lorsqu’on fait de l’évaluation des politiques, on n’est vraiment plus 
très loin de la politique tout court évidemment). Mais nous avons aussi les 
aspects internationaux progressivement à couvrir et nous avons les aspects plus 
proprement répressifs (en termes d’analyse, il ne s’agit pas de faire de 
l’information opérationnelle, cela c’est pour les policiers ou les douaniers, et en 
particulier c’est pour Europol), tels que le blanchiment de l’argent, les 
précurseurs chimiques; voilà des objets d’observation qui sont inscrits dans le 
réglement de l’Observatoire. Nous n’avons pas pu commencer tout cela dès le 
départ, et nous concentrons les trois premières années, jusqu’à l’année 
prochaine 1997, sur la demande de drogue et la réduction de la demande. Mais 
déjà nous travaillons, comme vous avez pu le voir, avec des partenaires qui 
nous apportent de l’information venant des autres secteurs et nous sommes déjà 
sûrs de l’information globale.
Quant aux changements de structures nationales que cela peut induire, 
l’exemple de l’observatoire français me paraît net. Tout cela doit avoir pour 
conséquence que l’information produite au plan national devienne de 
l’information responsable, et que nous ayons à Lisbonne la charge de 
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comme vous le savez, en matière de drogue, cela n’est pas un objectif simple à 
atteindre. Cela doit avoir un impact sur le fonctionnement des institutions 
européennes. Nous avons une première petite satisfaction à ce stade vraiment 
préliminaire, qui est que le Sommet de Madrid a adopté un document 
programmatique sur la lutte contre la drogue - puisqu’entre temps il y a une 
compétence communautaire sur le sujet - qui démarre sur une présentation du 
problème de la drogue en Europe, qui est une présentation conjointe entre 
l’Observatoire et l’Unité Drogues d’Europol. C’est une grande première. Cela a 
été adopté, tel quel, par les chefs d’Etat à Madrid, et nous sommes évidemment 
contents de cela mais aussi la précision et la qualité de ce document n’est pas 
encore celle que nous avons en tête. En tout cas, cela marque bien que les chefs 
de gouvernement acceptent d’utiliser leurs instruments, et n’ont pas créé ces 
instruments pour les laisser de côté.
La crédibilité, l’indépendance, le networking, je suis tout à fait d’accord avec 
cela, alors: ce que je prévois comme avenir, c’est bien sûr, à partir de 1998, la 
couverture plus globale de l’ensemble du mandat déjà défini dans le réglement. 
Au-delà de cela, je ne suis pas du tout impatient ou - comment dire? - ambitieux 
- dans le sens de “est-ce qu’on ne va pas avoir un rôle de proposition de 
décisions politiques, voire même de gestion de certains morceaux de politique 
de lutte contre la drogue ?”, je ne crois pas que ce soit souhaitable, parce que je 
suis convaincu que l’information est le premier élément de la politique, et que 
si nous n’avons pas un instrument fiable dans ce domaine-là, ce n’est pas la 
peine de penser à une prise de décision rationelle en matière de drogue en 
Europe dans les années qui viennent. Donc, c’est vraiment sur cette institution 




























































































E U R O P E A N  M E D IC IN E S  E V A L U A T IO N  A G E N C Y  : S T A T U S
R E P O R T
Fernand SAUER, Executive Director
I. The New European Registration System for Medicinal Products
The Council of the European Union adopted in 1993 the regulation and 
directives concerning the creation of two new Community authorisation 
procedures for human and veterinary medicines and the establishment of a 
European Medicines Evaluation Agency (EMEA). London was chosen as the 
seat of the Agency, and the new system for the free movement of medicinal 
products within the Community became operational in February 1995. In 
essence, these new measures are intended to promote the free circulation of 
medicinal products within the European Union, while reinforcing the protection 
of public health. In particular, they should permit the rapid access of new 
products to a Community-scale market. A single evaluation of the highest 
possible scientific quality can be undertaken through the new European 
Medicines Evaluation Agency, working in close partnership with the existing 
national authorities in the Member States. The European Commission is 
responsible for enforcing EMEA's opinions through pan-European decisions.
• Choice of procedures and co-operation with national authorities
Since 1995, three registration procedures for medicinal products for human or 
veterinary use are available to pharmaceutical companies operating in Europe:
• A centralised registration procedure, reserved for innovatory medicinal 
products, and leading to a single authorisation, valid for all the Member 
States of the European Union.
• A decentralised procedure applying to the majority of other medicinal 
products, based upon the principle of mutual recognition, and covering a 
number of Member States.
• A national procedure, which after 1997 will be limited in principle to 
applications of local interest concerning a single Member State.
The support and commitment of all national authorities and of the European 



























































































The New European Agencies
smooth development of an Agency and a system in which industry can have 
confidence - as shown by some 30 new applications for the central approval of 
medicinal products received since the second half of 1995. Over two-thirds of 
these were voluntary applications which could have used alternative national 
routes for authorisation.
• Harmonised requirements, soft law and subsidiarity
Criteria and procedures for approval of human and veterinary medicines, 
together with several other important aspects of pharmaceutical legislation, 
have been extensively harmonised within the European Union. The Community 
provisions applicable to medicinal products include binding legislation 
(regulations and directives), as well as "soft law" in the form of numerous 
guidelines on the conduct of the quality, safety and efficacy studies and a 
notice to applicants describing the administrative procedures to be followed in 
order to obtain authorisation of medicinal products.
The EMEA is also responsible for the coordination of national activities with 
respect to post-marketing surveillance (pharmacovigilance), inspection and 
laboratory controls, to ensure the safety of medicinal products circulating 
within the Community. However, the actual conduct of inspections continues to 
be the responsibility of each national authority, who must supervise the 
pharmaceutical market on behalf of the whole European Union.
II. Main Achievements of the EMEA, One Year after Inauguration
• Pooling the best pharmaceutical expertise at European level
One year on from its inauguration on 26 January 1995, the EMEA and the new 
European registration system have proved the centralised procedure to be a real 
success. The Committee for Proprietary Medicinal Products (CPMP) and 
Committee for Veterinary Medicinal Products (CVMP) are fully functioning 
independent scientific committees. With this new organisation, they have also 
each created a number of permanent and ad hoc working groups. The new 
scientific emphasis of the committees’ work has been strengthened by their 
access to over 1,600 experts on the Agency’s European experts list. This list is 
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: . Binding European Decisions
Despite all the difficulties experienced in the initial setting-up of the Agency, 
13 positive Opinions have so far been adopted by the CPMP by consensus. 
These have all been transmitted to the Commission and Member States. Seven 
Opinions were transformed by the Commission into European Marketing 
Authorisations since October 1995 and more decisions are expected shortly 
from the Commission.
Following the CVMP's opinion, the Commission recently authorised a new 
veterinary vaccine. The CVMP, working against a tight deadline to fix 
maximum residue limits (MRLs) for veterinary medicinal products by the end 
of 1996, adopted some 200 recommendations for MRLs which have been or 
will be implemented in Commission Regulations.
k
Another innovation is that companies can now ask the EMEA, through its 
committees, for scientific advice long before they make an application for a 
marketing authorisation. Of the many requests received, the CPMP completed 
the examination of 8 cases, and the CVMP of one case.
• Information Technology, Transparency and International 
Co-operation
Better information for health professionals and consumers through harmonised 
Summary of Product Characteristics (SPCs) and package leaflets is a central 
part of the EMEA’s work. As part of this commitment, the Agency makes the 
scientific assessment report (European Public Assessment Reports - EPARs) 
available to the public once the Commission decision is taken.
With the help of the Commission's Joint Research Centre, the EMEA is setting 
up a telecommunication network and other advanced computer techologies to 
facilitate the dissemination of information on medicinal products evaluated by 
the EMEA. An internetworking service (EUDRANET) will be established with 
the Commission and the competent national authorities during 1996.
After the first year of operation, the structure of the Agency strengthened and 
took form. A Directory giving further details of the committees and Secretariat 
is available, along with guidelines and drafts for consultation, press releases 




























































































The New European Agencies
Within the context of current activities of the ICH process (International 
Conference on Harmonisation of Technical Requirements for Registration of 
Pharmaceuticals for Human Use) between the EU, Japan and the US, the 
Agency has already made an important technical contribution. 19 Trilateral 
Guidelines were already adopted and 19 more are under consideration before 
the Fourth International Conference, ICH4, in Brussels, July 1997. In 1996, the 
EMEA looks forward to initiating, together with the European Commission, a 
similar trilateral effort for veterinary medicinal products - the VICH.
III. EMEA’s Budget and Staff: Evolution and Trends 
• Budgetary perspectives
The revenues of the European Agency for the Evaluation of Medicinal Products 
(EMEA) consist of a contribution from the European Union's budget and the 
fees paid by the pharmaceutical industry for obtaining and maintaining central 
marketing authorisations, as well as other services provided by the EMEA. 
Council Regulation (EC) No 297/95 on fees payable by industry to the EMEA 
was adopted in February 1995 and will have to be reviewed, in consultation 
with Parliament, before 1998.
During its preliminary installation period in the last quarter of 1994, the EMEA 
received a Community subsidy of 6 800 000 ECU, devoted to the selection, 
leasing and fitting out of the Agency’s headquarters in Canary Wharf and the 
initial installation of computer and telecommunication networks. The 1995 
budget amounted to ECU 14.4 million, mainly based on a Community subsidy 
of ECU 10.4 million. The EMEA received new applications from companies, 
accompanied by the relevant fees, amounting to about ECU 3.5 in 1995.
For the 1996 budget, the Management Board approved an amount of ECU 23.5 
million, based on a subsidy of ECU 13.75 million (2.75 still "frozen" by the 
European Parliament) and an expected fee income of ECU 9.6 million in 1996. 
The 1997 budget is currently estimated at ECU 34.7 million, including an 
expected ECU 17 million fees to be paid by the pharmaceutical industry. The 
Management Board has requested a subsidy of 17.5 from the European 




























































































Fernand Sauer: The European Agency for the Evaluation of Medicinal Products 
• Evolution of staff at the EMEA
The Secretariat of the Agency is primarily responsible for providing 
administrative and technical support to the Scientific Committees and their 
Working Parties. The Agency has no permanent staff yet and staff recruited 
through the competitions are offered contracts of five years, in accordance with 
the rules and practices of the EU institutions. Once selected by an independent 
jury, candidates are placed on a reserve list from which they may be selected 
for a post. Staff come from throughout the European Union and it is anticipated 
that the increased number of staff will allow a fair presence of all nationalities.
The staff structure is rapidly evolving. Starting with 16 people the Agency 
grew to some 67 by the end of 1995. Recruitment is planned to reach 100 by 
mid-1996 and 140 by the end of 1996. It is expected that about 250 members of 
staff will be working at the Agency by the year 2000. This represents a 
relatively small number of staff compared to major regulatory authorities 
around the world which employ several thousands of staff in the 
pharmaceutical sector (5000 at the US Food and Drug Administration).
• Major challenges for the EMEA
The Agency has enjoyed the support of both consumers and industry and it is 
expected that the workload of the Agency will dramatically rise over the next 
few years. Unfortunately, the level of revenues, both from subsidy and fees has 
been uncertain from the start and drastic reductions or reserves were imposed 
without proper consultation.
All parties involved in the new registration system, in particular the main 
European Institutions, must be aware that the EMEA needs adequate resources 
with which to carry out its main public health functions in relation to the safety 
of medicinal products for human and animal use. The extent to which the 
workload will increase will also depend on the confidence industry has in the 
EMEA being able to efficiently undertake its tasks. Part of this debate in 
Parliament and Council will undoubtedly concern whether or not the Agency 




























































































T H E  E U R O P E A N  E N V IR O N M E N T  A G E N C Y
Domingo JIMENEZ-BELTRAN, Executive Director
THE ORIGINS OF THE AGENCY
It is now more than two years since the regulation establishing the Agency 
came into force, with the decision of the European Council of 29 October 
1993 to locate the Agency in the Copenhagen area.
1. Environment has been one of the EEC policies that has developed rapidly in 
recent years. Although there were no specific provisions in the 1957 EEC 
Treaty concerning the environment, the European Council meeting in Paris 
in 1972 joined the many initiatives of that year, in particular the UN 
Conference "Human Environment", and asked for an EC environmental 
action programme, the first of a continuous rolling environmental 
programme. The latest one, the 5th, "Towards sustainability" specified the 
programme until the year 2000.
2. During these 22 years, the environment has not only been introduced into 
the Treaty, already adopted by the Single European Act (Art. 130 R.S.T.) in 
1987 and reinforced in the Union Treaty adopted in Maastricht, but has also 
become a goal for the European Union in the pursuit of "sustainable 
growth, non inflationary, and respecting the environment", as indicated in 
Art. 2 of the European Union Treaty. This policy is implemented through 
more than 200 acts, mainly regulations and directives, that can be credited 
for an important share of the increase in life quality all throughout the EC 
and for the EC contribution to mitigating transnational and global 
environmental problems.
As many of us have repeated, should we not have had an EEC nor an EU, 
we should have needed one on environment grounds.
3. In the dynamic process, during the 80’s, the required shift from a "reactive 
environmental policy" to an "active" one was evident, from "end of the 
pipe" solutions to "action at the source", from "correction" to "prevention", 
from the "environment as burden" to "environment as a challenge and an 
opportunity" for assuring a continuous and balanced improvement in the 
quality of life..., which implied an increase in the institutional capacities to 
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information to develop and implement adequate measures at national and 
EU level.
4. The European Council in December 1988. in the Rhodes Declaration, 
requested a major effort in environmental matters and the Commission 
reacted immediately; President Delors himself announced in his speech to 
the European Parliament of January 1989 the "setting-up of a European 
measurement and control Network comprised of public or private, regional 
or national facilities".With this declaration, that surprised even the EC 
Services, Jacques Delors was anticipating the need in the then emergent 
information Society of separated bodies dealing only or mainly with 
information, and for which reliability and credibility will be paramount.
5. While presenting the proposal1 for the creation of the European 
Environment Agency in July '89, Mr. Ripa di Meana (Commissioner in 
charge of Environment at the time) stated that "...the main purpose of the 
Agency is to aid the Member States in meeting the environmental 
protection and restoration goals, as defined in the Treaty and in the different 
environmental programmes of the Community".
At this time, the Commission was responding to the pressure from the very 
active European Parliament Environment Committee, and to the need, also 
recognised by the increasingly influential Environment Ministers, for 
improved information to face their growing and complex responsibilities.
It is clear that the Agency and the related European Information and 
Observation Network were not only conceived or expected, as a partner, to 
provide information, but also as an environmental watcher or, to some, a 
"watch dog" of EU legislation and compromises. Through analysis of the 
tasks to be performed by the Agency, it is seen that its constructive role is 
dominating while improved information will certainly contribute to better 
(and objective) control of the respect of, or otherwise, the adequacy and 
efficiency of EU environmental legislation.
6. The objectives of the Agency2 are to provide the Community and the 
Member States with objective, reliable and comparable information, 
enabling them to develop and implement adequate environmental policies, 
and to assure that the public is properly informed about the state of the 
environment.
1 Com 1989 Final 303, 12 July 1989.




























































































Domingo Jimenez-Beltran: The European Environment Agency
Since the Agency has to furnish information which can be used directly in 
the implementation of Community environmental information, another 
characteristic, and maybe the one that covers them all, is that the Agency 
has to produce efficient information and in an efficient way. Efficiency is 
no doubt a key word in achieving sustainable development, as has been 
mentioned also by some industrial leaders, and it is without doubt a goal 
shared by economic, political, social and environmental agents, while the 
other key word for sustainable development is equity.
7. The Agency has to establish itself and to prove that it is an independent and 
reliable source of efficient information. The EEA has to assure that, as is 
stated in Article 130R of the Treaty, actions regarding the environment at 
the Union level take into account, inter alia, available scientific and 
technical data, considering the different situations of the Member States.
In applying the principle of efficiency, the first and immediate goal of the 
EEA is to screen, evaluate, validate, and process (add value to) existing 
data and specific information to transform all this into efficient information 
both for public institutions and the public at large.
Besides, the Agency, supported by a European Information and Observation 
Network (EIONET), has to provide the necessary guidelines and technical 
specifications so that future information developed is reliable, consistent, 
comparable (when possible, taking into account the different situations), 
and efficient, to be used directly, addresses priority questions, and is 
produced with the minimum possible personal, technical and economic 
resources.
The use of existing data and information, and the improvement of existing 
capacities in Member States and other European institutions to produce 
reliable and efficient data and information is, without doubt, the main goal 
of the European Environment Agency.
8. During informal consultations with key representatives of industry councils 
and non-governmental organisations prior to drafting the Agency’s work 
programme, I was struck by the repeated and common insistence on the 
need for the new Agency to call to order existing information resources and 
to put them to more open, efficient use, as a matter of higher priority than 
multiplying or expanding such resources.
Besides the added value that the Agency has to give such data and 




























































































The New European Agencies
the institutions and the public, the Agency has to develop some new 
projects to develop information capital at the European level ("taking 
stock") and to develop products that allow the institutions and the public to 
use it ("capacity building"). But these needs will have to be in balance with 
the anticipation and prospective activities to establish the necessary basic 
work to answer the new challenges that appear in the environmental field 
and to develop the instruments for application of the new principles 
(prevention, precautionary principle, no-regret strategies, shared 
responsibility, environmental cost, internationalisation, polluter pays 
principle, resource-user pays principle, introduction of the state of the 
environment and the natural resources into national accounts, etc.).
Many are the tasks of the Agency in order to achieve the goals mentioned, 
and many are the areas to cover, since environment is a very large concept, 
above all when it has merged with development, which means that some 
priorities have to be established.
9. The Regulation reflects, in Art.20, the result of the compromise reached at 
the time to satisfy the demands of the European Parliament to have the 
Agency playing an active role in cooperation with the European 
Commission in the monitoring of the implementation of Community 
legislation, and most of the Member States’ opposition to it. Therefore, a 
review of the Regulation was foreseen for two years after its entering into 
force, on the basis of a report and appropriate proposals from the 
Commission.
Other further tasks have also to be considered in the areas of environmental 
labeling, clean technologies and environmental impact assessment.
10. In addittion, the Regulation, as for other Agencies, and as a result of the 
battle for seats of the different EU bodies, includes a clause, Art. 21, by 
which it should only enter into force on the day following that on which the 
competent authorities have decided on the seat of the Agency. This was 
three and a half years after the date of adoption.




























































































Domingo Jimenez-Beltran: The European Environment Agency
some Member States, some preparatory work could be done during these 
years:
- The CORINE (Collect and Coordination of Information on the 
Environment)3 project; a demonstration project related to environmental 
information (Air, Biotopes, Land-cover ...), and that formally came to an 
end in 1990, was a successful experience and the Commission Services 
have continued it.
- The European Commission Services, and in particular DG XI, established 
within its own capacities a Task Force to assure the exploitation of 
CORINE and also the coordination and drafting of a report on the State of 
the Environment for the whole of Europe (as demanded by the Sofia 1991 
Conference of European Environment Ministers), and also to do some 
preparatory work for the Agency, acting informally as a forerunner, 
known as the EEA Task Force. This came to an end in the summer of 
1994, when the new Director of the EEA assumed his duties in 
Copenhagen.
THE BUILDING-UP OF THE AGENCY
11. The Agency has not developed as quickly as we would have liked, and 
certainly not quickly enough to satisfy the growing expectations developed 
or increased by the 3 1/2 years of waiting, but it was able to open its doors 
at its first anniversary in November 1994 and to present important 
achievements, measured by its delivering of significant products (reports) 
and services already in its second year of formal existence and its first year 
of real operation in 1995.
This year, 1996, should be a year of consolidation for the Agency (coping, 
finally, with some administrative and budget control problems, improving 
our general management plan and completing the staff, and catching up 
with some backlogs and bottlenecks, in particular, translation and 
publication) and above all of building up, following the compromise of the 
Council and the Member States, of the EIONET (The European 
Environment Information and Observation Network), wherein all the 
National Systems participate and that, with its more than 450 Institutes, is a 
basic capacity for the Agency. The only adequate building up of the 
national systems is in itself an achievement.




























































































The New European Agencies
12. With regards to personnel, the Agency followed, from the beginning, the 
principle of equal opportunities, all the available posts in 1994 being 
published in the Official Journal and to fill the additional posts of the 1995 
establishment plan from the resulting reserve lists.
The selection process, with more than 7,000 candidates, has been a long 
(over one year) and costly exercise, but the result has been the progressive 
incorporation of adequate experts and project managers basic to the 
operation of the system. Of the 54 staff of the 1996 establishment plan, 34 
are in place, 8 are in the final phase of contracting, 9 posts have been 
published again, since adequate personnel could not be identified or was 
not available, and 3 are pending republishing.
An important limitation, above all with regards to posts where adequate and 
experienced administrative personnel could be found in the EU Institutions 
and in particular in the European Commission, has been that, due to the fact 
of the Agencies not being included among EU bodies under the mobility 
clause, the recruitment of such personnel has not been very successful. 
Anyway, many of the required staff for the Agency are experts in areas not 
necessarily covered by EC Services.
While in the original establishment plan there were provisions for some 
permanent posts, all except those related to Administration and Personnel, 
are now temporary, the contracts being established for a period of 5 years.
13. The revenue of the Agency is basically a subsidy from the Community 
entered in the general budget of the the European Community. There is also 
a contribution from the EEA countries since they are also members of the 
Agency, and other Third Countries may contribute as they join the Agency. 
Payments for services rendered is also possible and the possibility of 
developing a self-financed publication programme, considering the volume 
of information and the additional costs of translation into the different 
languages (13 for the EEA space,and more than 20 when trying to cover the 
European audiences), publication and distribution is being considered.
Following the Opinion of the European Parliament, and while the 
Regulation allows for the EEA Management Board to designate another 
Financial Control, that from the EC has been designated. Following some 
bad experiences in 1995 related to the proper control and implementation of 
the budget, capacities in this area have been substantially increased and 




























































































Domingo Jinienez-Beltran: The European Environment Agency
14. The existence of an informal forerunner, such as the Task Force, has in 
some aspects facilitated the launching of the Agency, and, in particular, has 
allowed the Agency, building on the information that existed, to deliver 
products, reports, in its early days and with a still limited staff. Some of the 
Task Force staff has, by competing in the general recruitment procedure, 
come to Copenhagen. There has been no direct transfer of personnel.
The experiences of the Task Force and of the CORINE Programme were 
useful but were not enough for defining a model to structure the Agency. 
No similar national bodies existed, so the process followed has been to 
translate the mandate of the Regulation into operational Work Programmes 
(Multiannual, '94-'99, and Annual '94-'95) that were adopted in September 
1994, and, on the basis of these to define the organigramme of the Agency 
and the posts, published by the end of October 1994. It has been a long 
process, but, with the exception of the part related to Administration, that 
was not of an adequate dimension to cope with the required task, this 
approach has been very efficient.
15. The Regulation, very criticized when adopted, is showing its worth in its 
implementation within the framework of the Information Society and above 
all in supporting European Union development and the prospects foreseen 
the IGC.
The goals of more efficient EU Institutions, improve public information 
(awareness) and participation, and a more active role of the EU on the 
international scene, are very much facilitated by the availability of reliable 
and efficient environmental information (the best available information), 
that is the goal and main/only task of the Agency. The necessary expansion 
of the EU, with the adhesion of the East and Central European Countries, 
should be facilitated by the on-going pan-European work of the Agency and 
the fact that many of these countries will join the Agency as part of the first 
steps to join the EU. So the Agency is already facilitating the building-up of 
the natural EU, the Ecological Union.
16. In this context, the present allocation of functions is adequate while too 
broad, since it is not only related to information on the state and trends of 
the environment but also to the state and prospects of action, involving not 
only monitoring but also policy analysis. Giving to the Agency direct tasks 
of inspection or control of the implementation of legislation, or in 
environmental management (ecolabeling), or as an arbitration body should 




























































































The New European Agencies
its possibilities to be recognized as an independent, and credible source of 
the best available environmental information.
17. The Institutional arrangement is in general adequate. But the possibility of 
the Agency having a direct relation with the EU Institutions, and in 
particular with the Council and the European Parliament, especially in the 
process of Budget adoption (while keeping the EC related services 
informed) has to become a reality.
18. Networking and cooperation, are fundamental to the Agency, since it is a 
small unit based mostly on existing or build-up external capacities. Both the 
principles of exploiting and of avoiding duplication of existing capacities 
are paramount in the work of the Agency.
The Regulation established the Agency and dictated the setting-up of a 
European Environment Information and Observation Network (EIONET), 
which the Agency is supposed to establish, in cooperation with the Member 
States, and to coordinate. This work is progressing. Operational 
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) and concrete work programmes are 
established with EC Institutes and Services (EUROSTAT and JOINT 
RESEARCH CENTRE), as mandated by the Regulation. Good cooperation 
with and support to the relevant EC Services, in particular with DG XI, is 
operating.
19. The Agency is also supposed to be very active in international cooperation, 
as mandated by the Regulation, to promote the incorporation of 
environmental monitoring programmes and to support its own work and 
avoid duplication. MoU’s are already operational with the WHO, UNEP 
and similar arrangements are being established with the ECE, the OECD, 
and Council of Europe ....
The Agency is also cooperating with some Central and Eastern European 
countries under the PHARE programme, and hopefully soon also under 
TACIS. Furthermore, cooperation with Institutes of other Third relevant 
Countries is also being developed, in particular with Switzerland (that has 
applied for EEA membership) and the USA, as well as participation in 
project 6 of the G7 programme related to the Information Society.
20. The most serious current problems facing the Agency so far are:
- The efficient operation of its “variable geometry” configuration (the EU; 




























































































Domingo Jimenez-Beltran: The European Environment Agency
“ad hoc” projects, products and services and by different financing 
configurations.
- The limitations, in this context, to establishing an effective, efficient and 
feasible public information and dissemination system, including 
translation and publication in many languages and broad distribution. 
Even with electronic supports, home pages on INTERNET (see htpp: 
eea@www. dk), CD ROMS and other developing mean, translations will 
still be needed and paper publications required.
- The streamlining of the production and distribution process (a single 
“twin key” project with the Translation Centre and the Office of 
Publications, both in Luxembourg, on the basis of a first original 
provided by the Agency) and either an external or decentralized 
financing system (by the Member States concerned by the language 
version) or a self-financing publication programme (price policy) has 
still to be established.
- The establishment of adequate structures, capacities and supporting 
instruments for administration, financial management, budget 
implementation and control. The EC Services’ support, or supply of, 
services of a general character or need, such as those now performed by 
DG IX with regards to personnel, that are better and less costly done in 
Brussels, should help to avoid oversizing of these structures and 
distraction of resources required for the specific tasks of the Agency. The 
development or adaptation of existing procedures to the size and budget 
of the Agency, including required software, is also needed.
21. As for the future, the efficient implementation of Agency tasks will be very
much related to the solution of a number of developing problems:
- Difficulties in defining the information demand model. Inputs from the 
environmental policy agenda both at EU and national levels will be of 
key importance to guide in part (the Agency also has to feed in its own 
priorities resulting from its own evaluation) Agency work, but have 
proven to be problemetic because of the lack of medium-term strategies 
in many cases.
- Growing expectations from the Institutions, socioeconomic agents and 
the public in general (in particular NGOs) in the field of environmental 
information. Keeping the size of the Agency at an adequate dimension, 




























































































The New European Agencies
building of existing information systems will require an on-going 
exercise of prioritizing and a change of course in information strategies 
toward delivering only effective and efficient information which will 
involve many risks.
- In this context, the biggest challenge for the Agency will be to assure, 
under the existing terms of the Regulation and other EU legislation and 
norms of application, a flexible structure, in particular regarding staff, to 
adjust it to the changing needs, and evolving working programmes. The 
mobility of the staff will be of paramount importance.
- The big challenge will continue to be that of being recognized as an 
independent source of reliable information, of the best available 
environmental information. The Agency has to serve policy-makers ( 
with timely and efficient, targeted information) and the public (with 
accessible and credible information).
FUTURE PERSPECTIVES
22. Capacity-building and improvement of the operation of different national 
systems and related European networks, in particular:
- The EIONET (The European Information and Observation Network).
- The related National Environmental Monitoring and Information 
Systems.
- The European Environment Topic Centres, including public and private 
Institutes and also experts networks as well as less formal information 
structures.
- The extention to third countries, in particular to Eastern and Central 
European Countries. (Not only through cooperation but also by 
“mimetisme”, of the EEA information strategy and work programmes 
and above all of those EEA networks, formally or informally).
The Agency is having and will have an increased effect on improving 
national systems and capacities, but is also making available better 
supporting capacities to EC Services in the field of the environment. In 
addition, the building-up of common information systems, Member States’ 





























































































Domingo Jimenez-Beltran: The European Environment Agency
5
will progressively change national structures, introducing harmonisation as 
a fact more than as a regulated requirement.
)
23. There is no doubt that there are many additional driving forces behind the 
changes that can be facilitated by the building-up and proper operation of
, the Agency and related networks:
- The emergent civil society, in the progress from representative towards
i participatory democracy, requires better informed agents and public.
- The main agents, the NGO’s, including also the socio-economic ones,
! Industry, Federations ... are directly or by means of “lobbies” more and
more active in striving for better available information.
- Market forces push for informed choice and competition also on
: environmental quality grounds.
- The national and the European Parliaments require better information for 
the policy and decision-making process and to make national 
governments and the EC Commission more accountable and to submitto 
informed prior consultation processes when launching new initiatives.
24. The Agency’s main goal is to support and increase the efficiency of the
j related European Institutions, the European Commission in the first
instance, but also the European Parliament and the Council by providing 
them with better and more targeted environmental information.[
The Agency should help the European Commission to identify,prepare and 
evaluate adequate measures, including legislative, in the field of the 
’ environment, and should also reinforce the EC task of ensuring the
implementation of Community legislation by Member States. It should also 
simplify and support EC work related to the so-called Reporting Directives
I
 that imply processing large amounts of information provided by Member
States as part of implementation control.
It should facilitate debate and evaluation of EC proposals by the European 
Parliament and Council of the EC proposals as well as the so much required 
by the European Parliament “prior consultation” process by providing 
status of the situation and trends reports prior to EC proposals. The Agency 
will also facilitate political initiatives or mandates at this level, by 




























































































The New European Agencies
In general, the decision-making process could be better served, along with 
the parallel or interactive public information and participation process.
In this context, it must not be forgotten that the Agency is also mandated to 
serve Member States’ requirements in order to satisfy the goals of EU 
environment policy, which may imply information on areas where there are 
no measures at EU level, since these are decided by the Member States 
under the principle of subsidiarity. This, therefore, implies a broader 
interpretation concerning the information of interest to be developed at 
European level.
25. The credibility of the Agency is and will increasingly be of paramount 
importance in assuring the efficiency of its tasks and to the fulfilment its 
mandate.
For this, it has to establish itself as an independent source of the best 
available environmental information.
This implies:
That no additional tasks, un-related to information are given to the Agency, 
which could determine an oriented or interested or restricted information 
strategy.
That no end of the pipe controls over the final products or reports of the 
Agency, other than those, i.e. by the Scientific Committee, as part of a and 
other formalized quality assurance process, be established nor suspected to 
exist.
That the Agency remain open to all sources of the best available 
environmental information.
That the Agency, by timely and periodical reporting, countinuously expose 
what is considered to be the best available environmental information and 
the related sources and methods used.
26. Experience until now has shown that in principle no further tasks should be 
given to the Agency and certainly no further powers, that the existing tasks 
are more than enough and the better and efficient execution of these in the 
coming years should also indirectly imply (“information is power”) the 
required powers of the Agency to assure what is now a weakness of the 




























































































Domingo Jimenez-Beltran: The European Environment Agency
Member States to develop adequate environmental monitoring and 
information systems, or to deliver related data and information (out of those 
required by the Reporting Directive).
If Member States continue to consider the role and tasks of the Agency as 
constructive and their participation in EIONET as rewarding in the progress 
towards positive (non-reactive) environmental policy (where the more you do 
the better) the Agency does not seem actually to need neither more tasks nor 
powers. The Regulation does not need to be reviewed for the moment, only 
efficiently implemented. All this is pending the evaluation and review process 
to be initiated by the EC in 1997 and the subsequent decisions under 



























































































T H E  E U R O P E A N  T R A IN IN G  F O U N D A T IO N
Peter DE ROOIJ, Director
ORIGINS OF THE EUROPEAN TRAINING FOUNDATION
The idea of the ETF was bom at a very special moment in European history - 
the fall of Communism in Hungary and Poland in 1989. The west was very 
quick to respond to this political earthquake. The Group of 24 most 
industrialised countries decided to join forces to support the newly-created 
democracies and asked the European Commission to co-ordinate the G-24’s 
assistance to those countries.
It was the European Council at its summit meeting in Strasbourg in December 
1989 which decided that training and education were among the priority areas 
for assistance to Hungary and Poland and which invited the Commission to put 
forward specific proposals in this area. There appears to have been broad 
support among the Member States all of whom wished to be seen to respond to 
the events in Eastern Europe and to uphold the fragile new democracies. The 
Parliament was equally supportive of the idea of a European Training 
Foundation which would help to co-ordinate assistance for the reform of the 
vocational training systems in the countries concerned.
To sum up, the Foundation was one of the outcomes arising from the need to 
respond positively to a specific set of political circumstances.
The Commission subsequently submitted two specific proposals in January 
1990. One was for the European Training Foundation; the other was the 
Tempus programme for co-operation in higher education, which much later was 
transferred to the Foundation to implement.
There were no major difficulties in the passage of the regulation establishing 
the Foundation due to the fact that a general consensus on the principle existed. 
As a result, the regulation was passed relatively quickly - a sign that the 
Council and the Parliament recognised the importance of converting its 
intentions into concrete form given the dire economic circumstances in which 



























































































The New European Agencies
If the adoption of the Foundation went relatively smoothly, the establishment of 
the Foundation was a different matter. The Foundation remained a mere piece 
of paper for another four years. This was because the regulation could not enter 
into force until the Member States agreed unanimously on where it should be 
located. This finally came about at the Brussels European summit in October 
1993 when an agreement was reached on the sites of the various EU 
institutions, including the location of the agencies which are the subject of this 
conference today.
By the time that the European Council had finally decided on Turin as the 
headquarters of the Foundation in October 1990, the political map in Eastern 
Europe had altered dramatically since 1989. Eight countries had shaken off 
Communism, the Berlin wall had long fallen and the Soviet Union had 
disintegrated into some sixteen states. The Foundation’s regulation enabled it to 
operate in all of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe but not in the ex- 
USSR. The Council had already given the political green light for an extension 
of the regulation at the Brussels summit. Consequently, the Foundation’s 
regulation was amended in July 1994 to allow this wider geographical 
coverage: the twenty-four countries covered by the EU’s Phare and Tacis 
programmes which support those countries in the transformation process 
towards a market economy.
It was at this point that the Commission decided to introduce a number of other 
“minor” changes which had significant consequences for the Foundation as an 
organisation. One was the decision to amend the regulation to the effect that the 
Financial Controller of the Commission became in fact the Financial Controller 
of the Foundation. The other change was to the terms and conditions of 
employment of the Foundation’s staff. The latter now would benefit from the 
same terms and conditions of employment as Commission staff. Both 
amendments meant that the Foundation follows the Commission’s rules on 
finance and personnel.
THE BUILDING-UP OF THE FOUNDATION
Governing Board
The Foundation’s Director reports to a Governing Board made up of one 
representative from each EU Member State and two representatives of the 




























































































Peter de Rooij: The European Training Foundation
Advisory Forum
The Foundation is supported by an Advisory Forum which meets once a year 
and whose primary role is to advise the Governing Board on the work 
programme. There are some 90 members on the Forum, mainly training experts 
from the forty countries with which the Foundation operates.
Personnel
The Foundation started operations in Turin in January 1995 with 60 staff and 
by the end of the year was employing around 120 staff. The bulk of the 
remaining 60 staff could only be recruited at the end of 1995 for budgetary 
reasons. The Foundation was able to make a quick start thanks to the 
infrastructure already in place through the Tempus programme. Both 
generalists and experts are employed with the balance tipping towards 
generalists. The Foundation’s staff exercise their skills mainly in managing the 
process of change in the education and training fields and as information 
brokers.
Finance
For its running costs, the Foundation receives a subvention from the European 
Union’s budget. Programme funds are the subject of separate conventions 
between the Commission and the Foundation. All programme money comes 
from the Phare and Tacis programmes which are the European Union’s 
assistance programmes for the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the 
former Soviet Union respectively. At present, the Foundation has no other 
source of income. However, provision exists in the Foundation’s regulation to 
manage funds on behalf of other organisations (including bilateral funds from 
the Member States and third countries). Plans are already underway for the 
Foundation to manage two such projects, one bilateral; the other multilateral. 
The Foundation is, in any case, non-profit-making.
In its first year, the Foundation managed around a total of ECU 200 million in 
programme funds. This included some ECU 125 million for the Tempus 
programme and about ECU 75 million from the Phare budget for vocational 
education and training reform projects.
As indicated previously, the Foundation answers to the Financial Controller in 
the Commission.
Functions
The Foundation has had limited involvement to date in the countries of the 




























































































The New European Agencies
Eastern Europe, on the other hand, has been much more rapid with the 
Foundation now implementing programmes in all eleven countries.
The Foundation is generally satisfied with its present functions but believes that 
its expertise could be applied to other regions. In fact, a new area of activity 
could open up to the Foundation with the possibility of its participation in the 
implementation of the MEDA programme for the Mediterranean countries. The 
Foundation’s possible role in the programme was announced in the conclusions 
of the Barcelona conference in November 1995.
Networks
The Foundation considers it important to effect change in the training structures 
of the partner countries including through the use of networks. Networks can 
help to influence the transfer of expertise and experience from the European 
Union to the partner countries. Against this background a number of networks 
have been, or are in the process of being, established by the Foundation:
• the Advisory Forum involving training experts from 40 countries as well as 
the major international organisations involved in the assistance field
• a network of Programme Management Units (PMUs) which manage 
programmes in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe.
• a network of National Tempus Offices from Central and Eastern Europe.
• a network of key contacts in each of the beneficiary countries identified 
through the Staff Development programme
The Foundation also took the initiative to establish a different kind of network: 
the informal network of the Directors of the new European agencies.
Problems to date and proposed solutions
The first problem concerns the way in which the budget for the Foundation is 
decided. The Foundation would like to have a more direct involvement in the 
preparations of the decision-making process. The present arrangements, 
particularly the practice of putting funds in reserve, and releasing them late in 
the financial year run counter to efficiency and prevent proper planning.
The second problem relates to the way in which the Foundation is obliged to 
follow strict administrative procedures laid down by the European 
Commission. There is very little room for flexibility in the application of 
financial, personnel and other administrative procedures. Whilst on the one 
hand, there are many good reasons for such procedures, on the other hand, a 
decentralised agency such as the Foundation has little room for manoeuvre to 




























































































Peter de Rooij: The European Training Foundation
tasks efficiently. This has consequences for the agency’s credibility and its 
ability to satisfy the expectations of the outside world. A balance needs to be 
struck, therefore, between the need for strict accountability in terms of financial 
control and accountability and the need to be able to work more flexibly with 
respect to content matters.
Of course, the Foundation is open to any control which the institutions see fit, 
provided that it is permitted the professional freedom required for it to carry out 
its mission. To this end, it is recommended that the agencies be judged on their 
ability to meet objectives rather than on procedural terms, as tends to be the 
case. The Commission should endeavour to set more long-term objectives 
related to the agencies’ missions. To sum up, the Foundation believes that it 
should:
• be set clearly defined objectives related to its mission
• have a more flexible administrative regime
• be subject to strict monitoring and evaluation procedures, particularly 
regarding finance.
More generally, there needs to be recognition that the agencies are different 
from the Commission and that being different should not be considered as 
threatening the existence of the European public service. By promoting a more 
flexible approach, the Foundation can contribute to improving the image of the 
European institutions in the eyes of Europe’s citizens.
FUTURE PERSPECTIVES
The establishment of the Observatory will have many beneficial effects both for 
the EU and for the beneficiary countries. Firstly, it will fill a gap by providing 
expert information on the state of vocational education and training in the East, 
including identifying examples of good practice and successful strategies. It 
will enjoy a unique overview of training developments in the East in relation to 
the reform process. Secondly, it will contribute to the development of a 
coherent European policy on vocational training and education questions with 
respect to the countries concerned.
As regards the beneficiary countries, the Observatory will be an important 
source of information on training policy and practice in the EU Member States. 
It will be at the centre of a network of national observatories in each of the 
partner states which will transmit information to the Foundation on vocational 




























































































The New European Agencies
national observatories in each of the partner states, moreover, will fulfil a vital 
need. The national observatories will collect basic information on vocational 
education and training questions and provide a basis for policy analysis and 
research currently lacking in most of the eastern countries. By collecting 
information on the same basis, the national observatories will permit 
comparisons to be made on the different national systems and will provide 
national governments with better tools for taking strategic decisions on 
vocational education and training questions.
The Foundation will bring added value as follows:
• the establishment of a whole series of networks on vocational education and 
training matters both East-West and East-East
• the introduction of an increased European dimension to training in the East 
thus preparing the ground for the accession of the associated countries to the 
European Union
• the introduction of more diversified and co-operative approaches to planning 
and delivery of training in the partner countries based on a partnership 
approach involving all the social partners at different levels (local, regional 
and national) in line with the needs of the labour market
• transparent information on the state of vocational education and training in 
Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.
It is important to bear in mind that the Foundation is operating in a complex 
field. Education and training are long-term issues; training systems cannot be 
transferred overnight. It can take many years to affect the necessary changes in 
attitudes and values. Legislation has to be accompanied by education in the 
broadest sense of the word. Changes cannot be imposed and the Foundation 
cannot insist on a particular training model for the partner countries. Indeed, a 
fundamental precept of the EU’s assistance policy to the countries of Central 
and Eastern Europe is that the programmes should be demand-driven. Such a 
policy makes it more difficult to set objectives with regard to desired changes 
in the training systems of the different countries. This process is part and parcel 
of the démocratisation process in the former communist countries. The 
Foundation is contributing to this process in ways which are not always easy to 
measure. Better trained and educated people lead to an overall improvement in 
the quality of civic life and help to reinforce democratic values. By promoting a 
partnership approach based on the idea of co-operation and openness and 
respect for diversity and plurality, the Foundation is making a small 




























































































H IS T O IR E , E X P E R IE N C E  E T  F U T U R  D E  P O F F IC E  D E  
L ’H A R M O N IS A T IO N  D A N S  L E  M A R C H É  IN T É R IE U R  
(M A R Q U E S , D E S S IN S  E T  M O D È L E S )
Jean-Claude COMBALDIEU, Président
Mesdames et Messieurs, permettez-moi d’abord de souligner que c’est pour 
moi une joie, un honneur et une grande responsabilité de pouvoir participer à ce 
colloque aujourd’hui. C'est une joie parce que, comme vous tous, je jouis du 
privilège de profiter de cette superbe ville qu’est Florence. C’est un honneur et 
une responsabilité car je suis au milieu de personnalités éminentes pour traiter 
aujourd’hui du sujet essentiel des organismes décentralisés de la Communauté 
européenne. C’est une grande responsabilité pour moi car je sais que certains ne 
sont pas convaincus de l’utilité ou de l’opportunité de créer de telles agences 
autonomes. Je suis ici, Mesdames et Messieurs, pour vous expliquer combien 
l’existence de l’Office de l’harmonisation dans le marché intérieur (marques, 
dessins et modèles) est une réalité essentielle et incontournable pour le futur de 
la Communauté.
Une des choses qui m’ont le plus marqué depuis que je suis entré en fonction 
est le fait que toutes les agences communautaires sont mises, par une grande 
partie des décideurs de la Communauté, dans une sorte de pot commun dans le 
noir duquel il est difficile de différencier les spécificités de chacune d’elles. Or 
ma thèse est que l’Office que je dirige est une agence particulière. Pour vous 
conduire dans ma démonstration, je suivrai le plan qui m’a été suggéré par les 
organisateurs de ce colloque. Je ferai donc d’abord un historique de l’idée de la 
marque communautaire et de l’Office communautaire des marques. Ensuite, 
nous verrons dans quelle mesure l’état actuel des choses correspond aux idées 
de départ et, enfin, je vous ferai part de notre expérience actuelle et des 
relations de notre Office avec les institutions communautaires, ainsi que les 
principaux éléments de notre mise en place.
I. HISTORIQUE DE L’INITIATIVE COMMUNAUTAIRE POUR LE 
DROIT DES MARQUES
Cette histoire commence avec l’entrée en vigueur du traité de Rome en 1958. 
En effet, les six Etats membres originaires de la Communauté ont très 



























































































The New European Agencies
marques et des dessins et modèles. Les groupes de réflexions qui ont été créés 
ont débouché sur des rapports dont le contenu et les vicissitudes d’adoption ne 
méritent pas d’être soulignés ici. C’est en 1973, que la Commission a sorti de 
ses tiroirs la première mouture pour un système de marque communautaire. En 
1976 elle a publié un mémorandum sur la création de la marque 
communautaire. L’idée de base était, d’une part, de créer une marque 
communautaire en tant que telle, et donc un titre de propriété industrielle qui 
viendrait s’ajouter aux titres de propriété industrielle déjà existant dans les 
Etats membres. D’autre part, afin d’obtenir une harmonisation du droit matériel 
en matière de marques, la proposition d’une directive communautaire 
d’harmonisation. Le débat était lancé.
Les propositions formelles ont été adoptées par la Commission en 1980. Il 
s’agit de la proposition de règlement sur la marque Communautaire. Celle-ci 
est basée sur l’Article 235 du traité CEE. La proposition d’une première 
directive sur l’harmonisation du droit de marques des Etats membres, a été 
adoptée dans le même élan par la Commission. Cette proposition de directive 
était basée à l’époque sur l’Article 100 du traité CEE. L’adoption par la 
Commission de ces propositions constitue le vrai début institutionnel d’une 
discussion longue, difficile, et parfois même décourageante. Mais les efforts 
déployés par tous ont été couronnés de succès comme vous le savez et c’est 
pour cela que je suis parmi vous aujourd’hui.
Il faut dire d’emblée que la création de la marque communautaire était 
indissolublement liée à l’idée d’instituer un Office communautaire des 
marques. En effet, il est impensable de créer un titre de propriété industrielle 
qui ne serait pas géré par un Office spécialisé en la matière. Du reste, l’Office 
Bénélux des Marques constitue un préalable important en cette matière. Si un 
titre de propriété industrielle vaut pour tout un territoire, il ne peut pas être 
administré par des Offices différents car ceci suppose nécessairement des 
pratiques divergentes dans les décisions quotidiennes.
Puisqu’un titre de propriété industrielle doit être géré par une administration, 
encore faut-il décider laquelle sera chargée de cette tâche. Deux possibilités 
viennent à l’esprit. La première consiste à créer un Office spécialisé en la 
matière. L’autre alternative est de constituer, au sein même des administrations 
centrales, un service spécialisé pour ces questions mais qui reste une partie 
intégrante de cette administration.
Comme vous le savez, le législateur communautaire a tranché en faveur d’une 
agence autonome. Cette solution n’a d’ailleurs jamais véritablement été remise 
en cause. Il faut dire qu’en faisant cela, le Conseil des ministres n’a fait que 




























































































Jean-Claude Combaldieu: l ’Office de l'harmonisation dans le marché intérieur
membres de la Communauté européenne et de la plus grande partie des pays 
tiers. Il est en effet très rare que la gestion et la délivrance des titres de 
propriété industrielle soient administrées par l’administration centrale.
Permettez-moi, Mesdames et Messieurs, de rappeler l’expérience française que 
je connais bien et qui constitue un exemple éclairant. Alors que l’Office de la 
propriété industrielle français fonctionnait correctement de manière autonome 
avec son propre budget, il fut décidé, par un décret du 20 mars 1939, au nom de 
l’unité budgétaire, de réincorporer ce service autonome dans l’administration 
centrale. Les recettes qui provenaient des diverses taxes en matière de propriété 
industrielle devaient depuis lors être perçues pour le compte du trésor par un 
régisseur des recettes et des dépenses.
Cette réincorporation au sein de l’administration centrale constitua le début de 
la dégradation dans le fonctionnement des services de propriété industrielle en 
France. Très rapidement, les autorités françaises se sont rendu compte de leur 
erreur. Dans un rapport remarqué de l’Assemblée Nationale du 7 décembre 
1950, le député Jules - Julien analyse l’évolution de l’Office de la propriété 
industrielle. Ses conclusions sont claires : il faut réinstaurer “un organisme doté 
de l’autonomie financière auquel seront confiées toutes les tâches d’exécution 
en matière de brevets d’invention, de marques de fabrique, de registre de 
commerce et des métiers et de dépôts des actes de société, tâches qui donnent 
lieu à la perception de taxes”. En conclusion, le rapport souligne “que la 
création d’un institut national qui donnera aux services d’exécution de la 
propriété industrielle, une organisation adaptée à leurs besoins, permettra de 
combler rapidement les lacunes actuelles, de moderniser les méthodes de travail 
et d’adapter l’administration de la propriété industrielle aux nouvelles tâches 
qui lui seront dévolues. L’enseignement de la période d’avant guerre est 
concluant à cet égard. De 1920 à 1939, l’Office national a donné entière 
satisfaction. Au contraire, l’expérience de 1946 à 1950 apporte la preuve qu’il 
est impossible d’incorporer les services d’exécution de la propriété 
intellectuelle à une administration centrale”. Il est difficile d’être plus direct !
L’adoption par le Conseil de l’Union européenne, le 20 décembre 1993, du 
règlement n° 40/94, qui crée la marque communautaire et son corollaire, c’est- 
à-dire l’Office de l’harmonisation dans le marché intérieur, suit la même 
logique. Personne n’a souhaité que la Commission gère cette marque car ce 
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II. ETAT ACTUEL PAR RAPPORT AUX IDÉES DE DÉPART
Comme il a été indiqué précédemment, le Conseil a estimé nécessaire de créer 
un Office véritablement autonome. Les raisons qui sous-tendent ce choix sont 
résumées au considérant n° 11 du règlement 40/94:
“considérant que le droit des marques créé par le présent règlement requiert, pour 
chaque marque, des mesures administratives d’exécution au niveau de la 
Communauté; qu’il est par conséquent indispensable, tout en conservant la structure 
institutionnelle existante de la Communauté et l’équilibre des pouvoirs, d’instituer un 
Office de l’harmonisation dans le marché intérieur (marques, dessins et modèles) 
indépendant sur le plan technique et doté d’une autonomie juridique, administrative et 
financière suffisante; que, à cet effet, il est nécessaire et approprié de lui donner la 
forme d’un organisme de la Communauté ayant la personnalité juridique et exerçant 
les pouvoirs d’exécution que lui confère le présent règlement, dans le cadre du droit 
communautaire et sans porter atteinte aux compétences exercées par les institutions de 
la Communauté”.
La mise en oeuvre des objetifs qui sont énoncés à ce considérant est prévue au 
titre XII du règlement qui traite de l’Office. Dans une première section de ce 
titre, les articles 111 à 118 définissent la structure de l’Office de 
l’harmonisation dans le marché intérieur. L’Office se voit attribuer la 
personnalité juridique et la capacité la plus large reconnue aux personnes 
morales par les législations nationales dans les Etats Membres. Il peut ainsi par 
exemple passer des contrats de toute sorte sans avoir à demander une 
quelconque autorisation ou un aval d’une des institutions à condition de rester 
dans ses missions et compétences.
L’article 111 paragraphe 3 précise que l’Office est représenté par son Président. 
C’est lui qui dirige l’Office et prend les décisions nécessaires à cet effet. Ainsi, 
l’article 119 paragraphe 2 a) précise que le Président “prend toutes les mesures 
utiles, notamment l ’adoption d ’instructions administratives internes et la 
publication de communications, en vue d ’assurer le fonctionnement de 
l ’Office". Mais le rôle du Président lui permet également de soumettre à la 
Commission tout projet de modification du règlement de base et des règlements 
adoptés en vertu de celui-ci (article 119 paragraphe 2 b). Il a donc un rôle 
important dans l’évolution future du système de la marque communautaire 
puisqu’il peut suggérer son amendement. On peut également rappeler que le 
Président est l’Autorité investie du pouvoir de nomination des agents de 
l’Office (article 119, 2,e). C’est donc lui qui décide des recrutements, sauf pour 
les membres des chambres de recours et les Vice-présidents qui sont comme lui 





























































































Jean-Claude Combaldieu: l'Office de l ’harmonisation dans le marché intérieur
Parmi les autres caractéristiques essentielles de l’Office en tant qu’organisme 
communautaire, on retiendra l’article 112 qui prévoit que le personnel de 
l’Office sera soumis au statut des fonctionnaires des Communautés 
européennes et au régime applicable aux autres agents. Cette dispostion est 
essentielle puisqu’elle a notamment pour conséquence pour l’Office que celui- 
ci a la possibilité de “titulariser” les agents qu’il veut garder à son service plus 
de 3 ans.
Par ailleurs, l’Office s’est vu attribuer un régime linguistique particulier prévu à 
l’article 115 du règlement. La mise en place du compromis sur les langues a été 
particulièrement difficile. Deux préoccupations principales et peut être 
contradictoires devaient être satisfaites. La première est le droit de chaque 
citoyen de l’Union de pouvoir utiliser sa langue. L’autre est la nécessité de 
créer un Office qui puisse fonctionner de manière satisfaisante et à des coûts 
raisonnables. Le besoin de limiter les coûts est plus que la simple idée de ne pas 
exiger trop d’argent des entreprises clientes de l’Office mais aussi une véritable 
nécessité car l’Office se trouve en fait en situation de concurrence par rapport 
aux autres systèmes d’enregistrement des marques. Il s’agit de l’Arrangement 
et du Protocole de Madrid qui prévoient l’enregistrement international des 
marques. Or, le système de Madrid n’a que deux langues de travail, à savoir le 
français et l ’anglais. Il a fallu trancher la question des langues au plus haut 
niveau puisque le Conseil européen de Bruxelles d’octobre 1993 en a été saisi. 
Selon le compromis en question, les demandes de marques communautaires 
peuvent être déposées dans chacune des langues officielles de l’Union. C’est à 
dire, à l’heure actuelle, une des onze langues officielles des quinze Etats 
membres de la Communauté. Par contre, les langues de l’Office en tant que 
telles, sont limitées au nombre de cinq: l’allemand, l’anglais, l’espagnol, le 
français et l’italien.
L’Office ne sera donc amené à dialoguer avec les tiers que dans une de ces cinq 
langues. Même ce régime linguistique allégé, par rapport au régime linguistique 
des Communautés européennes, a été jugé trop lourd par certains intéressés. 
L’avenir dira si nous pouvons effectivement faire de l’Office de 
l’harmonisation dans le marché intérieur un Office fonctionnant bien et de 
manière rentable. Pour ma part, je n’en doute pas.
Il y a également lieu de signaler que le règlement prévoit que la Commission 
effectue le contrôle de la légalité des actes du Président de l’Office à l’égard 
desquels le droit communautaire ne prévoit pas de contrôle de la légalité par un 
autre organe. Il en va de même des actes du comité budgétaire institué au sein 
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pour deux raisons. D’abord, en ce qu’il est un contrôle a posteriori de nature 
juridique, il ne remet pas en cause l’autonomie de l’Office. L’opportunité d’une 
mesure ne peut pas être remise en cause puisque le contrôle de légalité ne porte 
que sur les conditions juridiques qui peuvent entraîner une annulation. Ensuite, 
l’existence de ce contrôle répond à une nécessité puisque sans lui certains actes 
de l’Office ne pourraient pas être soumis au test juridique de leur légalité.
Quant à la structure de l’Office en tant que telle, elle est déterminée aux 
sections 2 à 5 de ce même titre XII. La direction de l’Office est assurée par un 
Président qui est assisté, à l’heure actuelle, par deux vice-présidents. C’est cette 
direction qui effectue la gestion quotidienne de l’Office comme cela a été 
indiqué ci-dessus.
La troisième section prévoit l’institution d’un Conseil d’administration auprès 
de l’Office. Celui-ci a pour rôle de conseiller le Président sur les matières 
relevant de la compétence de l’Office. Il est également consulté avant 
l’adoption de directives relatives à l’examen des dépôts pratiqué par l’Office. 
Le Conseil d’administration étant composé en grande majorité par les chefs des 
Offices nationaux, il constitue un organe privilégié de contact entre la direction 
de l’Office à Alicante et les directions des Offices nationaux des Etats 
membres. L’expérience rassemblée autour de la table du Conseil 
d'administration est, comme vous vous en doutez, considérable. Par ailleurs, le 
Conseil d’administration est chargé de dresser la liste des candidats pour la 
Présidence et les vice-présidences, ainsi que pour les membres des chambres de 
recours.
La quatrième section traite de l’application des procédures. Elle définit 
notamment les différentes structures administratives à l’intérieur de l’Office 
telle que, les examinateurs, les divisions d’opposition, la division de 
l’administration des marques et des questions juridiques, les divisions 
d’annulations et les chambres de recours. Il faut ici faire une mention 
particulière pour les Chambres de recours. Celles-ci sont constituées au sein de 
l’Office mais sont totalement indépendantes quant aux décisions à prendre. 
Elles peuvent statuer sur toutes les décisions des examinateurs, des divisions 
d’opposition, de la division de l’administration des marques et des questions 
juridiques, et des divisions annulations. Ce n’est que lorsque les Chambres de 
recours ont rendu leur décision qu’un intéressé peut avoir recours au Tribunal 
de première instance à Luxembourg s’il persiste à estimer que ses intérêts sont 
lésés.
La cinquième section du titre XII traite du budget et du contrôle financier. Elle 




























































































Jean-Claude Combaldieu: l ’Office de l'harmonisation dans le marché intérieur
numéro 17 du règlement qui résume les objectifs principaux en matière 
budgétaire pour l’Office. 11 indique les raisons pour lesquelles l’Office est 
autonome sur le plan budgétaire:
“considérant que, en vue d’assurer la pleine autonomie et l’indépendance de l’Office, 
il est considéré nécessaire de le doter d’un budget autonome dont les recettes 
comprennent principalement le produit de taxes dues par les utilisateurs du système; 
que, cependant, la procédure budgétaire communautaire reste d’application en ce qui 
concerne les subventions éventuelles à charge du budget général des Communautés 
européennes; que, par ailleurs, il convient que la vérification des comptes soit 
effectuée par la Cour des Comptes.”
On peut donc constater que le Conseil a souhaité donner une autonomie à 
l’Office puisqu’il va même jusqu’à utiliser le terme “indépendance”. La mise 
en place d’un budget autonome est certainement une mesure nécessaire pour 
garantir cette situation. Il n’en reste pas moins vrai que dans la réalité, 
notamment parce que l’Office a besoin d’une subvention communautaire 
importante pour la mise en place de ces différentes infrastructures, cette 
indépendance est théorique. Nous verrons tout à l’heure que l’expérience des 
exercices budgétaires passés a largement confirmé cette situation. Il n’en reste 
pas moins vrai que la 5ème section du titre XII met en place les conditions de 
cette autonomie budgétaire. Le Comité budgétaire joue un rôle central. C’est en 
effet lui qui arrête le budget qui comprend également le tableau des effectifs de 
l’Office. Le Comité budgétaire est donc l’autorité budgétaire de l’Office. Il est 
toutefois prévu, que pour autant que les prévisions budgétaires prévoient une 
subvention communautaire, un état prévisionnel préparé par le Président et 
approuvé par le Comité budgétaire soit transmis à la Commission qui elle- 
même le répercute à l’autorité budgétaire des Communautés européennes. La 
Commission peut par ailleurs joindre à cet avant projet de budget de l’Office un 
avis circonstancié comportant éventuellement des prévisions divergentes.
En ce qui concerne l’exécution du budget de l’Office, le règlement prévoit deux 
mesures particulièrement importantes. La première est que le contrôle de 
l’engagement de paiement de toutes les dépenses et le contrôle de la 
constatation et du recouvrement de toutes les recettes de l ’Office sont exercés 
par un contrôleur financier désigné par le Comité budgétaire. L’Office dispose 
d’un contrôleur financier sur place à Alicante. Il faut savoir que dans un Office 
comme le nôtre, le contrôleur financier joue un rôle essentiel. Bien entendu, il 
contrôle notre régie d’avance ainsi que tous les dossiers qui ont des 
conséquences financières pour l’Office (ex. actes d’engagement pour les 
achats; passation de marchés publics; fixation des droits à l’entrée en fonction 
des agents). Mais il est aussi pour le Président et pour tous les services de 
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ou de droits du personnel. Il faut d’ailleurs indiquer qu’il est en contact 
permanent avec les services de la Commission et notamment du contrôleur 
financier (DG XX). Je tiens à souligner que la présence sur place du contrôleur 
financier est une nécessité. Du reste, nous avons eu pendant une période 
l’expérience de devoir passer par les services de la Commission. Les difficultés 
de communication sont telles que ce système n’est pas viable pour un Office 
dans lequel le contrôleur financier est amené à viser une cinquantaine de 
dossiers par semaine en moyenne. La situation est encore pire pour ne pas dire 
intenable en période de “coup de feu” comme en fin d’exercice. Enfin et 
surtout, maintenant que nous percevons des recettes quotidiennement c’est des 
centaines de visas par semaine que le contrôleur va avoir à effectuer.
L’exécution du budget est également contrôlée politiquement puisque le 
Président de l’Office doit adresser à la Commission, au Parlement européen, au 
Comité budgétaire et à la Cour des Comptes, les comptes de la totalité des 
recettes et des dépenses pour l’exercice écoulé. La Cour des comptes joue son 
rôle conformément à l’article 188C du Traité.
Enfin, il est prévu à l’article 138 du règlement que l’Office dispose de son 
propre règlement financier qui est arrêté par le Comité budgétaire après avis de 
la Commission et de la Cour des comptes européenne. Il est expressément 
prévu que les dispositions financières s’inspirent, dans la mesure compatible 
avec le caractère propre de l’Office, des règlements financiers adoptés pour 
d’autres organismes créés par la Communauté. En d’autres termes, le règlement 
financier de l’Office doit être harmonisé avec celui des autres organismes créés 
par la Communauté. Il l’est déjà. Ceci correspond pleinement au souci légitime 
de cohérence exprimé par le Parlement européen. L’Office dispose de son 
règlement financier depuis un certain temps, puisque celui-ci a été adopté par le 
Comité budgétaire du mois de juillet de l’année dernière avec l’avis favorable 
des institutions notamment de la Cour des Comptes.
ffl. L’EXPÉRIENCE DE L’OFFICE JUSQU’À CE JOUR
La mise en place de l’Office sur le plan réglementaire est une chose. La vie de 
l’Office, sa véritable entrée en fonction, ses relations avec les autres institutions 
de la Communauté ainsi que son rôle dans les relations internationales, sont des 
questions différentes.




























































































Jean-Claude Combaldieu: l'Office de l ’harmonisation dans le marché intérieur
Le principal partenaire de l’Office de l’harmonisation dans le marché 
intérieur est, bien entendu, la Commission des Communautés européennes et 
plus particulièrement la DG XV chargée du marché intérieur et des services 
financiers. En fait, ce sont les services de cette Direction Générale, qui après 
avoir négocié le règlement 40/94, ont fait les premiers pas et les premiers 
travaux pour la mise en place effective de l’Office. Ce n’est qu’au fur et à 
mesure que l’Office se constituait que le rôle de cette Direction Générale s’est 
amenuisé. Tout le monde comprendra aisément, qu’il n’est pas toujours facile 
pour les personnes qui ont investi un temps et une énergie considérable dans la 
mise en place d’un système juridique de voir partir leur enfant qui veut devenir 
indépendant. Si on ajoute à cela que certains des cadres principaux de l’Office 
sont en fait d’anciens membres de la Direction Générale XV qui ont participé à 
la négociation du règlement 40/94, on comprendra qu’il y ait une relation très 
sensible entre l’Office, et en tout cas une grande partie des ses agents, et les 
fonctionnaires de la DG XV. Je peux dire que tout c’est globalement bien 
passé.
11 est évident que la bonne connaissance que les uns ont des autres a un côté 
particulièrement positif. Il ne faut toutefois pas réduire la relation actuelle de 
l’Office à ces relations humaines entre personnes qui se connaissent. Au niveau 
institutionnel des relations entre l’Office et les services de la Commission, il y a 
parfois des difficultés liées à la rupture ou à l’élongation du lien entre le “père 
et l’enfant”. Les services de la Commission, qui s’est battue pour que l’Office 
soit autonome en tout cas sur le plan administratif, semblent parfois avoir un 
vrai problème à accepter toutes les conséquences de la politique qu’ils ont 
mené avec tant de détermination.
Ainsi certains services semblent avoir un vrai problème pour accepter toutes 
les conséquences de la création de l’Office. Je citerai en exemple le fait que les 
premiers fonctionnaires qui sont venus travailler à Alicante ont rencontré des 
difficultés parfois considérables pour obtenir leur détachement. D’ailleurs, un 
certain nombre d’entre eux ont dû attendre plus d’une année pour que leur 
situation administrative soit réglée de manière claire du côté de la Commission. 
En ce qui concerne les fonctionnaires du Secrétariat Général du Conseil, leur 
détachement n’a été accepté qu’il y a très récemment.
Il faut dire que ces réticences ou ces hésitations ne semblent pas du tout se 
refléter au niveau supérieur de la Commission, c’est à dire au niveau des 
Commissaires eux-mêmes. A ce titre, je dois dire que le Commissaire Monti 
qui est en charge du marché intérieur, de même que le Président Jacques Santer, 
nous ont toujours donné un soutien sans réserve. Du reste, le Président Santer, 




























































































The New European Agencies
des agences décentralisées et notamment la nôtre. Il a dit avec la plus grande 
clarté, que ce qu’il avait voulu en tant que Président du Gouvernement 
Luxembourgeois lorsqu’il siégeait au Conseil européen, c’est à dire 
l’autonomie de l’Office, il le voulait toujours dans sa nouvelle fonction en tant 
que Président de la Commission. Dans le journal EUR-OP NEWS n° 4 (Hiver 
1995) il déclarait: “Avec son autonomie administrative et financière l ’Office 
des marques est la parfaite illustration de cette politique de décentralisation. Il 
faut dans le futur aller dans cette direction et identifier des domaines 
spécifiques où une plus grande efficacité peut être obtenue en termes 
d ’administration et de m anagem entCette conviction doit encore descendre la 
hiérarchie.
En ce qui concerne nos relations avec le Conseil et le Parlement européen, 
celles-ci sont limitées. On ne peut d’ailleurs pas dire qu’il y ait véritablement 
une relation entre l’Office et le Conseil ou une relation entre l’Office et le 
Parlement européen. Toutefois, l’Office participe aux réunions du groupe de 
travail du Conseil sur les projets de directive et de règlement relatifs aux 
dessins et modèles industriels.
En ce qui concerne le Secrétariat Général du Conseil, nos contacts se limitent 
au détachement de fonctionnaires ou, dans un cas bien précis, à la demande que 
nous avons formulée au Secrétaire Général du Conseil de pouvoir publier dans 
le Journal Officiel de l ’Office les déclarations interprétatives adoptées lors de 
l’adoption du règlement 40/94.
Le Parlement européen, est une institution beaucoup plus multiforme. Nous 
n’avons pas, en tant que tel, des relations institutionnelles avec lui. Je peux 
toutefois indiquer que j ’ai rencontré le Président Hànsch lors d’une de ses 
visites en Espagne, et que nous avons eu des contacts avec un certain nombre 
de parlementaires européens lors du débat budgétaire. Par ailleurs, j ’ai participé 
au mois de mars de l’année dernière à une réunion de la commission des 
budgets dans laquelle j ’ai été amené à expliquer le rôle et la composition de 
l’Office et à faire valoir nos prises de position en matière budgétaire.
2. Personnel et budget
Comme il a été rappelé tout à l’heure dans le deuxième partie de cet exposé, 
le Président de l’Office de l’harmonisation dans le marché intérieur a la 
fonction d’Autorité investie du pouvoir de nomination. C’est lui qui a le 
pouvoir de nommer agents auxiliaires, agents temporaires ou fonctionnaires des 
personnes qui travaillent pour son Office. Le statut des fonctionnaires et autres 




























































































Jean-Claude Combaldieu: l ’Office de l ’harmonisation dans le marché intérieur
autonomie de recrutement dont nous faisons usage pleinement. Dans un 
premier temps, les hauts fonctionnaires désignés par le Conseil, c’est à dire le 
Président et les deux vice-présidents, ont choisi des collaborateurs parmi ceux 
qui à la Commission ou dans les Etats membres avaient participé à la 
préparation de l’Office. Ceux-ci sont donc particulièrement qualifés. Nous y 
avons ajouté toute une série de personnes que nous avons recrutées localement 
et qui avaient les capacités requises pour travailler dans un organisme 
international. Une grande partie du personnel encore engagé aujourd’hui, est 
constituée par des fonctionnaires des différentes institutions Communautaires 
qui souhaitent travailler à l’OHMI. Ces fonctionnaires obtiennent en principe 
un détachement de leur institution d’origine et sont dans un premier temps 
engagés sur base d’un contrat d’agent temporaire.
Maintenant que l’Office a commencé véritablement à fonctionner, nous 
avons procédé, pour le recrutement des examinateurs, qui est la tâche la plus 
importante à l’Office à l’heure actuelle, à des publications d’annonces passées 
dans les principaux journaux. Il s’agit d’un véritable concours dans lequel 
toutefois, nous n’avons pas fait passer des épreuves écrites aux candidats. Je 
tiens à souligner que l’absence d’épreuves écrites n’est en rien motivée par une 
quelconque facilité. D’abord, les personnes qui seront recrutées sont des 
personnes qui effectuent déjà actuellement, dans les Offices nationaux, le 
travail d’examinateur ou qui sont des juristes ou spécialistes des marques dans 
les Etats membres. Les personnes dont le curriculum vitae est satisfaisant sont 
convoquées pour une épreuve orale à l’issue de laquelle nous décidons ou non 
de les faire mettre sur une liste de réserve. Toutefois, les ressources de l’Office 
étant ce qu’elles sont, il nous est totalement impossible d’organiser un concours 
sur base d’épreuves écrites et orales. Je souligne ce point, parce qu’il est parfois 
reproché aux agences d’effectuer des recrutements sur des bases qui ne sont pas 
très objectives. En ce qui nous concerne c’est tout le contraire. Je dois ajouter 
que, s’agissant d’un travail très spécialisé (l’examen des marques) l’origine des 
candidats est parfaitement identifiable dans la mesure où nous avons été de la 
plus haute exigence en matière de compétence et d’expérience. Il s’agit de 
critères objectifs et notre indépendance nous a permis de résister à toutes sortes 
de pressions. Il faut savoir que le système des concours tel qu’il est conçu par 
les institutions à Bruxelles est un système extraordinairement lourd et coûteux. 
Si l’on sait que l’Office avait pour 1995 un budget d’un peu plus de 9 millions 
d’écus, on comprendra aisément qu'il soit totalement impossible pour nous de 
procéder par ce genre de concours.
Comme il a été dit tout à l’heure, les agents sont d’abord recrutés sur base 
d’un contrat d’agent temporaire. Mais il est évident qu’un organisme tel que le 




























































































The New European Agencies
impossible le maintient dans les services des personnes sur base de contrats 
d’agents temporaires au-delà d’un certains temps. On a donc soit le choix de 
renouveler complètement ces effectifs au bout de trois ans lorsque le contrat 
d’agent temporaire est échu ou alors il faut procéder à la titularisation de ces 
personnes. Nous avons choisi cette deuxième solution pour les agents qui 
donnent satisfaction. Ainsi, l’Office aura ses propres fonctionnaires et pourra 
fonctionner dans la continuité et la sérénité.
Il y a lieu de souligner, que pour ce qui est de nos recrutements, nous 
sommes extrêmement vigilants et nous faisons particulièrement attention à ne 
recruter que ceux qui correspondent effectivement aux tâches que nous devons 
remplir. Ainsi, nous ne recrutons pas à tout va, mais nous attendons de voir le 
nombre de demandes de marques qui seront véritablement déposées afin de 
déterminer le nombre d’examinateurs que nous allons engager. Ceci nous 
permet de faire le lien avec les questions budgétaires.
A l’heure actuelle, le budget de l’Office de l’harmonisation dans le marché 
intérieur est constitué de deux composantes. La première, sont les ressources 
propres à l’Office qui ne sont rien d’autre que les taxes et autres tarifs que 
l’Office exige des intéressés lorsque ceux-ci déposent une marque ou lorsqu’ils 
s’abonnent au Journal Officiel. En 1996, selon le budget prévisionnel que nous 
avons, ces ressources propres devraient être supérieures à la subvention 
communautaire qui constitue notre deuxième ressource. Mais l’obtention de la 
ressource communautaire pose bien des problèmes.
Les expériences que nous avons eues pour l’adoption de notre budget pour 
1996 sont une longue succession de difficultés. D’abord, notre Comité 
budgétaire a fixé un montant de subvention communautaire en fonction des 
besoins. Toutefois, la Commission a baissé de 20% le montant fixé par le 
Comité budgétaire. Une fois que la Commission s’était prononcée, l’autorité 
budgétaire a reçu l’avant projet de budget général des Communautés 
européennes. Dans un contexte budgétaire difficile, le Conseil a, dans un 
premier temps, fait savoir qu’il souhaiterait probablement encore baisser la 
subvention communautaire de l’Office. Finalement, il a confirmé, en première 
lecture, l’avant-projet de la Commission. Par contre, le Parlement européen, en 
fonction de ses propres priorités politiques, a estimé que le budget des agences 
en général était trop élevé. Notre budget n’a pas fait exception aux yeux du 
Parlement européen. C’est là que la difficulté de communiquer avec le 
Parlement s’est faite jour. Pour nous, la question était de savoir comment nous 
pourrions expliquer au Parlement européen que nous sommes dans une phase 
d’investissement et que sans des investissements maintenant il ne serait pas 




























































































Jean-Claude Combaldieu: l ’Office de l'harmonisation dans le marché intérieur
cela est son rôle. Or, le fait pour nous de ne pas pouvoir enregistrer des 
marques signifie que des recettes allaient être perdues. Il nous fallait donc 
expliquer qu’il nous faut de l’argent pour que nous puissions gagner notre 
propre argent. En tout cas, nous n’avons pas ménagé nos efforts. C’est un peu 
comme une usine de voitures qui doit d’abord être construite à la bonne 
dimension pour permettre la production puis la vente de voitures en nombre 
suffisant sur le marché. L’Office est une usine administrative.
Ils ont été couronnés de succès en ce sens qu’en deuxième lecture, le Parlement 
européen a finalement retenu une subvention pour l’Office de l’harmonisation 
dans le marché intérieur égale à ce que la Commission européenne avait 
proposé, c’est à dire 16,2 millions d’écus.
Le Parlement a toutefois jugé utile de soumettre un dixième de cette subvention 
à une réserve. Je voudrais dire quelques mots sur le système des réserves. 
Autant je comprends que l’autorité budgétaire ou du moins une de ses branches, 
souhaite avoir un plus grand contrôle sur l’utilisation effective des budgets 
qu’elle a voté. Autant je dois souligner qu’il est pratiquement impossible pour 
les personnes qui gèrent effectivement les agences d’avoir une gestion et une 
administration cohérentes de leurs services lorsque ces réserves sont levées tard 
ou même très tard. Il faut savoir qu’une réserve de 1 mécus n’a été levée par le 
Parlement européen que fin novembre de l’année dernière. Je rappelle que 1 
mécu constituait une somme considérable pour l’Office puisque le budget total 
était inférieur à 10 millions. Dans ces conditions, la libération tardive de la 
réserve a eu comme conséquence que nous n’avons pas pu utiliser tous les 
fonds comme nous aurions souhaité le faire. Ceci a notamment 
considérablement retardé le recrutement de toute une série d’agents de l’Office.
L’autre élément qu’il faut souligner dans la procédure budgétaire qui s’applique 
à l’Office, est qu'il est traumatisant pour nous de vivre des batailles politiques 
au plus haut niveau dans lesquels nous ne sommes finalement qu’une quantité 
négligeable qui est balayée de gauche à droite. Par ailleurs, alors que le 
règlement précise que pour l’établissement du budget l’état prévisionnel doit 
être transmis par la Commission aux autorités budgétaires avec les 
commentaires de la Commission, nous nous sommes retrouvés dans la situation 
où la Commission a préparé son avant-projet de budget comme bon lui semblait 
et n’a transmis nos prévisions qu’en annexe. Il en est résulté que leur 
distribution au Conseil et au Parlement européen en a été moindre que prévu. 
Dans ces conditions, il était presqu’impossible pour l’Office de défendre son 
budget qui pourtant était tout à fait légitime et justifié. Une amélioration serait 




























































































The New European Agencies
Quoiqu’il en soit, l’objectif de notre Office est de devenir autosuffisant sur le 
plan budgétaire comme la plupart des Offices nationaux. Je répète ici ce à quoi 
je me suis engagé auprès de certains membre du Parlement européen: si nous 
obtenons des subventions communautaires suffisantes pour lancer cet Office de 
manière satisfaisante, nous serons financés par nos propres recettes dans moins 
de dix années.
3. Relations de l’Office avec les Offices nationaux et l’Organisation 
Mondiale de la Propriété Intellectuelle
En ce qui concerne les relations avec les Offices nationaux de la propriété 
industrielle, celles-ci sont excellentes, importantes et régulières. En fait, les 
Offices nationaux ont joué un rôle essentiel dans la définition de la marque 
communautaire lors des négociations sur le règlement du Conseil. Par ailleurs, 
ces Offices nationaux gardent un rôle prédominant puisque ce sont 
généralement eux qui envoient à l’Office des représentants au Conseil 
d’administration. Du point de vue du fonctionnement de système de la marque 
communautaire, les Offices nationaux ont également un rôle à jouer. Ils 
constituent d’abord des offices décentralisés auprès desquels il est possible de 
déposer des demandes de marques communautaires. En d’autres termes, un 
demandeur de marque n’est pas obligé de remettre sa demande directement à 
l’Office à Alicante, il peut très bien effectuer ce dépôt auprès d’un institut 
national de la propriété industrielle ou auprès du bureau Bénélux des Marques.
Le règlement prévoit également que lorsqu’une demande de marque a été 
soumise à l’OHMI, celui-ci transmet une copie aux services nationaux de 
propriété industrielle des Etats membres afin qu’ils effectuent une recherche 
d’antériorité dans leurs propres registres nationaux.
De plus l’Office organise des réunions de travail avec les Offices centraux de 
propriété industrielle des Etats membres, notamment afin de mettre au point 
exactement les données techniques qui doivent être incluses dans les 
formulaires ou dans les notes explicatives, ou afin de définir les nonnes 
informatiques qui seront appliquées pour les contacts entre les points qui 
constituent ce réseau.
Ces contacts au niveau technique, sont également une nécessité entre 
l’Office et l’Organisation mondiale de la propriété intellectuelle. Il y a lieu de 
rappeler que l’OMPI n’est pas seulement une organisation spécialisée des 
Nations Unies au sens le plus politique du terme, mais son bureau international 
est surtout un office international d’enregistrement de marques. Or, la marque 




























































































Jean-Claude Combaldieu: l ’Office de l ’harmonisation dans le marché intérieur
lorsque la Communauté aura ratifié le Protocole à l’arrangement de Madrid sur 
l’enregistrement international des marques.
Toutefois, la question des relations internationales est particulièrement 
sensible au niveau communautaire. La Commission européenne estime être 
investie d’un monopole des relations avec les Nations Unies et les 
organisations spécialisées de ce système en vertu de l’article 229 du Traité CE. 
En conséquence, la définition du rôle de l’OHMI dans les relations avec 
l’OMPI, a fait l’objet de quelques malentendus et difficultés avec les services 
de la Commission. Finalement, des contacts répétés et une bonne volonté 
mutuelle nous ont amenés à des solutions qui seront satisfaisantes pour tout le 
monde. L’Office pourra participer dans la délégation de la Communauté 
européenne ou de la Commission selon le cas, lorsque des questions traitant des 
marques seront abordées au sein de l’OMPI.
IV. CONCLUSION
Je pense que la mise en place de l’agence spécialisée que constitue l’Office de 
l’harmonisation dans le marché intérieur (marques, dessins et modèles) était 
une nécessité incontournable pour la Communauté à partir du moment où celle- 
ci s’est dotée d’un titre de propriété intellectuelle particulier. Bien entendu, ce 
type de décentralisation, qu’il y a d’ailleurs plutôt lieu d’appeler une 
déconcentration, ne va pas sans poser des problèmes de départ. Une structure 
nouvelle comme notre agence, doit trouver sa place et se faire accepter par les 
institutions préexistantes. Je ne doute toutefois pas que nous trouverons notre 
juste place et que nous serons acceptés pour ce que nous sommes par les 
institutions préexistantes. L’existence de l’Office n’est pas et ne peut pas être 
une menace pour l’équilibre institutionnel existant. L’Office répond 
simplement à la création nouvelle que constitue la marque communautaire et 
bientôt, j ’espère, les dessins et modèles industriels. Aucun autre moyen pour 
gérer cette marque n’eut pu être aussi efficace et conforme aux intérêts de la 
Communauté européenne et de ses entreprises qu’un office autonome qui sera, 




























































































A N  A D M IN IS T R A T IV E  P E R S P E C T IV E  F R O M  T H E  
C O M M IS S IO N
Niels AHRENDT, Secretariat-General, European Commission
I. The relation between the Commission and the Agencies
Role of the Secretariat General in relation with the new Agencies
Other horizontal Services have a certain role in relation with Agencies.
The formal link and the main contact points between the Commission and each 
Agency
II. Commission's motives and reasons for the establishment of 
decentralized Community Organizations
The time - End of the '80’s, beginning of the '90’s.
A pragmatic approach and ad hoc process
Motives and reasons
III. The new Agencies
- more differences than common functions
-Misled if we regard the new Agencies as a more or less homogeneous group 



























































































The New European Agencies
Four different groups of Agencies in which to place the existing 8 + 2 Agencies.
1
. European Agency for the Evaluation 
of Medicinal Products 
. Office for Harmonization in the 
Internal Market (Trade, Maries and 
Designs)
. The Community Plant Variety Office
9
Own resources/Self-financing 
Conformity and notification of 
product, etc.
z
. European Environment Agency 
. European Monitoring Centre for 
Drugs and Drugs Addiction 
(EMCDDA)
Central for collection and 
dissimination of information, extra 
Union, "Regulation by information"
3
European Foundation for the 
Improvment of Living and Working 
Conditions
European Centre for the 
Development of Vocational Training 
. Agency for Health and Safety at 
Work
Tripartite
Instrument for bringing the social 
partners together in a closer 
collaboration
4
. European Training Foundation 
. The Translation Center for Bodies of 
the European Union Subcontracting from other Institutions I 
Commission, Agencies, etc...
When we reach the time to make an evaluation of the experience and value added 
of the Agencies that evaluation will first be made for each Agency on its own 
merits.




























































































L E S  A G E N C E S  E U R O P E E N N E S : P E R S P E C T IV E  J U R ID I Q U E
D U  C O N S E IL
Antonio SACCHETTINI, Directeur au Service juridique du Conseil
1. En répondant le 18 décembre 1995 à une question écrite portant sur les 
"Organismes communautaires, notamment organismes décentralisés"1, le 
Président Santer indiquait qu'"(7 est peut-être utile de préciser que les agences 
(de première et deuxième génération) ont été créées pour effectuer un travail 
technique, scientifique ou de gestion bien précisé dans leurs actes constitutifs."
Les actes auxquels il est fait référence dans leur ensemble étant les dix 
règlements par lesquels les organismes actuellement existants ont été institués, la 
subdivision entre organismes "de première" et "de deuxième génération" semble 
reposer sur une distinction de nature juridique relative à des entités créées par le 
traité lui-même d'une part, par des actes fondés sur celui-ci d'autre part. Quoi 
qu'il en soit, cette distinction juridique est pertinente afin de mieux caractériser 
dans leurs différents aspects institutionnels les organismes dont il s'agit.
2. Même s'ils sont indiqués avec des dénominations variées (agence, office, 
fondation, observatoire, centre), ces organismes ont tous la même nature 
juridique et ne doivent dès lors pas être confondus avec certaines entités créées 
par les traités communautaires d’une part et avec certains services de la 
Commission d'autre part.
On rapellera en ce qui concerne la première catégorie la Banque européenne 
d'investissement (art. 4 B et 198 D du TCE), l'Agence d’approvisionnement de la 
CEEA (art. 52 par. 2b), l'Institut monétaire européen et la Banque centrale 
européenne (art. 109 F, 4 A et 106 respectivement du TCE); quant à la deuxième, 
l'Office statistique et l'Office d'inspection vétérinaire et phytosanitaire.
3. Certains points communs existent entre les organismes rentrant dans la 
première catégorie qui vient d'être rappelée et les "agences européennes" qui font 
l'objet de la présente conférence.
Comme les premières, celles-ci sont régies par le droit communautaire. Elles 
constituent des organismes de droit public distinctes de la Commission et, 
comme il est indiqué ci-dessus, sont chargés d'un travail technique, scientifique,



























































































The New European Agencies
ou de gestion bien spécifique. Les "agences" (comme les entités visées à la 
première catégorie du paragraphe 2 ci-dessus) sont dotées de la personnalité 
juridique la plus large reconnue par les Etats membres. D'une manière générale, 
elles connaissent une structure caractérisée par la présence d'un conseil 
d'administration, dont la composition est fixée par le règlement portant création 
de l'organisme dont il s'agit2 et d'un directeur exécutif qui est le responsable légal 
du même organisme.
Des différences existent parmi les différentes "agences" quant aux dispositions 
applicables à leurs budgets et à leur personnel, comme il sera indiqué plus avant.
4. La liste des organismes décentralisés reprise dans la réponse à la question 
écrite reprise à paragraphe 1 ci-dessus est la suivante (dans l'ordre chronologique 
de leur création):
1. Centre européen pour le développement de la formation 
professionnelle (CEDEFOP) (Règlement N° 337/75 du Conseil, JO 
L 39/75).
2. Fondation européenne pour l'amélioration des conditions de vie et 
de travail (Règlement N° 1365/75 du Conseil, JO L 139/75.3
3. Agence européenne pour l'environnement (Règlement N° 11210/90 
du Conseil, JO L 120/90).
4. Fondation européenne pour la formation (Règlement N° 1360/90 du 
Conseil, JO L 131/90).4
5. Observatoire européen des drogues et des toxicomanies (Règlement 
N° 302/93 du Conseil, JO L 36/93)5
6. Agence européenne pour l'évaluation des médicaments (Règlement 
N° 2309/93 du Conseil, JO L 214/93).
7. Office de l'harmonisation dans le marché intérieur (marques, dessins 
et modèles) (Règlement N° 40/94 du Conseil, JO L 11/94).
2 Des représentants des Etats membres et de la Commission ainsi que, exceptionnellement des 
personnalités désignées par le Parlement européen, font partie du conseil d'administration.
3 Modifié par les Règlements N° 1131/94 {JO L 127/94) et 354/95 {JO L 41/95).
4 Modifié par le Règlement N° 2063/94, JO L 216/94.



























































































Antonio Sacchettini: Les Agences européennes: perspectives juridique du Conseil
8. Agence européenne pour la sécurité et la santé au travail (Règlement 
N° 2062/94 du Conseil, JO L 216/94).6
9. Office communautaire des variétés végétales (Règlement N° 
2100/94, JO L 227/94).
10. Centre de traduction des organes de l'Union européenne (Règlement 
N° 2965/94, JO L 314/94).7
5. On observera à titre de rappel historique que les organismes qui viennent d'être 
mentionnés ne sont pas les seuls qui ont été institués par des dispositions 
adoptées en vertu du traité; en 1973, le Règlement N° 907/73 du Conseil a 
institué un Fonds européen de coopération monétaire ayant pour objectif de 
contribuer à la réalisation par étapes, entre les Etats membres de la CEE, d'une 
union européenne économique et monétaire;8 en 1981, le Règlement N° 3245/81 
du Conseil a créé une Agence européenne de coopération destinée à faciliter les 
tâches confiées à la Commission en matière de coopération avec les ACP, 
notamment en ce qui concerne la question du personnel recruté à cet effet.9
Ni l'un ni l'autre de ces règlements n’ont été abrogés à ce jour.
6. A une exception près10, l'ensemble de ces règlements a été adopté par le 
Conseil sur la base de l'article 235 du traité. Le recours à cet article exige que les 
trois conditions suivantes soient remplies:
"une action de la Communauté apparaît nécessaire" (le caractère 
nécessaire de l'action est soumis à l'appréciation politique du 
législateur communautaire),
"pour réaliser, dans le fonctionnement du marché commun, l'un des 
objets de la Communauté",
"sans que le traité ait prévu les pouvoirs d'action requis à cet effet".
6 Modifié par le Règlement N° 1643/95, JO L 156/95.
7 Modifié par le Règlement N° 2610/95, JO L 2678/95.
8 JO L 89/73.
9 JO L 328/81.
10 Le Règlement N° 1210/90, relatif à la création de l'Agence européenne de l'environnement est 




























































































The New European Agencies
On observera que les objets de la Communauté s'identifient dans une large 
mesure à la mission de la Communauté (article 2 du traité) et à l'énumération de 
l'article 3, auxquels il convient d'ajouter les objectifs spécifiques définis à 
certains articles du traité, voire les objectifs découlant du système du traité pris 
dans son ensemble. L'existence de "pouvoirs d'actions" repris à l'effet voulu 
faisant défaut sauf quant à l'Agence européenne de l'environnement - où ces 
pouvoirs sont accordés par l'article 130 S du traité - l'article 235 a été retenu 
comme base juridique des différents règlements.
On rappellera que dans deux cas le Conseil s'est écarté à cet égard de la 
proposition de la Commission: il s'agit de l'Agence européenne pour l'évaluation 
des médicaments, pour la création de laquelle la Commission avait proposé un 
règlement fondé sur l'article 100A du traité CEE, et de l'Office européen pour les 
obtentions végétales pour lequel la Commission avait envisagé dans sa 
proposition l'article 43 du même traité.
Quelles quelles soient, les opinions juridiques à cet égard11, la question paraît 
désormais tranchée par la jurisprudence au moins quant au domaine de la 
propriété intellectuelle à la suite de l'arrêt de la Cour en date du 13 juillet 1995 
dans l'affaire C-350/92 (Royaume d'Espagne contre Conseil), aux termes duquel:
"...la Communauté dispose... d'une compétence d'harmonisation des 
législations nationales au titre des articles 100 et 100 A et peut se 
fonder sur l'article 235 pour créer des titres nouveaux qui viennent 
se superposer aux titres nationaux, comme elle l'a fait avec le 
règlement sur la marque communautaire... " (paragraphe 23).
7. Des questions spécifiques se sont posées à 1 égard des "agences" faisant l'objet 
de la présente conférence dans trois domaines particuliers: le budget, le statut du 
personnel et le lieu d'implantation (site).
a) Lorsque le Conseil crée un organisme communautaire doté 
de la personnalité juridique, deux solutions sont possibles 
sur le plan budgétaire:
11 On rappellera que l'article 100 A en tant que fondement juridique du Règlement 2309 
(Agence) a été écarté sur la base de la constatation que le système centralisé d'évaluation des 
médicaments et la création d'une Agence ne relevaient pas d'un rapprochement des législations 
nationales et que la création d'un Office communautaire des variétés végétales et d'un régime de 





























































































Antonio Sacchettini: Les Agences européennes: perspectives juridique du Conseil 
l'intégration dans le budget général des Communautés des 
recettes et des dépenses de l'organisme en cause,
ou
la création d'un budget propre de l'organisme, distinct du 
budget général.
La deuxième solution a pour conséquence que l'acte communautaire portant 
création de l'organisme doit contenir des dispositions budgétaires autonomes.
La première solution a été retenue pour le CEDEFOP, la Fondation pour 
l'amélioration des conditions de vie et de travail et l'Agence européenne pour 
l'évaluation des médicaments. On remarquera que, parmi les différents 
organismes faisant l'objet de la présente conférence, l'Agence européenne pour 
l'évaluation des médicaments et l'Office de l’harmonisation dans le marché 
intérieur disposent de recettes propres.
b) Les dispositions applicables au personnel des organismes 
dont il s'agit peuvent également être distinguées entre les 
deux régimes suivants:
fixation de dispositions à titre autonome
ou
renvoi à l'application du statut des fonctionnaires des 
Communautés européennes.
Le premier régime a été appliqué dans une première période par le CEDEFOP, la 
Fondation européenne pour l'amélioration des conditions de vie et de travail et la 
Fondation européenne pour la formation.
Un tel régime a donné lieu en cas de contentieux à des difficultés analogues à 
celles qui ont surgi à l’égard du personnel de la Banque européeenne 
d’investissement. D’une manière analogue à l’arrêt concernant un agent de celle- 
ci12, la Cour s’est fondée notamment sur l’application du protocole sur les 
privilèges et immunités des Communautés européennes au personnel du




























































































The New European Agencies
CEDEFOP pour constater que “les agents du Centre sont des agents des 
Communautés européennes”.13
Dans un souci d’harmonisation des régimes relatifs au personnel à appliquer au 
sein des différents organismes, la Commission a proposé en 1994 d’étendre les 
dispositions du statut des fonctionnaires et du régime applicable aux autres 
agents aux trois organismes visés ci-dessus. Par son Règlement N° 2063/94 du 
27 juillet 1994, le Conseil a adopté une disposition en ce sens en ce qui concerne 
la Fondation européenne pour la formation.
c) Le nombre croissant d’”agences” créées dans les années 
1990 a donné lieu à de sérieuses difficultés quant à leur lieu 
d’implantation, chacun des différents Etats membres ayant 
manifesté son intérêt à avoir leur siège sur son territoire. C’est à 
partir de l’adoption du Règlement N° 1210/90 relatif à la création 
de l’Agence européenne de l’environnement que, par une formule 
juridiquement assez critiquable, l’entrée en vigueur des 
règlements institutifs a été subordonnée à la décision des 
“autorités compétentes” sur le siège.14 C’est par leur décision du 
29 octobre 1993 que ces autorités, à savoir les représentants des 
Gouvernements des Etats membres réunis au niveau des chefs 
d’Etat ou de Gouvernements, ont procéedé à la fixation des 
différents sièges.15 La fixation du siège de l’Office 
Communautaire des variétés végétales n’a pas encore été décidée.
8. Comme il a été rappelé ci-dessus, chacun des organismes faisant l’objet de la 
présente conférence est doté de la personnalité juridique et dispose de certaines 
compétences. Dans la mesure où l’organisme en question est compétent pour 
prendre des décisions ayant des effets juridiques, il est indispensable d’assurer la 
protection des particuliers sur le plan jurisdictionnel. Les moyens appropriés à cet 
effet mériteraient de faire l’objet d’une étude approfondie, les compétences 
exercées par les organismes en question étant de nature différente.
S’agissant de catégories particulières de parties intéressées (les demandeurs 
d’enregistrement d’une marque ou de protection d’une obtention végétale), des 
systèmes de recours devant les chambres spécialisées avec recours ou pourvoi 
devant la Cour de Justice des Communautés sont prévus.
13 Cf. arrêt du 13 mai 1982 dans l’affaire 16/81, Alaimo, Rec„ p. 1559.
14 Cf. l’article 21 du Règlement N° 1210/90.




























































































Antonio Sacchettini: Les Agences européennes: perspectives juridique du Conseil 
En ce qui concerne les particuliers sur un plan plus général, le problème a une 
importance relativement limitée à l’état actuel de la législation, les décisions 
prises par les différentes “agences” ayant, à l’exception de celles de l’Agence 
européenne pour l’évaluation des médicaments, des effets juridiques limités.
L’attribution d’un pouvoir à la Commission en tant qu’”organe de tutelle” mise à 
part16, deux solutions paraissent possibles à cet égard afin de garantir en toute 
circonstance la protection des droits individuels:
un système d’”appel” devant la Commission à l’encontre des actes 
adoptés par les différents organismes;
un droit de recours devant la Cour de Justice des Communautés 
européennes.
Le premier système, inspiré de l’article 53, deuxième alinéa du traité CEEA 
quant à l’Agence d’approvisionnement, a été repris par les règlements instituant 
le CEDEFOP (art. 18 du Règlement N° 337/75 du Conseil), la Fondation 
européenne pour l’amélioration des conditions de vie et de travail (art. 22 du 
Règlement N° 1365/75 du Conseil) et l’Office d’harmonisation dans le marché 
intérieur (art. 188, par. 3 du Règlement N° 40/94).
L’ouverture d’un droit généralisé de recours devant le Tribunal de première 
instance ou la Cour de Justice n’est pas actuellement prévue par les règlements 
régissant les différentes “agences” (hormis bien entendu à l’encontre des 
décisions des chambres des recours rappelées au début du présent paragraphe).
L’ouverture d’un droit de recours direct devant la Cour de Justice est en revanche 
prévue, par une modification expresse de l’article 173 du traité instituant la 
Communauté européenne, à l’encontre des actes d’un organe créé directement 
par ce traité, la Banque centrale européenne.
9. La croissance du nombre d’”agences” communautaires spécialisées mises en 
place au cours des dernières années et la constatation de leurs liaisons toujours 
plus étroites avec les administrations nationales ont amené les auteurs de 
l’ouvrage: “Europe: l’impossible statu quo” (“Club de Florence”) à envisager le 
renforcement d’une prise de décisions administratives individuelles de la part de 
ces agences, en faisant allusion à cet égard à un contrôle éventuel de la 
Commission. La nécessité évoquée ci-dessus d’une protection en toute





























































































The New European Agencies
circonstance de droits individuels exigerait au cas d’un tel renforcement un choix 




























































































T H E  F U T U R E  O F  E U R O P E A N  A G E N C IE S : A  B U D G E T A R Y  
P E R S P E C T IV E  F R O M  T H E  E U R O P E A N  P A R L IA M E N T
Laurens JAN BRINKHORST, Member of the European Parliament, General 
Rapporteur for the 1997 Budget
I am pleased with the initiative which Florence has taken and I think it is a very 
good sign that so many of the directors of agencies are present here today. I was 
asked to come and speak specifically from the Parliament point of view. Before I 
shall concentrate on the things which are ahead of us, let me look at things a little 
bit from a distance. As someone who has worked for a number of years to 
achieve the European Environment Agency, the idea of a hidden aspect of sort, 
of trying to get control by the Commission behind the backs of the Member 
States is really very funny. It took about five years before the Member States 
could agree on the seat of this Agency, although they themselves had actually 
created it after only three months’ discussion in the Council of Ministers. So, 
sometimes xenophobia is not only fed from within the Community, but also from 
outside the Community. That's one small point that I can make.
It is very appropriate to have this discussion at this time, because the 
pattern of development of the European agencies corresponds very much to the 
overall period of review of the Community structures. Within a few weeks, we 
shall start the IGC, we shall start the experiment which for the next year and a 
half will occupy a lot of Europeans on what is the future shape of Europe. To a 
certain extent, the exercise in which you have been engaged today and yesterday 
is an element of the overall cultural change of the bureaucracies in Europe as a 
whole. Words like transparency, more legitimacy, more control, are not limited, 
of course, to the agencies. They have to do with the overall pattern of how we 
organize our institutions, now and in the future. I feel that what Mr. Ahrendt said 
is correct, we are approaching a new era.
Although the United States, of course, remains an important element in our 
thinking, there are so many major differences in the way the United States is 
organized and the way we are organizing ourselves, that I would be wary of 
putting too much emphasis on comparisons. Just to take one example, the 
European Community structures, the bureaucracies in Brussels, still, after about 
forty years, employ no more than 15,000 to 20,000 persons. This is 



























































































The New European Agencies
way, compare that with the hundreds of thousands of U.S. federal employees. By 
its very nature, the organization of Europe has to depend much more on the 
cooperation of national structures than on separating European from state 
structures. The American administration, as Dehousse pointed-out, is largely 
based on the idea of division of powers, between state organs and federal organs 
working in the States. We have no federal organs working in the states, except in 
terms of the agencies, which are not very relevant in overall bureaucratic terms. I 
wish that those who have said that this is a take-over bid by the European 
Commission would show a little bit more understanding about what really 
happens on the ground.
Having said that, we have to deal with major new openings and initiatives. The 
origins of these agencies can be seen already in Article 8 of Euratom, which 
speaks of a joint nuclear research centre. At the time, the question was: shall it 
have a legal personality or not? Finally it was decided that it should not and it 
developed into the joint research center, which is sitting in Ispra, working for the 
past forty years as a Service to the Commission. The Statistical Office and the 
Publications Office were always seen as institutions of the Commission. If they 
were to be decentralised, the data would be removed from the centre of decision­
making in Brussels itself. So the whole question of dependence and 
independence has been with us for a long time. The originality and the novelty is 
perhaps that since 1990,we have suddenly had a proliferation of a number of new 
agencies, but for CEDEFOP and the Dublin agency, which were created in the 
mid-70's and already had some experience in a previous phase.
Now, let me come to the European Parliament. The Parliament was relatively late 
in reacting to this new phenomenon. In 1992, a number of years after the first 
agencies of the second generation were created, there was the first report, Mrs. 
Theato, Chairman of the Budget Control Committee, said we really needed to 
look not only at each of the individual agencies, but also at the overall structure. 
This is important from a legislative and budgetary point of view. Between 1987 
and 1992, between the Single European Act and the Treaty of Maastricht, the 
powers of the Parliament, in legislative terms, were very much limited to the 
internal market. We were still living "the last phase of the conspiracy of the 
initiated". We were living in the period between 1987 and 1992, when the 
Commission was at the heights of its power and still believed it could do without 
Parliament, helped to a certain extent by developments in the Council. So each 
time the Parliament proposed certain elements of democratization and control in 
these regulations, the Commission and the Council decided otherwise. But we are 




























































































Laurens Jan Brinkhorst: A Budgetary Perspective from the European Parliament
negotiated and the co-decision was granted to a much larger extent, there was a 
decision on the overall approach to these agencies. It took until 1995, however, 
before the Parliament actually woke-up and said: we will not grant any financial 
powers to these agencies, we will not inscribe them into the budget unless we 
have more clarity about a number of specific points. That is where the whole 
question of the “reserve” came in. The agencies here know that, in budgetary 
terms, they fall under the so-called non-compulsory expenditure. This non- 
compulsory expenditure part, which is about fifty per cent of the overall budget, 
is finally determined by the Parliament. The Parliament can, therefore, use its 
power over non-compulsory expenditure, in a certain sense, to re-orient the 
budget.
Putting on a reserve means no more that power allotted to these agencies 
will be subject to control, reports, and discretion over what is happening with 
them. In that sense, I hope that our friends from the agencies here will realize that 
this is a fundamental way of deciding democratic control, in a period in which an 
overall review of the EU institutions is taking place. With respect to the scope, 
when this is done and under what conditions, the fundamental point is that in a 
period of uncertainty, in which the growth of institutions is still taking place, 
putting things on reserve is actually a way to get more transparency. This is, 
afterall, a development linked with the overall development of the current 
structures. I am very sorry that Mr. Tappin, who was the Budget Rapporteur for 
the agencies for last year, is not here, but I am sure that before we will establish 
the budget for 1997, he will see the agencies. I promise this to you and I will 
report this to Mr. Tappin. The budget line for 1995-96 was a watershed, because, 
for the first time, the power of the Parliament concentrated on these agencies, not 
in an incidental way, looking at the individual agencies, but from an overall 
horizontal point of view.
Two specific points which were requested in an earlier phase, and which 
the Commission and the Council have always neglected, are to have: a) more 
harmonization of the financial regulations of these agencies, and b) more 
harmonization of the budgetary aspects of these regulations. Because these 
regulations were established as legislative orders at a stage when the power of the 
Parliament, in legislative terms, was limited, the only way forward was to use the 
power of reserve.
There are quite significant discrepancies in the various agencies in terms 
of the discharge procedure. The European Parliament, under its power under 




























































































The New European Agencies
to the Foundation in Dublin. Most of the others, with the exception of the Trade 
Mark Office and Alicante, have the discharge procedure by the management 
board. So the question is: why and under which conditions should the 
management board, which by itself is an organism dependent basically on the 
Member States and one or two representatives of the Commission, have that 
power? The second major difference is in the composition of the internal organs. 
The management boards may or may not have representatives of the Parliament. 
The latter institution most nearly represents what 1 would call civil society. This 
is a way of opening-up these agencies, lest they become too much bureaucracies. 
The general reserves which are now linked to the budget of 1996 should all be 
released. I think there is a large consensus in the Parliament about this. The 
Commission should come forward with a proposal to harmonize these various 
elements, at least to indicate which harmonization should take place, as agreed in 
our last trilogue with the Council. The trilogue is an institutional arrangement 
between the Commission, the Parliament, and the Council in order to better solve 
problems of a political nature. This trilogue reached the conclusion that we will 
have a proposal by the Commission coming forward. The reserve is not put into 
the budget to make the running of the organizations a nuisance. Obviously, for 
the directors here and their staff who have, quite rightly, the view that "this is my 
organism and I have to run it as well as I can", it is sometimes a complication. 
But I think you have to weigh this against the broader perspective of the quest for 
more transparency, democratization, and legitimacy. So, while this whole 
question of the discharge procedures and the opening-up of the structures is 
necessary, this is also an important element. Secondly, the performance patterns 
of the various agencies also depends on this. The Commission has forwarded a 
report to the Parliament and we have also made our own analysis of this. I think 
that in any democracy, in any national structure, it is quite normal that the 
national parliament reviews the performance of agencies, of the national type, 
before actual releases take place.
Therefore, one should look in a rather non-dogmatic way at the agencies. 
Laws are needed to solve the necessary links between national structures and 
Community structures. Mr. Ladeur just made the point very eloquently, and again 
I refer to my own experience with the European Environment Agency, that we 
will not have an environmental policy in the European Union with any chance of 
developing if we have not a better information system. We will not have this if 
we do not have more harmonized, more transparent data on a European level. I 
gather that von Lersner, with whom we worked closely at the time, is here 
because the federal agency in Germany has made enormous contributions to this 




























































































Laurens Jan Brinkhorst: A Budgetary Perspective from the European Parliament
that if this European agency will succeed, we will have a much better 
environmental data information picture than exists at this time in the United 
States, because you don't have anything of this scale in the United States. The 
EPA, with whom we have had many relations in the past, has never been able to 
set something up in the European-style.
What, then, is the overall prospect for these agencies? I looked at the 
European Parliament, we must really now look at the agencies, which, after 1996, 
are more or less approaching cruising speed. Any budgetary authority which has 
provided to the agencies an overall increase of about thirty per cent last year 
compared to no more than three per cent to the more established institutions, 
cannot be said to be very over-thrifty. At the present time, the agencies have 
budget loads together equaling about 180 million ECU. We are now in a phase of 
a European Community which has to reach the Maastricht criteria, and that also, 
obviously, will have considerable impact on the structures of the agencies in the 
future.
Let me just summarize a number of the points at which we will be looking 
in the coming period. In the first place, obviously, the agencies must have the 
means to operate effectively and efficiently within the framework of tasks given 
to them. Most of the agencies are approaching cruising speed and the idea is that 
by the end of 1996, they should be fully in operation, with a few exceptions: the 
Translation Centre in Luxembourg is only starting on a very small scale now, 
because their structure is still not quite in shape, and the Bilbao Centre is also far 
from complete. In administrative terms, the Community budget will be quite 
constrained. Category 5, administrative expenditure, will not grow by more than 
three per cent. That these constraints should also apply to the agencies, is quite 
normal. On the average, the budgets of the agencies will not go, after 1997, 
beyond those of the other big institutions. Granting of the funds will, in the 
future, of course, (irrespectively of self-defined needs, and obviously any good 
director will define need to be greater than what is actually accepted!) be subject 
to evaluation by the budgetary authority, both in light of overall needs and from 
the viewpoint of the individual agencies. This will be examined by the specific 
budget rapporteur for the agencies between now and the end of this year. Most of 
the agencies have no external revenues, so they will be fully budgetized and put 
in the budgetary structure. It is interesting to note, (and we have Mr. Sauer here 
from the Medicinal Agency in London) that there are agencies which will have 
some revenues. From the point of view of the European Parliament, these 
revenues are, by their very nature, contributions to the European Union and 




























































































The New European Agencies
have had experience in the past with the European Development Fund, which is a 
budget totally outside of the European structures. But the view of the future is 
that all resources of the European Union should be budgetized, and should 
therefore be in a proper platform. Since this issue has not yet been fully 
regulated, we are pushing for a proposal by the European Commission on the 
proper budgetization of revenues for 1996 in order to be able to establish 
something on this for the first reading for 1997. I am sorry if this seems overly 
specific, but I have been asked to discuss a few specific items.
Finally, what about the future development of tasks? As budget rapporteur, 
it is not up to me to make comments on each specific agency. But it is clear that 
we are in the face of a reshaping of the culture of the Commission as a whole. 
Every organism and every management consultant you speak to believes that you 
should shake-up any institution every ten years. The European Commission has 
not been shaken-up for about forty years. That is what is now being done and 
what could happen in the coming time.
In any case, it is clear that there is no sort of rule of nature that any agency, 
established for a particular purpose, shall grow indefinitely in activities and 
budget. In the case of the Environment Agency, the decision was to review the 
inspection of eco-label activities. This has been somewhat delayed. The 
Commission has proposed that it will take a few more years. It is quite clear that 
review, at some point, will also imply review of financial and budgetary 
consequences. In the case of the Medicinal Agency, which has a totally different 
task, once it is up to speed, in theory, all its revenues should be its own. Here, 
developments will be different. So we cannot fix things once and for all. But I'm 
convinced that the issue of transparency and democratic control is absolutely 
essential for the credibility of these institutions. Even though, to a certain extent, 
they fulfill technical and technocratic tasks, they are part of civil society and civil 
society has been far too absent from European institutions in the last thirty years.
Mr. Rhodes said there are control, steering, and accountability deficits. I 
think this is one of the reasons we are in the "age between the ages". But, where I 
depart from him is that, once you create an internal market, you need to have a 
more common approach, a more common approach on trademarks or on 
licensing pharmaceutical products. We need to do something about the 
environment and information about the environment is absolutely essential. The 
drugs issue, is no more a national responsibility and the national structures are 




























































































Laurens Jan Brinkhorst: A Budgetary Perspective from the European Parliament
Europe may exist. It is for this reason that networking, coordination, and the 
combination of approaches is so important.
There are a number of areas where we should look in the future to 
decentralize. But what remains absolutely essential are the questions of control, 
of accountability, of steering. No matter how well-meaning you are, certain 
structures are finally needed to acquire confidence. It will not be Mr. Santer or 
the Commission who will decide how and in what way your agency will be 
independent, and you'd better understand that we live in a time where 
transparency and credibility are no longer granted, but need to be earned.
Of course, the budget is not the only thing, and I hope I made clear that I 
wish the agencies well. But I do think that the question of a new act based on Ait. 
235 was the argument of the conspiracy of the initiators. Art. 235 was a way to 
move the Community forward at a time when the general public was sleeping. It 
was the theory of implicit powers, that a Council behind closed doors, together 
with the Commission, could work in a system to do all kind of things which the 
founding fathers had never imagined. But I believe Art. 235 is dead after the next 
negotiations. In order not to go back to a structure in which the bureaucrats run 
the European Union, but to achieve a structure where democracy and control will 
lead to a new Europe which is indeed more democratic and more transparent, we 
need to have accountability structures. And that is my final word here. I hope the 




























































































P A R T  II: N A T IO N A L  E X P E R IE N C E S  W IT H  A G E N C IE S  -
L E S S O N S  F O R  T H E  N E W  E U R O P E A N  A G E N C IE S
1. Professor Giuliano Amato, Presidente dell’Autorità Garante della 
Concorrenza e del Mercato, Rome and Visiting Professor, European 
University Institute, Florence
2. Professor Doktor Heinrich von Lersner, Former President of the German 
Federal Environment Agency, Berlin




























































































A G E N C IE S  IN  IT A L Y
Giuliano AMATO
I was supposed to give you some hints on the Italian independent agencies, 
which might be useful for the new experience of the Community agencies. I don't 
know if everything will succeed in this connection, but here are my reflections.
I am one of those deeply convinced that many of the new agencies that we are 
creating in many of our countries, despite their differences, reflect common 
inspirations and trends of evolution in all of our institutional systems, in the 
Western world, at least: need of expertise and efficiency, special protection for 
individual rights of paramount consitutional value, consumer protection, that 
seems to be a value in itself, and increasing distrust of political decisions in areas 
that were traditionally political and where today political decisions are perceived 
as arbitrary. This is one of the points that Majone has been touching upon 
frequently and is perhaps one of the most important aspects of this new 
phenomenon. My personal opinion is that these trends will reach the Community 
sooner or later, and that some of the obstacles that Member States are now posing 
to the transfer of power to the Brussels level, might be by-passed if, instead of 
going to that political level, they will go to independent agencies, mostly due to 
the reason that Majone is focusing upon (the sentiment of protection of the 
citizens against politicians, trough “impartial” decisions).
Having said so, and being, as I am, convinced that independent agencies 
will go beyond the borders of administrative law, within which they are most 
frequently dealt with today, and will enter into the sphere of constitutional law, 
where, up until now, they create more embarassment than real attention. I must 
admit that the step-by-step experience which we are having may not justify these 
conclusions, because it is an experience that seems to be casual. Every agency 
has its own history, sometimes quite different from the others. The history of 
Italian agencies is of this kind. Every once in a while something happens which 
brings about this new creature. At the end, and only at the end, you realize the 
connections between this creature and others which were created before.
We have, let’s say, three waves in our recent history. The first was due to 
the reform of the stock exchange market twenty years ago with the creation of 



























































































The New European Agencies
creation of Consob, that initially was more an embryo of an independent agency 
than a really independent agency, the main reason of independence was the fact 
that the problem to be solved was to take powers out of the different minsterial 
departments and put all of them into a new box. The unification of these powers 
plus the introduction of new ones mostly aimed at the transparency of the market, 
was politically much easier if all of them were bestowed upon a new institution 
than through the choice, for all of them, of one of the pre-existing departments. 
The initial Consob, however, had the structure of an agency, it was not part of 
any ministerial department, but its decisions and regulations were issued under 
the form of ministerial decrees, decrees of the Minister for the Treasury. Only 
years after, through new legislative interventions, has it acquired its present 
status.
The second wave arrived in 1990. Three new agencies were created, the most 
independent of all, but, incredibly enough, for reasons that were totally different 
in the three cases. The first one was the Commission supervising strikes in public 
services, provided for by a statute approved in June and accepted by the trade 
unions under the conditions that the newly introduced limitations to the “freedom 
of strike” would not be enforced by the Executive or administrative branches 
depending on the Executive. This was the platform upon which the Commission 
was created, with nine members designated by the Presidents of the two 
Chambers of Parliament and eventually appointed by the President of the 
Republic. The Commission was totally independent of the Executive and was 
empowered to regulate its own organisation and activities.
The second agency arrived three month later, in August, with the new statute on 
public and private TV, that created the Mass Media Authority (Garante per la 
Radiodiffusione e l’Editoria), a single member Authority, appointed through the 
same procedure as the Commission on strikes: joint proposal of the Presidents of 
the two Chambers, decree of the President of the Republic. The reasons of the 
independence are totally different in this case and go back to the peculiar features 
of the Italian TV system. Initially, we had a public monopoly that the 
Constitutional Court declared legitimate in the 1960’s only if detached from the 
Executive. The first legislative consequence of the Court’s ruling was a statute in 
the 1970’s that transferred the appointment of the TV company’s Board from the 
Executive to the Parliament. Later on, when private TV entered and was legally 
admitted, Parliament maintained its powers over the State company, but a new 
Authority was needed to supervise the overall system. This is how and why the 




























































































Giuliano Amato: Agencies in Italy
The third agency of this prolific 1990 was the Antitrust Authority, that arrived in 
October. For years, Italy had been the only founding father of the European 
Community without a general antitrust law, even though bills on the matter had 
been discussed in Parliament since the late 1950’s. One of the diverging features 
of these bills involved the nature of the Antitrust Authority: the bill the Cabinet 
provided for an advisory body (with final decisions by the Minister for Industry), 
while the bills of the opposition stood for an independent authority. The 
increasing pressures of the Community after the approval of the Single Act and 
the rush towards completion of the Single Market forced the Italian authorities to 
bring their sluggish debates to a positive conclusion. The general antitrust law 
was eventually approved in October 1990 and provided for an independent 
authority to enforce the new rules. The Authority has five members, all of them 
are directly appointed by the Presidents of the two Chambers of Parliament, there 
is no influence whatsoever of the Executive, that may not even accept questions 
in Parliament on the decisions of the Authority.
The third and final wave has arrived lately, in connection with the privatisation 
process: publicly owned companies in charge of public services that are 
privatized, monopolized markets that become competitive, regulations and 
regulators for the transition (and perhaps further). It is the same process that we 
saw in the UK in the 1980’s and in both countries the regulators are independent 
agencies, for well-known reasons that I will not repeat here. What I want to 
underline as far as Italy is concerned is that the new regulatory agencies created 
in 1995 are less independent than those of the second wave of 1990. Firstly, they 
will be appointed by the Executive and not by the Parliament, even though the 
advise and consent by two-thirds majority of the competent standing Committees 
of the two Chambers will be required. Secondly, some of their powers will be 
either shared by the Executives or exercised under its guidelines.
A question that I am supposed to answer is “who opposed the agencies in 
Parliament ?”. At the end, almost nobody opposed the three agencies in 1990, 
that (for different reasons) rallied a wide majority precisely because they were 
independent and were expected to exercise new powers that nobody was in 
charge of previously (which reduced the ranks of their enemies). The opposition, 
instead, rallied more for the new regulatory agencies: certainly one of the reasons 
was the anti-privatisation stand of some of our parties, but the other was the fact 
that they were stealing pre-existing powers from pre-existing apparati. This 
explains the main tension in Parliament between texts providing for a semi­
advisory role for these agencies and texts providing for an independent role. The 




























































































The New European Agencies
of bureaucrats and, generally, of the Cabinet, and, of course, of some 
parliamentarians working for them, because of the well-known system of hiding 
ideas under different parliamentarians.
The final compromise is quite visible in the statute, because, as I have said, 
besides the appointment power that is shared between the cabinet and Parliament, 
some of the powers of the agencies are shared between the agencies themselves 
and the ministerial departments. There has been quite a discussion as to whether 
or not licences to the companies should be released by the agencies. According to 
the statute, even though the agencies prepare the decision, the signature of the 
licence has to be of the Minister, which, in fact, quite clearly reflects this 
compromise.
How may we systematize all these pieces we now have: the Consob, the 
regulatory agencies, the anti-trust, the mass media and the anti-strike agencies? 1 
would say, first, that all of these agencies are more than regulation by 
information. Information, the collecting and distributing of information to the 
area that needs them, is an essential part of their job, but they also have, and 
probably need, regulatory powers for the sake of information itself. And this is 
typical of Consob. Any kind of information that companies are expected to give, 
to the potential buyers of their shares, to the financial markets, require specific 
regulations by Consob on the nature of the information, on the fashion in which 
information is given, with forms, formalities, etc. So, it is difficult to escape this 
connection between collecting and giving information and having regulatory 
powers.
A second inevitable power is the power of ajudication, because any time conflicts 
arise in this area under the jurisdiction of the agencies, somebody has to decide 
upon them. The agency itself seems qualified for this job with some sort of 
judicial review, inevitably. But here comes in a difference that is very important. 
The Antitrust Authority, that I personally chair, enforces not its own rules, but 
statutory rules, and can only adjudicate, which it does with procedures that are 
quasi-judicial. As a consequence, we are really far away from political power 
and, I think, also from administrative law. I do not know exactly to where 1 
belong. I am sure that I belong to public law, I am not sure that I belong to 
administrative, law, as long as administrative law is the law of the branches of the 





























































































Giuliano Amato: Agencies in Italy
Third, not all of the agencies are on equal footing. They are different from one 
another. I would like to be more humble than I might seem, but broadcasting and 
anti-trust are above the others, not because we are nicer people, but because we 
are protecting constitutional values and constitutional rights. It is not by 
coincidence that, by doing so, we are exercising powers and functions that did 
not exist before the creation of these two agencies. Quite differently, the new 
regulatory agencies, après the U.K., are exercising pre-existing activities that are 
being decentralized to them, because privatization and promotion of competitive 
markets make those activities more neutral and less politically oriented. This is 
very important, because when we open the chapter of the European agencies, I 
lean toward a radical position as to the expected, sooner or later, European Cartel 
Office. Let me say one word on this.
In the area of antitrust, of European antitrust, there is quite a discussion as to 
whether or not we should ask the Intergovernmental Conference to mandate the 
introduction into the Treaty of a clause creating a European Cartel Office. There 
are, at the moment, two open positions about this: one is German, the other 
Italian. The Germans are insisting more on the creation of this independent 
office, which is quite natural for those who are familiar with the German culture 
of independence in this area: Order-Liberals, Franz Bohrn, and all the consequent 
German tradition. But, they propose an amendment to Article 89 according to 
which the Council should be empowered to create the office. We Italians are 
more ambitious in the assumption that the new office requres a new allocation of 
powers inside the Community, that would abandon the principle of concentration 
of power, which was typical of the Soviet Union, on behalf of Montesquieu and 
Tocqueville, who thought, quite rightly, that you don't apply the rules that you 
establish. I am ready to accept that concentration has been essential and will 
remain essential as long as the integration of the market has not been completed, 
but one day we will arrive at the end, when this process will be completed. At 
this point, I would like to see the ajudication power separated from the regulatory 
powers of the Commission and bestowed upon a European independent office. 
Therefore, we would be happy to see an amendment of the Treaty which does not 
delegate to the Council the power to create such an office, but which directly 
provides for the institution of it and empowers it to enforce Articles 85, 86, and 
90 paragraph 2 (90 paragraph 3 has to remain to the Commission, because it 
concerns directives and regulations). Wasn’t this so when the European system 




























































































T H E  G E R M A N  F E D E R A L  E N V IR O N M E N T A L  A G E N C Y
Heinrich VON LERSNER
I.
I am very grateful to you for giving me the opportunity to speak here about my 
experiences as the founder and, for 22 years, the head of the Umweltbundesamt 
(UBA), the German Federal Environmental Agency. Since, for a number of 
years, I had also been a member of the European Environment Agency's 
Management Board, I know which of our national experiences can and which 
cannot be applied to the UBA's European counterpart. Nevertheless, I will 
refrain from addressing this point and leave it up to you and the subsequent 
discussion to draw relevant conclusions.
The UBA’s founding in 1973/74 came from the realization that there is 
probably no other policy area so dependent on scientific findings as 
environmental policy, dependent on the findings of a whole range of scientific 
disciplines which must be pieced together. The approximately 600 
academically trained members of the UBA staff (of a total of 1,300) represent 
nearly all branches of science, from biology to jurisprudence and from 
chemistry to economics. The only disciplines missing are theology and 
archaeology.
II.
The Act by which the Umweltbundesamt was founded provides that it is an 
independent federal authority whose functions are to provide the government 
with scientific support and to collect information on the environment, to 
generate measurement data and to inform the public on these activities. The 
Environment Ministry, however, exercises administrative and technical control 
over the Agency.
These rules reflect the state of friction in which any scientific governmental 
authority is caught. Science is, after all, by definition free of preconditions. It 
has to explore reality, irrespective of whether the result suits the commissioning 



























































































The New European Agencies
and, as such, is obliged to be loyal to the government and the parliament, which 
decide what tasks it has to fulfill and which also provide the financial and 
material resources that enable it to fulfill them. So, those running government 
agencies are Janus-faced and walk a tightrope. If they lean too far towards 
loyalty to the government, the public no longer recognizes their proposals as 
scientific; if they lean too far towards independence, they are excluded from 
internal governmental and parliamentary negotiations and their proposals carry 
no greater weight that those of Greenpeace or other environmental 
organizations.
In practice, this problem of friction between science and politics has been dealt 
with reasonably well in the last few decades. True, there have been instances 
where the Agency sent a proposal made on scientific grounds from Berlin to 
Bonn which was not to the Federal Government's liking. But never has any 
federal minister forbidden the Agency from making a particular proposal. To be 
sure, sometimes a proposal was returned to us on the grounds that particular 
aspects had not yet been investigated or that the available data were not yet 
sufficient. This happened, for example, to our proposal to introduce a speed 
limit on motorways; the Government had already decided against it. However, 
the minister did not forbid us to make the proposal but merely returned it to us 
saying that some data, e. g. freight transport data, were as yet missing, which 
was true. Subsequently, the Government initiated a large-scale trial which in 
fact improved the data base, but it has not yet decided in accordance with our 
proposal.
This practice is, incidentally, to the Government's advantage as well. If the 
Agency were only to propose things which suit the Government, the latter 
could no longer cite our expert opinions to justify measures vis-à-vis the 
Parliament, which would result in supplying the opposition with a good laugh.
Another potential area for such conflicts are the Agency's publications. Annual 
reports containing numerous research results and environmental data are 
published by us on a yearly basis. Dateti zur Umwelt, an UBA publication with 
facts and figures on the environment, appears every two years. The Agency is 
responsible for the contents of these reports. It does, however, submit them to 
the Ministry prior to publication, which of course, sometimes proposes changes 
and additions. The usual practice is that agreement is then reached to phrase a 
particular passage in a certain way. Where in the past no such agreement could 
be reached, it sometimes happened that the Minister called the President saying 




























































































Heinrich von Lersner: The German Federal Environmental Agency
to present the report to the press jointly with the President, as is customary. 
Since experience has shown that joint presentation attracts greater publicity, the 
President would occasionally give in. There have also been press conferences at 
which a State Secretary dispatched by the Minister to present a report jointly 
with the President would point out that the report in question did not in all 
points reflect the Government's opinion (a case in point being the study in 
which the environmental compatibility of rape-seed oil as diesel fuel was 
compared to that of mineral oil).
Similar conflicts sometimes occurred when a parliamentary committee invited 
UBA experts to one of its meetings. The practice in such cases is that we 
inform the Government beforehand of the contents of our presentation and try 
to settle any differences that may exist. Failing that, the Government states that 
it disagrees with some points of the Agency's presentation.
Another rule is of importance when the Agency is invited to Bundestag 
committee meetings or to meetings of committees of Länder parliaments. The 
selection of experts to be sent to such meetings is solely the responsibility of 
the UBA. There have been instances where the committee that requested UBA's 
attendance wanted to hear the opinion of a particular person. However, since 
what matters on such occasions is the Agency's opinion rather than that of an 
individual expert, the President replies that the host can only determine the 
subject and that it is up to the Agency to decide which member of its staff is the 
expert on that subject.
Such conflicts between personal opinion and the Agency's opinion, which it 
formulates following in-house discussion between the various branches, 
sometimes also arise when staff members publish their personal opinions. The 
Agency does not prevent its scientists from doing so, even when these do not 
reflect the views of the Agency. In such cases, however, they are not allowed to 
mention the Agency's name in their publication.
III.
I mentioned earlier that the Environment Ministry exercises administrative and 
technical control over the Agency. What precisely does that mean? 
Administrative control means first of all that the Ministry is obliged to check 
whether the Agency's management of personnel and funds complies with 
pertinent regulations. As for personnel, all hirings and promotions within the 




























































































The New European Agencies
Ministry's consent; in the case of some posts, even the Government must give 
its consent. These are positions that are usually filled by university graduates. 
An important point, however, is that we have no posts whose holders can be 
dismissed when there is a change in government or for political reasons. This 
sets us apart from, for example, the US Environmental Protection Agency, 
where virtually all personnel in executive functions are replaced when a new 
administration comes in, with the result that it often takes a whole year until 
there is a competent person whom one can contact. The traditional German 
Civil Service with tenure not only has the advantage of greater continuity but 
also that of greater independence in matters falling within a given area of 
responsibility. When Agency directors such as the president, the vice-president, 
or department heads are recruited, our Ministry of course also strives to acquire 
individuals whom it can trust. When, for example, the Agency proposes 
someone as head of a department, that person also has to be interviewed at the 
Ministry. However, the Government has never filled such a post with someone 
whom the President considered unsuitable; the worst that can happen is that of 
two suitable candidates proposed by the Agency, the candidate whom the 
President ranked second is chosen.
As for control in financial matters, a distinction has to be made between 
projects which the Agency itself carries-out with its own resources and projects 
carried out on its behalf by external institutes or companies. In the case of the 
former, the Ministry merely has to check whether the Agency manages the 
funds properly and sticks to its work programme. By contrast, in the case of 
R+D projects awarded to external institutes and companies, the Ministry 
provides the funds. Based on a research plan drawn up on a yearly basis, the 
Agency proposes a project to the Ministry, the Ministry approves it (or does 
not), and the Agency is then responsible for commissioning and supervising it 
as well as for spending the funds on behalf of the Ministry. Even though the 
funds provided for such projects have decreased markedly in the last few years, 
they still amounted to no less than approximately DM 50 million in 1995 
(1992: DM 77 million). These funds are of great importance to industrial 
innovation in particular, because by using them it is often possible to break 
down what can be referred to as anti-innovation cartels. It may occur that the 
companies of a given sector agree that none of them make the next step towards 
environmental improvement because if one of them does so successfully, this 
more eco-friendly process is considered the "state of the art" under German 
environmental legislation, with the result that the other companies have to use 
it as well. In such cases, investment subsidies provided by the Agency (of up to 




























































































Heinrich von Lersner: The German Federal Environmental Agency
Here, the Ministry is also quite influential since the money comes from its 
budget and not from the Agency's. The Agency works for the Ministry of 
Research in a similar manner.
IV.
Technical control by the Ministry is also important in areas where the Agency 
fulfills administrative functions on behalf of the Federal Government - 
functions, I may add, that have not yet been, but may some day be, assigned to 
the European Environment Agency. In most cases, it is the Länder (federal 
states) that are responsible for enforcing environmental legislation, and the 
Agency has no authority here to issue directives to the Länder authorities. It 
can only give advice. If a Land does not properly enforce a federal act, the 
UBA can only suggest to the Federal Government that this act or an ordinance 
issued thereunder be amended, or it can bring the problem up for discussion at 
the Umweltministerkonferenz (conference of federal govemment/federal states 
ministers for the environment).
It is mainly substance-related legislation for which the Agency fulfills 
enforcement functions of its own, i. e. in supraregional matters. Thus, for 
example, it participates in authorization and similar procedures under 
pesticides, genetic engineering, chemicals and detergents legislation. UBA's 
consent is required when a plant protection product is authorized by the 
responsible authority, which belongs to the Federal Ministry for Agriculture. 
Even though our Ministry exercises technical control over the Agency in this 
respect, it cannot direct us to consent to the authorization of a particular plant 
protection product because it is the Umweltbundesamt, and not the Ministry, 
who must give its consent.
Germany is - as you know - a country with a federal structure, and its 
constituent states, the Länder, are usually reluctant to relinquish administrative 
competencies to the Federation. Especially in the field of environmental 
protection, however, the Länder have been known to occasionally hand tasks 
over to the Umweltbundesamt, particularly in cases where their respective 
views differed greatly or where the topic at issue was unpopular. The 
comparison of the environmental impact of waste incineration and that of waste 
disposal without prior incineration is a case in point.
It would, in my view, be desirable if we in the European Union were soon to be 




























































































The New European Agencies
Agency in certain cases, particularly in areas where freedom of trade 
necessitates the use of harmonized procedures. Given our experiences with 
roaming wastes and also with transboundary water pollution, the Agency 
should be empowered to convene task forces with the authority to also instruct 
national bodies to initiate emergency measures or to propose such measures to 
the Commission.
V.
An area in which the UBA's scientific independence is of great importance, also 
in political respects, is the publication of environmental data. In democratic 
systems, the regular publication of data carries great political weight for it 
allows politicians and voters alike to see whether the government has reached 
its goals and kept its promises. Any student can be shown the political 
importance of a regular publication of data by a comparison of the two German 
states prior to 1990. In East Germany - the German Democratic Republic - 
environmental data were declared a state secret in 1980 so that often not even 
the very polluters knew what damage they had done. In democracies, regular 
publication of environmental data means having already traveled half the 
distance to success.
It is also important that government agencies not be prevented from publishing 
politically undesirable data and research results. Science lives off the 
publication of its results as the human body lives off oxygen. Esoteric lore runs 
the risk of suffocating. Of course, the Agency I headed also receives 
confidential industry data. If we were to publish them we would no longer get 
them, particularly such data as industry is not required to disclose. Here, we 
often managed to arrive at a compromise such as that the data were rendered 
anonymously or were aggregated.
The Council Directive of 1990 on the freedom of access to information on the 
environment (90/313/EEC) has helped us a good deal here, for especially in 
Germany, willingness to divulge information is less developed than in other 
European countries.
A prerequisite for the publication of data by any government agency is, 
however, that it is independent of economic interests. After all, anyone with 
experience with statistics knows how much they can be manipulated. 
"Everyone lies with their own statistics" is a slogan commonly heard not just 



























































































Heinrich von Lersner: The German Federal Environmental Agency
monitoring stations do we measure them, and to what do we relate them? If 
national sulphur emissions are related to square metres of national territory, the 
signal would be green for Spain and red for Germany. The situation is reversed 
if they are related to the number of inhabitants or the gross national product, 
which is why Spain, understandably, uses the former alternative when it 
publishes its national data. You can see from this example how important it is 
for any environmental authority to be economically and politically independent.
VI.
The situation is similar in the determination of limit values. A widely held view 
among the lay public is that limit values are based solely on empirical science 
establishing the relationship between cause and effect. Just as a German poet 
called names just hollow words, so are numerical limit values just hollow 
figures. The decisive factors are sampling, analysis and statistical evaluation, 
the methods of which are in most cases not established by governments or 
parliaments but are agreed upon in standardization committees of organizations 
such as ISO, CEN or, in Germany, DIN. There are examples where a substance 
extremely hazardous to the environment escaped regulation because the 
analytical method underlying the applicable limit value required, for example, 
the determination and multiplication of 6 congeners known to be toxic out of a 
total of 200. In such a case, a company can declare its product or waste to be 
free of this substance if the toxic constituents of that product or waste do not 
include the congeners to be measured. A similar approach is used for dioxins, 
which gained notoriety in the accident at Seveso, if only for rendering 
enforcement of the standard practicable. When Great Britain became a member 
of the European Community, it did not adopt the EC method for detergents 
because the numerical values of the British method were more stringent even 
though the method itself was less stringent due to a different measuring 
technique. This was to prevent the public from getting the impression that one 
would allow British standards to be weakened by European legislation.
VII.
These examples lead me to another problem faced by scientific government 
agencies under political control. Where lie the boundaries between science and 
politics? These boundaries can best be illustrated by the example of what we 
call eco-balances, or life-cycle analyses, meaning the comparison of different 
alternatives with respect to their environmental impact. Here too, it is important 




























































































The New European Agencies
appearing to be influenced by economic or national interests. When I heard of 
an epidemiological study which found that the life expectancy of people who 
drink red wine is higher than the national average and asked a well-known 
epidemiologist what he thought of the study, he replied that it was a good, 
scientifically sound study, the only flaw being that it was done by the 
University of Bordeaux. It should have been published in Hamburg (meaning, 
not in Florence, either!).
The UBA, therefore, asks the members of its staff to refrain from working for 
companies with an economic interest in environmental issues for remuneration 
or the provision of any other benefits. The same is true, in principle, for our 
research institute. It is up to the Agency's directors to consider exemptions in 
any given case.
As for life-cycle analysis, the boundaries between science and policy-making 
can be illustrated by the example of the comparison of nuclear energy and 
energy from fossil sources. It is possible for a scientific government agency to 
determine and evaluate the risks associated with the two alternatives - the risks 
posed by nuclear energy in the event of an accident and in terms of nuclear 
waste, on the one hand, and the risks of fossil energy to the climate and 
resources, on the other. However, a decision as to which of the two alternatives 
should be judged to involve the graver risk cannot be made on rational 
scientific grounds but only on political and ethical grounds.
We have also contrasted the environmental risks of glass bottles for beverages 
that are refilled and those of plastic beverage containers that are recycled after 
use. Where such a comparison results in a draw, it is up to policymakers to say 
that when in doubt, the refillable bottle is to be preferred to the recycled one­
way container, as an ethical reminder, so to speak, of the need for a departure 
from the throwaway society. The situation is similar for the comparison of 
mineral oil versus rape-seed oil as diesel fuel, which I already mentioned 
earlier, in the case of which the decision in favour of renewable resources and 
agricultural policy must be reserved to the political arena.
I know of many examples where scientists anticipated political weighing and 
where policy-makers, for tactical reasons, burdened science with making 




























































































Heinrich von Lersner: The German Federal Environmental Agency
VIII.
Let me summarize the results of my talk in the form of some theses:
1. Where tasks to be fulfilled depend on scientific findings, 
modem politics have to draw on independent authorities or 
institutes which present the results of scientific research to the 
political bodies.
2. Where political decision-making is dependent on the findings 
of different branches of science, it is important that the 
representatives of these scientific branches work in the same 
place so that they can communicate personally on a daily 
basis.
3. Governmental control over a scientific government agency 
has to be confined to administrative and financial matters and 
may not include any preconditions as to the desired scientific 
result.
4. Also when selecting agency staff, scientific qualification must 
remain the decisive criterion. Where the scientific 
government agency is not free to make the decision itself, it 
has to submit proposals to the governmental body responsible 
for decision-making, which must then decide solely on the 
basis of technical criteria. Members of a scientific 
government agency's staff may not be dismissed on political 
grounds.
5. The members of a scientific government agency's staff may 
publish their personal opinions provided that they make it 
clear to what extent the published conclusions reflect personal 
opinion and to what extent they reflect the agency's opinion 
which it formulates upon interdisciplinary weighing.
6. Especially when data are published, it must be ensured that 
the selection and presentation is not influenced by economic 
and political interests.
7. When limit values are formulated, it must be possible for 
policy-makers and the public to see to what extent the 
analytical method and limit value were derived by scientific 
deduction and to what extent they are the result of political or 
methodological conventions.
8. In such proposals, as in others, the government agency must 
bear in mind the boundaries between science and politics and 
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IX.
Ladies and Gentlemen, I know that it is difficult to extrapolate these national 
experiences to European agencies because, in their case, the conflicts of interest 
are even more complex, from the selection of staff (proportional representation 
of the member states) to differences in historical, social, ecological and 
economic conditions in the various member states. Nonetheless, I hope that I 
have been able to provide a few ideas that may be helpful for the European 




























































































A G E N C IE S  IN  T H E  E U R O P E A N  U N IO N : A N  A M E R IC A N  
P E R S P E C T IV E
Martin SHAPIRO
I am not, in fact, going to give a report on agencies in the United States, as I have 
already prepared a long written paper which has been published as a Robert 
Schuman Centre working paper (M. Shapiro, Independent Agencies: US and EU, 
Jean Monnet Chair Paper, n° 96/34, RSC, EUI, Florence). Instead, I am taking 
advantage of my position on the program to provide a kind of closing statement 
to address Majone's opening statement. Majone and I are both Political Scientists, 
we both rely heavily on American experience. I wholeheartedly support the 
premise from which he begins that information collection, and particularly 
information analysis, is a form of policy-making. In the current age, an age which 
we might characterize as that of the politics of information, this is a very central 
policy-making activity. Mr. Jimenez-Beltran and Mr. von Lersner have also 
seconded this premise of information as policy-making. Professor Majone goes 
on from that basic premise to a particular line of logic. I propose to go on from 
this same basic premise to arrive at the exact opposite conclusions from the ones 
to which he arrives; that is, to attack independent agencies, rather than prescribe 
them. Majone argues that the question to be asked is: How can we obtain credible 
information? His response is through independent agencies. I propose to go on to 
say that if information is policy-making by independent agencies, we must then 
ask the question of whether policy-making by independent agencies is a good or 
a bad thing. We must examine the question of policy-making by independent 
agencies. Moreover, since these independent agencies are information agencies, 
and, therefore, expert or technocratic agencies,we must not only ask the question 
of whether or not independent agencies are a good thing, but whether or not 
government by technocrats, experts, is a good thing. These questions are 
particularly pressing because Professor Majone seems to solve the problem of 
accountability of expert information-gathering policy-makers by speaking of 
professional accountability. Professional accountability is, of course, the 
accountability of one set of experts to another set of experts in the same field of 
expertise. This simply exaggerates the problem of whether government by 
experts is or is not a good thing. Professor Majone, among others, have promoted 
networking among these expert agencies. Networking consists of creating 



























































































The New European Agencies
current jargon, who resist control by politicians. This is yet another argument for 
government by experts. Finally, this set of questions about technocratic 
government is even more pressing, because for many of those concerned with the 
organization and operation of independent agencies, there is a strong notion that 
the expert technical staff of the agencies will overwhelm political control within 
the agencies. That is, since these agencies are defined as expert agencies 
designed to generate information, they will be agencies in which the internal 
power will lie with the experts, not with the thin layer of political supervision by 
their boards of management or other such devices for partial political control.
Let me begin, then, with this critique. Even from the standpoint of gathering 
credible evidence, I am dubious of the notion that independence creates 
credibility. I think that what creates credibility is inattention. When the public 
does not care about something, the information provided by experts is credible. 
As soon as the public cares about something,the information provided by experts 
becomes simply another item in the political struggle. As soon as information 
becomes highly policy-relevant in controversial policy areas, there will be 
counter-information by other actors. Independent agencies will not, in most 
instances, be able to assert their independence as a satisfactory block to counter 
analysis by other groups interested in the same questions.
Let me go on from that credibility issue to the main issues of whether 
technocratic independent agencies are a good thing or a bad thing in terms of the 
general problems of government. The first problem is, of course, that of 
coordination, and Mr. Rhodes has just talked about it. If we piecemeal create a 
very large number of independent agencies, and if those agencies are really 
policy-makers, then we will soon discover that we have turned- over a substantial 
segment of the whole of government policy to independent agencies and we will 
have an enormous coordination problem among them. This problem of 
coordination among independent agencies is, furthermore, multiplied enormously 
if the independent agencies are expert agencies, because the hardest people to 
coordinate are experts. Politicians are easier to coordinate than experts. In the 
world of modem knowledge, real knowledge comes from extreme specialization. 
There is just too much to know for us to know very much. Therefore, the expert 
is by definition an extreme specialist and extreme specialists suffer from the 
problem that the French call "déformation professionnelle". They know more and 
more about less and less, and, therefore, each tends to have perspectives and 
priorities that are different from the rest of us who know less and less about more 
and more. The man who was studying chickens all his life, the chicken expert, is 




























































































Martin Shapiro: Agencies in the European Union - An American Perspective
studied wildlife all his life knows that wildlife is more important than everything 
else. 1 defy you to coordinate chicken experts and wildlife experts.
Mr. Rhodes has also referred to the problem of control or accountability. The 
United States experience with independent agencies is that they have been 
subject to very strong Congressional control, contrary to the impression that 
usually is left abroad. The Congressional committees control independent 
agencies very fully, when they want to. In the American experience, when the 
independent agency is doing something nobody cares about, Congress pays it no 
attention. As soon as the agency starts to do something someone cares about, 
Congress pays a lot of attention and Congress gets its own way. The question in 
the E.U. is whether or not the Council, the Commission or the Parliament is in a 
position to exercise the kind of control over independent agencies that has 
existed in the United States and to decide whether or not that is a good thing. If it 
is not a good thing, I am fairly persuaded that simply saying that experts should 
be accountable to other experts is not a solution to the problem of control of 
experts in a democratic state.
The perhaps principle point is one of legitimacy. I disagree with Professor 
Majone and Mr. Amato in my assessment of how the world looks. Both are pretty 
confident that technocratic legitimacy can be substituted for democratic 
legitimacy, in some areas. I, however, am not very confident that you can do that 
in any area, and certainly not in very many. Indeed, it would appear that we are 
currently in a stage in which the people hate technocrats even more than they 
hate politicians. The Italian experience might be somewhat misleading, but I 
think it's very temporary in that. The existence of the Green Party itself, of the 
ecological movement, of the anti-technocratic themes in the last French general 
elections, and most importantly, the anti-technocratic themes after Maastricht as 
to "those Eurocrats in Brussels" illustrate this point. If the interest in independent 
agencies in Europe is not simply an attempt to tidy-up retrospectively the 
experience that has already been had, and I think if that was all that was going- 
on, this conference would not be being held, then we might not have to concern 
ourselves much with this anti-technocratic theme. But, I think that what's actually 
going-on in Europe in terms of interest in independent agencies is roughly the 
following. For those who wish the European Union to grow, it does not appear 
feasible at the moment to make the Commission grow. And if you cannot get the 
Commission to grow, then the way to make the European Union grow, is to plant 
European agencies all over the Union and see if you can get them to grow. If the 
independent agencies are a way of getting around the problem that "those 




























































































The New European Agencies
kind of popular support, then it seems to me to be a case of "out of the frying pan 
and into the fire". If the Commission cannot succeed in making itself legitimate 
by appeals to technical expertise, why should the independent agencies be able to 
make themselves legitimate by appeals to technical expertise? When we utter that 
terrible curse: "those Eurocrats in Brussels", first of all, what do we mean by 
"Brussels"? What is the derogatory character of the word "Brussels"? It may 
concern concentration, that what people do not want is the concentration of 
authority in Brussels. However, I believe that the fundamental derogatory 
element in "Brussels" is, to use a word used earlier by Mr. Rhodes, distance. It is 
not simply that the people of Europe do not want to be ruled by a concentrated 
power. More fundamentally, they do not want to be ruled by a distant power. 
Scattering the power among various distant places does not overcome the 
distance perception. Those Eurocrats in London or Lisbon are far farther away 
for most Europeans than are those in Brussels. How about the word "Eurocrats" 
in that expletive? The word "Eurocrats" is derogatory with regards to experts, 
rule by technicians, and technocratic government. It is not logical to suppose that 
legitimacy will be gained for the E.U. by emphasizing technocratic government 
in the form of independent agencies, when the problem is the rejection of 
technocratic government in the form of the Commission.
Finally, the words transparency and participation very often arise in discussions 
of the E.U., they are the fetish words of today. The independent agencies are 
highly participatory for experts. They are, therefore, also highly transparent to 
experts. However, the independent agencies are not transparent as far as non­
expert populations are concerned. Indeed, they are remarkably non-transparent. 
First of all, the mere fragmentation into many agencies makes it difficult for the 
citizenry to follow what is happening. Secondly, and just as importantly, the very 
fact that these agencies defend what they do on the basis of expert legitimacy 
indicates that the population is being denied transparency. If the language is the 
language of experts, which cannot be understood by others, but is at the same 
time the very basis of claiming legitimacy, then the message certainly must be 
given to the general population that: "someone is telling me that I'm not supposed 
to understand and can't possibly understand what is going-on in government". 
Therefore, I believe that the further multiplication of independent agencies within 
the E.U. would only aggravate the problems of transparency and participation 
with which the E.U. is already greatly concerned. My tentative conclusion, and I 
stress its tentativeness, is that multiplying independent agencies, rather than 
seeking to expand the Union more directly, through growth in the Commission or 






























































































The value and the importance of this Robert Schuman Centre conference were 
due not only to the various presentations by high-ranking practitioners and 
senior academics, but also to the discussions among the conference participants 
which followed each conference section. It is therefore the intention of the 
conference synopsis to disseminate the findings which came out of the various 
presentations and discussions.
The RSC conference on The New European Agencies focused on one 
type of Community agency, namely, bodies with their own legal personality, a 
certain degree of operational autonomy in performing specific tasks and which 
are not subject to the direction of one of the main Community institutions, and, 
furthermore, which are not foreseen explicitly in the EC Treaty. These EC 
agencies were established by the main Community institutions through the 
legislative decision-making process (unanimity in the Council after 
consultation with the EP).1 Each particular establishing Regulation sets-out the 
tasks and internal and governing structure of each agency. Formally, these 
agencies can be distinguished from other Community bodies which are 
explicitly mentioned in the EC Treaty (such as the future European Central 
Bank), from internal bodies or decentralised departments of the Commission 
(such as the EU Statistical Office), and from European bodies which were 
created on an intergovernmental basis outside the Community legal framework 
(such as the European Patent Office in Munich or the European University 
Institute in Florence). The first two agencies of this kind were established at 
Community level as early as 1975, but it is only in recent years that the further 
eight EC agencies have actually been established. Five of these new EC 
agencies were the main subject of investigation of the Robert Schuman Centre 
conference.
Article 235 EC Treaty is the legal base for almost all Council Regulations establishing an 




























































































The New European Agencies
PART I: The Emergence of the EC Agencies and their Present Functions 
1. Prehistory
Some of the issues to be addressed in an analysis of the formation of the 
five EC agencies included initial reasons for creating them, the actors who 
actually promoted them, and the duration of the legislative decision-making 
process to establish them. Informing this analysis was the larger question of 
whether the creation of the EC agencies was the result of piecemeal 
development or whether one can discover an overarching logic.
Indicators o f an Incremental Creation Process
This part of the conference found that although the regulations2 
establishing the five agencies came into force during 1993 and 19943, these 
establishment processes were not driven by central coordination within one of 
the main Community institutions, nor were the agencies seen within a broader 
context, for example, as an attempt to reform the institutional structure of the 
Community. The creation of each of the five agencies followed the same 
legislative procedure (consultation), but the actors involved, even if from the 
same EC institutions, were different in each case. The various proposals were 
advanced by different Commission Directorate Generals, discussed by the 
corresponding standing committees of the EP, and finally adopted by different 
Councils of Ministers.
The presentations showed that the original reasons for establishing the 
agencies varied (e.g. information deficits or need for coordinated reaction to 
external changes, such as recent political changes in Eastern and Central 
Europe and economic globalisation). The motives also reflected the demands of
2 07 L 120 of 11 May 1990 for the European Environment Agency; 07  L 131 of 23 May 1990 
for the European Training Foundation; 07  L36 of 12 February 1993 for the European 
Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction ; 07  L214 of 24 August 1993 for the 
European Agency for the Evaluation of Medicinal Products; 07  LI 1 of 14 January 1994 for 
the Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market.
3 For the coming into force of each Council regulation, the decision on the location of each of 
these agencies was a precondition. The location of various Community bodies and institutions 
was handled as a package and the Office for Harmonisation was located even before the 
respective regulation was adopted by the Council. For the decision taken by common 
agreement between the representatives of the government of the Member States, meeting at 
head of state and government level, on the location of the seats of certain bodies and 





























































































Alexander Kreher: Conference Synopsis
the respective policy areas of each of the agencies. In most cases, the various 
agencies had institutional or procedural forerunners. The forerunners included 
Technical Assistance Units (in the case of the European Training Foundation), 
the comitology system (two scientific committees4 in the case of the European 
Agency for the Evaluation of Medicinal Products), procedural mechanisms 
within the European Parliament5 and within the Commission (in the case of the 
European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction), or Community 
programmes (the CORINE programme6 in the case of the European 
Environment Agency) or activities which were undertaken at an 
intergovernmental level.7
The idea of setting-up an agency was also promoted by various political 
actors, such as by former French President Mitterrand8 (in the case of the 
European Agency for Drugs and Drug Addiction) or the former President of the 
Commission Jacques Delors,9 (in the case of the European Environment 
Agency).
Moreover, the prehistory of the five EC agencies also varied in respect of 
the point in time when certain agencies were first proposed and the length of 
time it took from the Commission’s proposal until adoption by the Council. 
With regards to the duration of the legislative decision-making process, it took, 
for example, in the case of the Office for Harmonisation, thirteen years - a first 
proposal was tabled by the Commission in 1980, but the Council regulation 
was not adopted until December 1993 - whereas it took only ten months in the 
case of the European Environment Agency (EEA) before the Council adopted 
the Commission proposal.
The European Parliament’s attitude towards establishing EC agencies 
was positive, and the various standing committees of the EP always supported 
the idea of creating an agency and generally supported the extension of the 
agencies’ tasks. Because of its purely consultative role in the legislative
4 Committee for Proprietary Medicinal Products (CPMP); Committee for Veterinary 
Medicinal Products (CVMP)
5 The European Parliament’s special Committee of Inquiry into the Drug Problem in the 
Member States of the Community which was set-up in 1985.
6 CORINE (COoRdination de l’INformation sur l’Environment) was an experimental project 
(1985-1990) to determine the need and methods for collecting and ensuring the consistency of 
information on the state of the environment and natural resources within the Community, see 
Council Decision 85/338/EEC, O JL I76 of 6 July 1985, p. 14.
7 The so-called Pompidou Group which was set-up in 1971, since incorporated into the 
Council of Europe.
8 On 3 October 1989, President Mitterrand sent a letter to his eleven fellow heads of state and 
government and to the President of the Commission, in which the first of seven priorities was 
“the setting up of a monitoring centre”.
9 For President Delors’ announcement in his speach to the European Parliament in January 




























































































The New European Agencies
decision-making processes, the EP’s proposed amendments have mostly been 
ignored by the Commission and Council. An exception was with the EEA, 
where the EP succeeded in ensuring that tasks that might potentially be adopted 
in the future were mentionned explicitly in the review article of the regulation 
establishing the EEA.
Thoughts about a Common Logic for the Creation of EC Agencies
Despite such evidence of a rather incremental establishment process, and 
repeated remarks during the conference that the agencies were created in 
answer to specific needs in various policy areas, arguments were presented 
concerning a possible overall explanation of the EC agencies. Professor Renaud 
Dehousse argued that the timing of the coming into force of the regulations 
points to an ex-post rationalisation. He argued that the establishment of EC 
agencies is a phenomenon which resulted from the political circumstances of 
the time, namely the Single Market project and its accompanying circumstances 
and the transformation processes in Eastern Europe. He stressed that the Single 
Market project is achieved not only through the adoption of over 300 
regulations. It also requires that the regulations be implemented, which 
necessitates a means by which to ensure uniform implementation and, at the 
same time, to retain the decentralised model for implementation. The creation 
of bodies on the Community level which are supposed to ensure cooperation 
among national administrations might be seen as a means to achieve this end.
Professor Giandomenico Majone’s opening paper also contains a rather 
general explanation for the establishment of EC agencies. According to 
Majone, their creation is due to the changing nature of policy-making at 
supranational level. Majone argues that the nature of today’s policy-making at 
national and Community levels demands credibility rather than traditional 
coercive means. The changing nature of Community policy-making asks for 
cooperation and compliance not only among the member states of the 
Community, but also between member states and the Community institutions. 
Therefore, he describes the establishment of EC agencies as a common 
understanding among the main political actors of the Community and asserts 
that these new agencies are one answer to the increased need for policy 
credibility.
2. Launching the Agencies
It was shown that the 1993 European Council decision on the location of 
the seats of the agencies did not mean that the agencies were to be fully 




























































































Alexander Kreher: Conference Synopsis
respective management boards to meet and start drafting a personal profile for 
the heads of their agency. Upon appointment by the management board, or, in 
the case of the Office for Harmonisation, nomination by the Council, most 
directors had to start from scratch, i.e. to select a suitable building and set-up a 
team of collaborators. The agency directors in Copenhagen, Lisbon, London 
and Turin were able to rely upon work done by institutional and/or procedural 
forerunners, such as the European Environment Agency Task Force, European 
Plans to combat drugs, the two scientific committees for proprietary and 
veterinary medicinal products, and the TEMPUS Technical Assistance Office. 
The heads of agencies described the present stage of each of their various 
agencies by focusing on issues such as governing structure, personnel, financial 
affairs and functional orientation.
Organisational and Governing Structure
Although the heads of the agencies generally enjoy operational autonomy 
in running their respective agencies, the founding regulations provide, in most 
cases, for a tripartite structure (management board,10 scientific committee,11 and 
director12).13 The presentations by the heads of agencies showed that the 
management boards and scientific committees are provided with different tasks 
in different agencies and that they also vary in institutional design. All five 
agencies are governed by a management board composed of representatives of 
the Member States and the Commission. The EP additionally designates “two 
scientific personalities particularly qualified in the respective field” to the 
management board in the cases of the European Environment Agency, the 
European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction, and the European 
Agency for the Evaluation of Medicinal Products. One Member State 
representative chairs the management board, with the exception of the 
European Training Foundation, where a representative from the Commission is 
chair.
The scope of the tasks of scientific committees within the agencies differ. They 
are also of differing sizes, but members of all agencies’ scientific committee(s) 
are experts in the respective fields of the agencies. These experts are appointed 
by the agency’s management board. The head of the agency is the legal 
representative of the agency and is usually appointed for a five-year period, 
renewable by the management board following a proposal by the Commission. 
An exception is the procedure for appointment of the Presidents and Vice-
10 Sometimes called “Administrative Board” or “Governing Board”.
11 Sometimes called “Advisory Forum”.
" Sometimes called “Executive Director” or “President”.




























































































The New European Agencies
Presidents of the Office for Harmonisation, who are appointed by the Council 
from a list of candidates prepared by the administrative board of the Office.
Personnel
Since the heads of agencies are the recruitment authorities, their 
recruiting procedures vary. Additionally, the presentations by the heads of 
agencies showed that the majority of persons on the agencies’ lists of posts 
have the status of temporary staff, to whom the same conditions of employment 
apply as to other employees of the Community.14 Only the Agency for the 
Evaluation of Medicinal Products provides no permanent posts at all, whereas 
other agencies do provide permanent posts at least in administration and 
personnel. The five agencies differ in size. In 1995, the five agencies were 
comprised of the following posts: 22 employees in the Lisbon agency, 47 in 
Copenhagen, 67 in London, 81 in Alicante, and 130 in Torino. In addition, 
budgetary provisions have been made in all cases for a number of auxiliary and 
interim staff. Commission services are responsible for the insurance and 
pensions of most agency staff.
Financial Affairs
With regard to financial affairs, the presentations referred to the amounts 
and sources of revenue, provisions for the establishment and implementation of 
the budget, and financial controls. The general Community budget for the 
financial year 1996 foresees 6.3 million ECU for the European Monitoring 
Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction, 14.58 millon ECU for the Office for 
Harmonisation, 14.5 million for the European Environment Agency, 16.5 
million ECU for the European Training Foundation and 14 million ECU for the 
European Agency for the Evaluation of Medicinal Products. The expenses of 
the five agencies are initially covered by the Community. After this initial 
period, agency revenue will come in varying degrees from two major sources: 
first, a subsidy from the Community, which is entered into the general budget 
of the EC, and, secondly, through payments (e.g. fees) for services provided by 
the agencies. Two agencies, the Office for Harmonisation and the European 
Agency for the Evaluation of Medicinal Products, aim to achieve financial self- 
sufficiency in the future.
14 It has proven to be an advantage for agencies to hire employees familiar with EC 
procedures (budget, personnel) because the agencies have to apply the Community “Financial 
Regulation” and their staff are subject to the Staff Regulations of officials of the European 
Communities, the Conditions of Employment of other servants of the European 





























































































Alexander Kreher: Conference Synopsis
As provided for in the Council regulations on establishing an agency, the 
agencies’ management boards or budget committee adopted the financial rules 
of each respective agency after consultation with the Court of Auditors and the 
Commission. With regard to financial control, it was shown that each agency is 
subject to external control by the European Court of Auditors, whereas the 
appointment of the internal controller is provided for differently in the 
establishment regulation for each agency. Some regulations provide that the 
internal controller must come from the Commission (in the case of the 
European Training Foundation and the Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug 
Addiction), others provide that the internal financial controller is to be 
appointed by the agency’s own management board or budget committee (in the 
case of the Agency for the Evaluation of Medicinal Products, the Office for 
Harmonisation and the Environment Agency).
Functions
In order to attain a clear understanding of the functions of the new EC 
agencies, it is important to be aware of the kinds of aims and tasks that are 
provided by the regulations establishing the agencies. The presentations’ 
subsequent discussions showed that there was considerable variety, not only in 
structural characteristics, but also with regard to the functions of the agencies. 
Presentations made by the heads of the different agencies showed that each 
agency performs various functions, some of which are common to all and 
others of which are performed uniquely by that particular agency. All five 
agencies are to ensure dialogue with, and between, national experts from 
Member States, as well as third countries and international organisations, 
through the establishment and management of networks. Furthermore, all five 
agencies are supposed to collect, produce and exchange information on their 
respective policy issues. They must provide this information to Community 
institutions, to regional, national and international organisations, as well as to 
the public.
In addition to these common tasks, all five agencies fulfill specific tasks. 
The European Agency for the Evaluation of Medicinal Products, for example, 
provides scientific expertise, through one of its two scientific committees 
which meet in the agency, to a regulatory committee of the Commission. On the 
basis of this advice, the European Commission gives or refuses authorisation to 
new medicinal products. The European Training Foundation provides technical 
assistance in the field of higher education and for the reform of vocational 
systems in Eastern and Central European countries. The Office for 
Harmonisation decides whether or not an application will be accepted to grant a 
European Trade Mark. The European Environment Agency and the European 




























































































The New European Agencies
comparability of already existing data by establishing common criteria to 
ensure greater uniformity in measurement methods.
Thus, although the EC agencies are supposed to fulfill various functions, 
such as management, information and advice provision, mediation, arbitration, 
administration, service-provision and/or adjudicative functions, we see that, at 
present, all of the EC agencies are far from US-style agencies, such as the US 
Environmental Protection Agency or the US Food and Drug Administration. 
These bodies have been given considerable regulatory decision-making powers 
which their European counterparts have not.
3. Reflections on the New EC Agencies by Representatives of the Main 
Institutions
The RSC also invited representatives of the main Community institutions 
to the conference with the intention of discovering their general attitude 
towards the establishment of EC agencies and learning about their experiences 
with them thus far. The representatives of the Council, Commission and 
European Parliament started their presentations by underlining the enormous 
work that has been done during the process of launching the agencies. The 
functional differentiation among the five EC agencies proposed by Mr. Ahrendt 
was not shared by all five heads of agency. Furthermore, all three 
representatives of the main Community institutions stressed in their 
presentations that they were taking into account the specificities of the 
agencies, but at the same time, the agencies have to comply with established 
Community procedures. In particular, the strict application of both the financial 
regulation and the personnel statute was a matter of discussion.
Although there may have been disagreements over the agencies 
functioning within the respective policy Directorates General of the 
Commission or EP standing committees, disagreements with various horizontal 
divisions of the Commission or EP (concerned with personnel, budget, and 
budget control) seemed to be more prominent during the agencies’ first year of 
existence. However, discussions showed that various efforts have been made to 
ensure that these will be tackled. The area of budgetary affairs served as one 
such example. In 1995, budget negotiations concerning the agencies’ budgets 
for the financial year 1996 ran into problems and the EP budget committee put 
agency money on reserve, i.e. this money was to be available only after the 
EP’s budget committee had released it. Mr. Brinkhorst admits in his 
contribution that this procedure causes problems for the agencies. He stresses 
that this move was prompted by the agencies’ financial behavior but that it also 
served the EP’s desire to strike back against the Commission and the Council 




























































































Alexander Kreher: Conference Synopsis
concerning the discharge procedure or the permissible origin of the agencies’ 
financial controller.
PART II: National Experiences with Agencies - Lessons for the New 
European Agencies?
This part of the conference was dedicated to experiences with agencies in 
Italy, the United States, the United Kingdom and Germany and aimed to 
discover the motivations for these states to establish agencies. It also sought to 
reveal how the establishment of agencies might advance the European venture 
and speakers were further asked to address problems that might potentially 
arise after their establishment.
Professor Guiliano Amato highlighted the fact that even during the 
various waves of agency creation in Italy, every agency had its own unique 
development, distinct from the others and, due to this, he claimed, that an 
overall explanation rationalising this development can be done only ex post 
facto. He argues that the reasons behind the creation of agencies varied in Italy. 
With regard to the role of some new Italian agencies, he shows that they 
exercise powers and functions that did not exist before the creation of these 
agencies.
In focusing on executive agencies in Britain, Professor Rod Rhodes 
showed that the so-called “next-step agencies”, established in the late 1980’s 
with the aim of carrying-out efficient operational management, were given 
functions previously carried-out by central departments and that the conferring 
of new tasks was not seen to occur in the UK in relation to these agencies. The 
UK government’s motivation for establishing these agencies was driven by an 
ex ante rationale, namely establishment within the framework of general 
administrative reforms and in an attempt to create private sector management in 
the public sector (i.e. their creation based on strategic planning). This was 
another point of difference between the reasoning behind agency creation in the 
UK versus the European Community approach. On the other hand, Rhodes 
shows that the next-step agencies do vary, like the EC agencies, with regard to 
funding and accounting arrangements.
In discussing the various types of US agencies (regulatory, 
administrative, executive, etc.) and the different reasons for their creation, 
Professor Martin Shapiro pointed-out that their institutional design was driven 
by one common rationale, namely, to prevent one of the two political parties 
from taking them over. In general M. Shapiro presented a rather pessimistic 
assessment of the independent or semi-independent agencies in the US and, 
perhaps due to this pessimism, he was particularly skeptical about the co­




























































































The New European Agencies
In his presentation on the German Federal Environment Agency, 
Heinrich von Lersner underlined the advantages of an information-providing 
agency composed mostly of scientific experts rather than administrators and 
stresses that such an agency must be economically and politically independent 
when publishing data. By looking comparatively at both the European and the 
German Environment Agencies, he highlights similarities in functional terms 
(information function), while showing, at the same time, their differences in 
governing structure. While the EEA is governed by its management board, the 
German agency is a decentralised body of the Federal Environment Ministry. 
Based on his experience as the former UBA chairman, and former member of 
the EEA’s management board from its inception, he sees the members of 
parliament (national and EP) as well as the public as important clients for 
information-providing agencies and, furthermore, depicted a positive future for 
the EEA.
Interestingly, the speakers in this part of the conference came to different 
conclusions regarding the exixtence of EC agencies. The speakers who focused 
on the UK and the US were rather pessimistic about the new EC agencies, 
whereas G. Amato and H. von Lersner focused more on their advantages, not 
only for the Community itself, but also for the Member States. In particular, the 
contributions by Rhodes and Shapiro argued that the establishment of agencies 
in the US and UK violated the principle of accountability.
In the discussions following the presentations, it became evident that the 
concepts of accountability, credibility, etc. are related to the various traditions 
of parliamentary states. It was argued by some conference participants that it is 
not particularly helpful to simply try to apply concepts developed in specific 
national contexts to the Community system. It was suggested that it would be 
better, instead, to begin with the political system of the EC at its present stage, 
which is often characterised by low visibility, low politicisation and indirect 
accountability. Given these Community characteristics, the establishment of EC 
agencies, in the views of some conference participants, is a clear step towards 
improving the present situation. The agencies will trigger debates which did not 
exist prior to their establishment and they will be more transparent than the 
present comitology system. It was G. Majone who emphasised the need for a 
concept of accountability adapted to the structures and needs of the EC that 
would also be applicable to EC agencies. He suggests adding a new category, 
the so-called professional accountability, to the two traditional understandings 
of accountability, i.e. financial and political accountability, which are linked to 




























































































Alexander Kreher: Conference Synopsis
Part III: Future Prospects for the European Agencies
After having learned about the agencies’ similarities and differences and 
about experiences with agencies within states, the third part of the conference 
was dedicated to the EC agencies’ future prospects. All the heads of agency 
first remarked that their first priority is to become fully operational, not only as 
an institution but also to ensure cooperation within the networks which each 
must launch and manage. It was generally agreed that in order to achieve their 
various objectives and in their particular structure, the new EC agencies have to 
be credible, not just in the eyes of the main Community institutions, but also in 
the eyes of various other clients, such as industry, national administrations, 
political parties and the public in general. In order to build-up a good 
reputation, it is necessary to withstand interference in day-to-day procedures by 
the main EC institutions and representatives of the member states within the 
management boards. It was mentioned as well that a high level of credibility of 
EC agencies is also in the interest of the main institutions, using agencies’ 
expertise as the grounds for decision-making.
The fact that the networks the agencies are supposed to establish and co­
ordinate is one of the key factors for the success of most of these agencies is 
underlined in Professor Karl-Heinz Ladeur’s contribution focusing on the 
European Environment Agency.15 However, his findings can equally be 
applyed to other EC agencies. He conceives of the network approach as a kind 
of dynamic, self-transforming interrelationship with knowledge-generating 
potential. Therefore, the networks are more than “just” a form of co-operation 
and co-ordination which ensures an exchange of information. One of the 
network approach advantages is that network participants, who are national 
experts with a high level of professionalisation in the respective area, have the 
possibility to model and develop in co-operation exactly how each agency’s 
aims and tasks can be fulfilled in spite of or as a consequence of different 
approaches within the member states’ administration. Furthermore, it was 
argued that the creation of these supra-national networks further complies with 
the subsidiarity principle.
Moreover, the agency networking might be useful in light of forthcoming 
association or accession agreements as well as with regard to Community 
cooperation as such. The establishing regulations explicitly provide for the 
possibility to include non-member countries and international organisations in 
the agencies’ network. So, the agencies’ networking with administrations in the 
non-member states might be seen as a supplement to the work already 
conducted by interparliamentary delegations of the European Parliament which




























































































The New European Agencies
look at matters affecting relations between the EU and non-EU countries. The 
latter relations can be supported or gain additional benefits from cooperation on 
the administrative side.
One of the main issues for future development was the question of 
whether or not the EC agencies should be entrusted with additional powers. 
This question has to be addressed in light of the forthcoming review of the 
Establishing Regulations. It is well known that within the European 
Parliament’s standing committees there were voices that wanted to confer 
monitoring, implementation and inspectorate powers on the agencies. Therefore 
many of the conference participants were impressed that both the directors of 
the European Environment Agency and the European Monitoring Centre for 
Drugs and Drug Addiction were emphatic that they did not want to take-on 
further tasks, such as inspectorate power, with the forthcoming review of the 
agencies’ tasks in 1996 and 1997.
Apart from the issue of whether or not to grant new powers to the 
agencies, a lot of discussion time was dedicated to the question of what impacts 
the EC agencies will have, with their present tasks, on the main Community 
institutions as well as on the member states. It was generally agreed that, 
although the agencies are not involved in the formal policy decision process, 
their work will certainly contribute to political initiatives as well as to ensuring 
the implementation of EC legislation by member states. The agencies will 
provide new information and this information may be used by the main policy­
making actors (the main institutions) in the policy-formulation process. The 
European Environment Agency’s Report on the Review on the Fifth 
Environmental Action Programme16 and the European Monitoring Center for 
Drugs and Drug Addiction’s Background Report for the Summit in Madrid are 
just two examples of this. Therefore, the agencies will lessen the tendency to 
burden the main Community institutions with multiple, and sometimes even 
inconsistent, objectives. Additionally, it was argued that the existence of the 
new EC agencies may serve as an impetus for reorganising structures and 
procedures which have become politicised, and, therefore, might also be helpful 
in inducing or accelerating various ongoing discussions with regard to the 
Community’s financial, personnel and administrative procedures.
The existence and development of the agencies certainly has implications 
for national administrative systems in the respective policy areas. The member 
states are obliged to establish national focal points which co-ordinate the
16 European Environment Agency: Environment in the European Union 1995 - Report for the 




























































































Alexander Kreher: Conference Synopsis
preparation and transmission of the information needed to the respective 
agency. Apart from the need to have a certain administrative structure, the EC 
agency approach ensures that the national experts will meet within the agency 
on a regular basis. Organised networking by the agencies could "europeanize" 
the national experts coming to the agencies, who will then, in light of 
commonly agreed standards or information deficits at Community level, force 
or re-organise their national systems, if necessary, to deliver needed 
information, based on the same measures and standards. The existence of the 
European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction, as described by 
Georges Estievenart, even influenced the establishment of an independent 
agency in France in this area. In the cases of the Office for Harmonisation and 
the European Agency for the Evaluation of New Medicinal Products, national 
authorities will certainly face competition in the near future. Both agencies 
deliver services to industry, allowing industry to decide whether to go to the 
national authorities or directly to European level, which can provide 






























































































Through the examination of the creation and the first steps of five of the 
new EC agencies, the Robert Schuman Centre conference has attempted to 
enrich understanding of EC agencies in general. Considering and discussing 
experiences of various agencies on a national level has shown the different 
motivations for establishment which can exist and has demonstrated that no 
state strategy can provide a suitable framework for reference and analysis of EC 
agencies. The conference underlined the need to start any analysis of the 
development of EC agencies within the framework of the particular 
characteristics of the Community’s political system.
If we describe the European Union as a system of multi-level 
governance, it can be argued that the establishment of new EC agencies within 
this political system might reflect a change in the pattern of EC governance. In 
comparison to former Community approaches, such as harmonisation and 
mutual recognition, the EC agency approach ensures institutionalised 
interaction between experts from member states, third countries and 
international organisations within the confines of an agency. The agency 
approach does not change the division of powers within the Community. It is 
still the Council which makes the final decision on the establishing regulations 
which provide the aims and tasks of the respective agencies and representatives 
of member states are represented on the management boards of the agencies.
The conference has found that the main element of the change in pattern 
of EC policy is the establishment and management of networks in a formal 
structure (agency) within a policy area. This ensures the fulfilment of tasks 
which, to date, have remained undone, as well as ensuring the implementation 
of new Community approaches. The result of this change will be a sometimes 
co-operative and sometimes conflict-ridden collaboration among national and 
international experts that produce expertise to be used by various political 
actors for policy-formulation, policy-evaluation and the management and 
implementation of Community programmes and procedures. In comparison to 
its functional alternatives, such as the EC comitology system, national or 
international procedures, the EC agency approach will provide greater 
transparency and could, therefore, increase the credibility of Community policy 



























































































The New European Agencies
While the agency approach provides clear opportunities for the 
development of EC regulatory policy-making and for European integration as a 
whole, it must also be acknowledged that this form of governance, in the sense 
of changing patterns of fulfilment of tasks, has various preconditions for 
success. At the outset, the creation and guarantee of an agency’s credibility is 
probably the most important, but agencies’ credibility depends on the 
reputation of the participants and their commitment to problem-solving and 
political independence. Moreover, it is important that the EC agencies are able 
to enjoy sufficient autonomy (financial, administrative, political) and to resist 
pressures from interest groups and member states, as well as from the main EC 
institutions, in their day-to-day management.
Should the agencies, which at present mostly provide information and 
services, be entrusted with further tasks, such as the power of formal decision­
making or inspectorate powers, as demanded, for example, by sectors of the EP 
and also provided for in the Commission’s proposal for establishing a European 
Agency for Veterinary and Phytosanitary Inspection1? Any answer concerning 
this issue certainly requires further discussion. The conference has shown not 
only that such reasoning should take into account the functional logic of the EC 
agencies and their political context, but also the perception that the present 
heads of agencies do not behave as budget maximisers, eager to get more 
power, as suggested in some literature about bureaucracies. Issues such as 
standardised recruitment and promotion procedures, standardised financial 
regulations, internal financial control or potential transfer and promotion across 
agencies and other Community institutions are but a few examples which must 
be discussed from a functional point of view and all participating actors should 
work to ensure that these issues do not become politicised.
Knowledge about EC agencies and the recognition of their European 
specificity is not only valuable per se, but also illuminates the discussions on 
reform of the Community’s institutional setting. The EC agency topic is, thus, 
an important constituent of further discussions not only on EU institutions and 
bodies but also in the on-going debate about the changes within the 
administrative systems of member states.2 Such an understanding may also 
inform debate on the wider field of EU regulatory policy-making characteristics 
and approaches to ensuring active co-operation during the various phases of the
1 See COM(96) 223 final from 29.05.1996.
2 See Schwarze, Jürgen: (Hrsg.): Das Verwaltungsrecht unter europäischem Einfluß - Zur 





























































































Alexander Kreher: Concluding Remarks
policy cycle (information-gathering; policy-formulation, decision-making; 
implementation, evaluation). The Robert Schuman Centre will certainly 
continue, as it has begun, to accompany the development of EC agencies in a 
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